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Stellingen 
1. Verzekeringen zijn in principe 'socially beneficial', wat niet wil zeggen dat dit ook zonder 
meer voor het subsidiëren van verzekeringen geldt. 
Dit proefschrift 
2. Het gelijkstellen van een opbrengstverzekering en een verzekering waarbij 
schadevergoeding slechts door hoeveelheid 'getriggered' wordt, is een in de praktijk veel 
gemaakte denkfout. 
Dit proefschrift 
3. Het feit dat de bevoegdheid tot het nemen van bestrijdingsmaatregelen in geval van een 
uitbraak van een besmettelijke dierziekte bij de overheid ligt en de private sector in 
toenemende mate de verantwoordelijkheid neemt om de geleden schade te dragen, vraagt 
om een optimale afstemming tussen beide partijen. 
Dit proefschrift 
4. De door Milgrom en Roberts (1992) slechts zijdelings genoemde optie om problemen 
rond 'moral hazard' te reduceren door 'agents' uit te sluiten en 'principals' zelf hun 
contracten te laten regelen, biedt, in de vorm van Onderlinge Waarborg Maatschappijen, 
belangrijke mogelijkheden voor het afdekken van 'nieuwe' risico's in de landbouw. 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
5. Modellen voor de berekening van de schade van een uitbraak van een besmettelijke 
dierziekte zouden moeten worden uitgebreid met een parameter voor emotionele schade. 
6. Hoewel 'public-private partnerships' met betrekking tot het afdekken van catastrofale 
risico's in de landbouw veel 'opportunities' hebben, geeft een volledige SWOT-analyse 
toch een beter beeld. 
7. Het is voor de veehouderijsector zeker op termijn een goede zaak dat de financiële rol van 
de overheid bij besmettelijke dierziekten afneemt. 
8. De validiteit van oma's spreuk "Een mens lijdt het meest door het lijden dat hij vreest" is, 
bij groot-effect-kleine-kans risico's in de landbouw, discutabel. 
9. 'Happiness is not a state to arrivé at, but, rather, a marmer of travelling.' 
Bron onbekend. 
10. Het streven naar erkenning van Limburgs als taal gaat voorbij aan de nuanceverschillen 
per strekkende kilometer. 
11. De tijdwinst van beperkt woon-werk verkeer wordt meer dan teniet gedaan door de 
uitbreiding van het huishoudelijk takenpakket die hiervan het gevolg is. 
12. Het verschil tussen de privaatrechtelijke sector en de universiteit is kleiner dan over het 
algemeen wordt aangenomen. 
13. Onze taal verengelst. 
Deze stellingen 
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ABSTRACT 
Insurance as a risk management tool for European agriculture 
Verzekering als een instrument voor risicomanagement in de Europese landbouw 
Meuwissen, M.P.M., 2000 
The risk environment of farmers is constantly changing; price and production risks, for 
instance, are increasing, and financial compensations from governments for catastrophic 
events, such as floods, are decreasing. In this context, the objective of this thesis is to study 
the appropriateness of insurance as a risk management tool for farmers to deal with the 'new' 
risks emerging in agriculture. The research includes a literature study of the principles, 
opportunities and problems of risk-sharing strategies in general. Furthermore, an empirical 
study of farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management is carried out. This is done by a 
questionnaire survey among a large sample of livestock farmers in the Netherlands. A 
feasibility study is carried out to some form of income insurance for European crop and 
livestock farmers. Key concepts in income insurance are illustrated by a Monte-Carlo 
simulation model. Yield data used in the model originate from a large panel data set with 
individual farm yield data from 49 regions in Europe. A second feasibility study refers to a 
farm business interruption insurance for livestock epidemics. Insight into the size of risk is 
obtained by a Monte-Carlo simulation model. For the financial part of this model, first a 
detailed model for calculating financial consequences of epidemics is developed. Based on the 
literature and the empirical study, it is concluded that insurance schemes provide good 
opportunities for farmers to deal with 'new' risks in agriculture: insurance schemes are in 
principle advantageous to individual farmers and to society as a whole. Moreover, farmers 
already perceive insurance as an important strategy to manage risks. Among various possible 
forms of income insurance, only revenue insurance is considered feasible because of 
asymmetric information. Furthermore, (also because of asymmetric information) revenue 
insurance is only considered applicable to field crops. A business interruption insurance for 
livestock epidemics is regarded as feasible if aspects such as farmers' and governments' 
influence on the size of risk are properly taken into account. Further research is required to 
actually develop and implement the insurance schemes. 
Ph.D.-Thesis, Department of Social Sciences, Farm Management Group, Wageningen 
University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The risk environment of farmers is changing, in part due to a changing role of the 
government—less intervention on the one hand, more regulation on the other—(Ritson and 
Harvey, 1997; Harwood et al., 1999) and an increasing industrialisation of agriculture 
(Boehlje and Lins, 1998). Examples of the changed environment include increased price risks, 
at least for European farmers currently producing under the price support programs of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and increased production risks due to more regulated use of 
medicines and vaccines, such as restrictions on the use of antibiotics and vaccines for 
epidemic diseases respectively. Changes are also occurring in relation to risks of catastrophic 
events such as floods. In the past, farmers have often been compensated for such losses by 
governments but now there is increasing pressure to find private market solutions. As a result 
of the increasing industrialisation of agriculture, required levels of investment increase and 
farmers become more and more dependent on changing market circumstances. 
Taking more risks can increase a farmer's expected profit. However, farmers (like most 
people) are generally risk averse. They therefore adopt a range of strategies to manage the 
risks they face. These strategies include on-farm measures such as diversification or selecting 
less risky production methods, as well as strategies for sharing risk with others (Hardaker et 
al., 1997). A well-known risk management strategy whereby farmers can share risks with 
others is to buy insurance for particular types of risk (Rejda, 1998; Harrington and Niehaus, 
1999). The current study is directed towards insurance to see whether this risk management 
tool is suited to deal with the 'new' risks with which agriculture is confronted. 
1.2 Scope and definition 
More specifically, the objectives of this study are to provide insight into: 
1. Principles, opportunities, and problems of risk-sharing strategies in general; 
2. Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management; 
3. The feasibility of farm income insurance; and 
4. Losses from livestock epidemics, and the feasibility of farm business interruption 
insurance. 
Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management (objective 2) are analysed for livestock 
farmers in the Netherlands. Income insurance (objective 3) is studied because it may comprise 
coverage of various ('new') risks into one overall concept (see for example Goodwin and Ker, 
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1998; Skees et al., 1998). The risk of livestock epidemics and a business interruption 
insurance for livestock epidemics (objective 4) is studied separately because of the systemic 
character of the risk (Berentsen et al., 1992; Miranda and Glauber, 1997). Livestock 
epidemics are studied in a European context and with special attention for Classical Swine 
Fever (CSF). 
13 Outline of the thesis 
The outline of the thesis follows the order of the objectives presented above. Chapter 2 
addresses the major principles and pros and cons of risk-sharing strategies. Various examples 
of risk-sharing strategies are listed. Survey data of Dutch livestock farmers on their 
perceptions of risk and risk management are used in this chapter to illustrate the 'current state 
of affairs' of farmers' attitudes towards strategies of risk sharing. 
Chapter 3 studies the survey data in more detail. Besides insight into farmers' perceptions 
of risk and risk management, the chapter also provides insight into characteristics of the farms 
and farmers that relate to these perceptions. Implications of the results for people working in 
the field of risk and risk management are addressed in a 'future outlook'. 
Chapter 4 discusses the feasibility of income insurance concepts for European crop and 
livestock farmers. Aspects determining the attractiveness of such insurance to farmers and 
insurers are addressed. A Monte-Carlo simulation model is used to illustrate some key 
concepts in income insurance. Yield data used in the model originate from a large panel data 
set with individual farm yield data from six European countries. 
The chapters 5 and 6 deal with livestock epidemics. In Chapter 5 a model, entitled EpiLoss 
(£p/demic Losses), is presented to allow a financial analysis of a CSF-epidemic. Financial 
consequences are calculated for affected parties, including governments (EU and national), 
farms, and related industries in the production chain. The model is applied to the 1997/98 
CSF-epidemic in the Netherlands." 
In Chapter 6, a Monte-Carlo simulation model is presented that simulates annual losses 
from CSF-epidemics. The model consists of three sub-models. Besides EpiLoss (Chapter 5), 
these are models on the frequency of epidemics (Horst et al., 1999) and the epidemiological 
extent of epidemics (Jalvingh et al., 1999; Nielen et al., 1999). As an illustrative example, the 
integrated simulation model is applied to the southern part of the Netherlands, a very densely 
populated swine area and the centre of the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic. For various scenarios, the 
model generates estimates of expected annual losses and of the ranges around these expected 
values. This information is used as a starting point to discuss the feasibility of farm business 
interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever. 
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The General Discussion (Chapter 7) addresses issues found to be crucial when discussing 
insurance for 'new' risks and discusses the further applicability of income insurance and 
business interruption insurance. 
A summary of the study is provided at the end of the thesis along with the main 
conclusions.1 
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2. SHARING RISKS IN AGRICULTURE: PRINCIPLES AND EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS* 
Abstract 
The risk environment of farmers is changing. In this chapter, risk management strategies such 
as insurance in which risks are shared with others are studied to see whether such strategies 
provide opportunities for farmers to deal with the new risks with which agriculture is 
confronted. From the study it is concluded, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, that 
risk-sharing strategies provide such opportunities. From a theoretical perspective, because 
risk-sharing tools are in principle advantageous to both individual farmers and society as a 
whole. From an empirical perspective, because farmers already perceive risk-sharing 
strategies (especially insurance) as important strategies to manage risks. The chapter is 
concluded by areas for further research, among others with respect to risk-sharing strategies 
for price risks and epidemic livestock disease risks. 
2.1 Introduction 
The risk environment of farmers is changing, in part due to a changing role of the 
government—less intervention on the one hand, more regulation on the other—(Zulauf et al., 
1996; Ritson and Harvey, 1997; Harwood et al., 1999) and an increasing industrialisation of 
agriculture (Boehlje and Lins, 1998). Examples of the changed environment include increased 
price risks—at least for European farmers currently producing under the price support 
programs of the Common Agricultural Policy—and increased production risks due to more 
regulated use of medicines, such as restrictions on the use of antibiotics. Changes are also 
occurring in relation to risks of catastrophic events such as floods. In the past, farmers have 
often been compensated for such losses by governments but now there is increasing pressure 
to find private market solutions. As a result of the industrialisation of agriculture, Boehlje and 
Lins (1998) state that farmers are increasingly exposed to so-called contractual or relationship 
risks. 
Paper by Meuwissen, M.P.M., Hardaker, J.B., Huirne, R.B.M. and Dijkhuizen, A.A., 
submitted for publication to Agricultural Economics. 
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Taking more risks can increase a farmer's profit. However, farmers (like most people) are 
generally risk averse. They therefore adopt a range of strategies to manage the risks they face. 
These strategies include on-farm measures such as diversification or selecting less risky 
production methods, as well as strategies for sharing risk with others. A well-known risk 
management strategy whereby farmers can share risks with others is to buy insurance for 
specified risks (Rejda, 1998). 
Given the changing risk environment farmers need to find ways to cope with the new risks 
they are confronted with. In this context this chapter studies the pros and cons of risk 
management strategies in which risks are shared with others. The chapter starts with a short 
introduction on risk. In section 2.3, principles behind the sharing of risks are discussed and 
some examples of risk-sharing strategies are listed. Related issues with respect to asymmetric 
information and systemic risks are also discussed, as well as the point that the use of risk-
sharing strategies itself can also lead to the introduction of new risks. Section 2.4 focuses on 
the benefits of risk sharing, first from a farmer's point of view and then for the society as a 
whole. In section 2.5, empirical results give insight into the perceived importance of various 
sources of risk and risk management strategies for a particular sample of farmers. In section 
2.6, conclusions and identified issues for further research are presented. 
2.2 Scope and definition of risk 
Throughout the thesis, risk is interpreted as 'uncertainty of outcomes'. This interpretation 
includes two generally used interpretations of risk, namely risk as the chance of a bad 
outcome and risk as the variability of outcomes (Young, 1984). 
Risks can be classified into various types of risk. For most agricultural risks the 
classification of Hardaker et al. (1997) can be used, who distinguish between business risks 
and financial risks. Business risks include production risks, which come from the 
unpredictable nature of the weather and uncertainty about the performance of crops and 
livestock, and price risks, which refer to uncertainty of prices of farm inputs and outputs. 
Business risks furthermore include personal risks (for example illness or death of people who 
operate the farm) and institutional risk, which originates from uncertainty about the impact on 
farm profits of governments' policies. The other type of risk, financial risk, refers to the risks 
related to the way a farm is financed. The distinguished categories of risks are not 
independent i-e. they can influence each other. Institutional risk factors, for example, can 
influence all the other sources of risk. 
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2.3 Sharing risks 
2.3.1 Principles of risk sharing 
Risk sharing involves a contract in which risk is shared. This risk-sharing characteristic 
distinguishes the contract from other forms of contract. In a rental contract, such as a lease 
contract, the farmer pays a rent to the lessor to use the resource, but has to bear all the risk 
(Stiglitz, 1974). In a risk-shifting contract, for example a fixed forward price contract, the 
risk-shifter pays a kind of premium to the risk-taker and receives in return a guaranteed price. 
The sharing of risks is based on the concept of pooling. The principle of pooling is that by 
combining independent losses in a pool, the expected amount of losses stays the same, but 
variance decreases (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). In addition, if the pool consists of large 
numbers of independent risks, relative variation of actual loss from average loss further 
decreases (law of large numbers; Rejda, 1998) and the party that pools the risk is able to more 
accurately predict average losses. 
2.3.2 Examples of risk-sharing strategies 
Risk-sharing tools differ in the type of risk shared (for example price versus production risk), 
the party with whom the risk is shared (for example a colleague farmer versus a contractor), 
and whether the risk is shared directly or indirectly (for example production versus insurance 
contract). Major forms of risk-sharing contracts include: 
1. Share tenancy (also called sharecropping or share lease). Share tenancy is a land lease 
under which the rent paid by the tenant is a contracted percentage of the value of output 
per period of time. As a rule, the landowner provides land and the tenant provides labour; 
other inputs may be provided by either party (Cheung, 1969). Share tenancy is less widely 
used nowadays having been replaced in many cases by the wage system on the one hand 
and full land rental contracts on the other hand (Stiglitz, 1974). Reasons indicated by 
Stiglitz for this decline include the development of capital markets (providing landlords 
and workers with other opportunities to diversify their portfolio), and the increasing capital 
intensity and technological change in agriculture, implying a need for stronger incentives 
(rental system) or stronger supervision (wage system). 
2. Production contracts. Production contracts typically give the contractor considerable 
control over the production process. Contractors enter production contracts to ensure 
timeliness and quality of commodity deliveries. For farmers, a guaranteed market access, 
ensured access to capital and lower variability of incomes are important reasons to enter 
such contracts. Production contracts are widely used in the broiler industry, and are 
7 
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becoming increasingly important in egg and hog industries (Harwood et al., 1999; 
Henessey and Lawrence, 1999). 
3. Marketing contracts. Marketing contracts are agreements between a buyer and a producer 
that set a price and/or outlet for a commodity before harvest or before the commodity is 
ready to be marketed. The producer usually remains fully responsible for the management 
decisions during the production process. The most commonly used marketing contract is 
the fixed forward price contract.2 With this type of contract farmers can completely 
eliminate the price risk. Other forms of marketing contracts do share the price risk between 
the buyer and seller of the contract (Harwood et al., 1999). 
4. Insurance. With insurance, an insured typically pays a premium to the insurer and receives 
an indemnity payment from the insurer once an insured loss occurs. The insurer is the party 
that pools the risks, but risks are still shared among the insureds. This sharing of risks 
among insureds manifests itself by additional premium assessments or dividend payments 
at the end of the policy period, and/or by premium adjustments at the beginning of the next 
policy period, all depending on the actual loss experience of the insurance pool (Rejda, 
1998). Insurance is widely available for personal risks (for example life insurance) and for 
a number of production risks such as hail (Hardaker et al., 1997). 
5. Financial leverage. Financial leverage is defined as the use of debt capital and other fixed-
obligation financing relative to the use of equity capital (Robison and Barry, 1987). 
Lenders pool the risk of loan defaults over many clients. 
6. External equity financing. Equity investors receive a share of the returns of the firm in 
which they invested equity (Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989). Investors pool the risk of the 
firm making low or negative returns over a diversified portfolio. Irwin et al. (1988) argue 
that investments in farm real estate are potentially attractive to investors because the 
performance of such investments is not highly correlated with the performance of a share 
market portfolio. However, the availability of equity financing in general production 
agriculture is limited because of, among others, the principal-agent problem and high 
monitoring costs (Collins and Bourn, 1986; Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989). Crane and 
Leatham (1995) argue that opportunities exist for wider use of external equity financing in 
agriculture by means of profit and loss-sharing contracts. 
2 Hedging on futures markets is rather similar to a fixed forward price contract, except for 1) futures contracts 
are standardised contracts that are widely traded (i.e. prices are more competitively determined), and 2) under a 
futures contract, delivery of the commodity normally does not take place (Hardaker et al, 1997). 
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2.3.3 Asymmetric information 
If a pool consists of large numbers of independent risks, the party that pools the risk is able 
more accurately to predict average losses (section 2.3.1) and the amount of money (for 
example an insurance premium) needed for dealing with these losses. Asymmetric 
information between the risk-sharing parties (such as between insurer and insured, or lender 
and client), however, can lead to established premiums being insufficient to cover the losses 
(Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
Asymmetric information includes moral hazard and adverse selection. These 
understandings are explained here for insurance. In case of adverse selection, exposure units 
most at risk buy more insurance than others but the extent to which this happens may not be 
known a priori to the insurer. With moral hazard, exposure units change their behaviour in a 
manner not predicted by the insurer after having bought an insurance (for example by 
becoming more careless) (Arrow, 1996). Ways to reduce problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard include: 
1. Underwriting. Before a risk-sharing contract is brought into effect, both parties try to get 
insight into each other's risk. In case of insurance, insurers generally impose an obligation 
of disclosure in the insurance contract, requiring the insured to tell them of any factors that 
may lead to above normal risk (if the insured fails to disclose relevant facts, the contract 
can be invalidated). Based on such information, insureds are classified and premiums are 
differentiated for different classes of risk (Rejda, 1998). Related to the use of debt capital, 
significant loan losses in the U.S. in the 1980s have led to agricultural lenders increasingly 
emphasising the credit quality and the management of the credit risk in their loan 
portfolios. This has resulted in a growing use of risk-adjusted interest rates, differential 
loan limits, security requirements, and loan supervision requirements (Miller et al., 1993). 
Considerable transaction costs can be involved in such measures (Arrow, 1996). 
2. Contract specifications. A risk-sharing contract can include 'rules of behaviour'. For 
sharecropping Stiglitz (1974) states that "a contract may not only specify the hours of 
labour to be provided, but also something about effort, degree of control, and amount of 
supervision". Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state in a more general context that monitoring 
and verification are remedies against moral hazard. As with underwriting, considerable 
costs may be involved. 
3. Deductibles. With deductibles, insureds pay some specified amount of losses themselves, 
which reduces fraud and encourages loss prevention (Rejda, 1998). By using deductibles, 
the extent to which farmers can share risks is reduced. In this regard Arrow (1992) argues 
that, if without the use of such tools as deductibles there would be a complete absence of 
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risk-shifting, it might be best to use the tools and have at least some shifting of risk.3 
4. Indemnification based on some objective and transparent index. Using an index reduces 
adverse selection since information regarding an index is more generally available and 
more reliable. It reduces moral hazard, because an individual farmer cannot influence the 
height of the index. It furthermore reduces transactions costs, because losses need not to be 
verified per individual. Indemnification based on an index, however, provides only 
sufficient risk protection to individual farmers if an index can be found that is highly 
correlated with farmers' loss experiences (Miranda, 1991). 
5. Local organisations. Risk-sharing pools that are locally oriented are likely to face less 
severe problems of asymmetric information (i.e. lower costs of monitoring and 
verification), because the risk-sharing parties have a more direct relationship with each 
other (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). However, local pools have more difficulties in dealing 
with systemic risks (see for example Anderson and Hazell, 1994). 
If problems of asymmetric information are severe and cannot be dealt with (at acceptable 
costs), sharing the risk becomes inefficient. 
2.3.4 Systemic risks 
Another important issue when considering the pooling of risks is the extent to which risks are 
stochastically independent. Pooling independent risks reduces the variance of losses (section 
2.3.1). For example, if systemic (i.e. positively correlated) risks are pooled, the variance of 
losses decreases less. In pooling completely systemic risks, variance does not decrease at all 
(Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). Risks that are completely systemic, such as prices and 
interest rates, can be efficiently dealt with on exchange markets. The so-called 'in-between 
risks' (risks that are not completely independent nor completely systemic; Skees and Barnett, 
1999) are more problematical. Examples include droughts affecting crop yields over a 
substantial area and widespread epidemics of livestock diseases. Organisations that pool such 
risks face higher costs of pooling because of the need to hold substantial reserves in case 
systemic events occur (Doherty, 1997). 
In order to prevent such increases in the costs of pooling, governments are often financially 
involved in insurance schemes for 'in-between' risks. The Standard Reinsurance Agreement 
for crop insurance in the U.S. is an example in which governments subsidise the insurance 
premiums as well as administrative costs and reinsurance (Goodwin and Ker, 1998). In 
general, it is argued that such government involvement is more efficient than ad hoc disaster 
3 Arrow regards insurance as a risk-shifting tool. In this thesis, insurance is considered as a risk-sharing tool with 
the insurer as intermediary. According to Vaughan and Vaughan (1996) both definitions are useful. The first 
reflects the individual's perspective, the second that of society. 
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assistance for such events as widespread floods or droughts, but still involves inefficiencies 
(Barnett, 1999). Skees and Barnett (1999) propose some—more market-based—solutions to 
deal with these inefficiencies. Furthermore, developments in capital markets, notably the 
increasing 'securitisation' of reinsurance, provide opportunities to reduce the need for 
government involvement in insuring risks with systemic characteristics in the future (Jaffee 
and Russell, 1997). 
2.3.5 Introducing new risks 
Risk-sharing contracts themselves can lead to the introduction of new risks. Related to 
financial leverage, Hardaker et al. (1997) illustrate that an increase in the financial leverage in 
financing a farm magnifies the impact on net income of variability of farm returns. 
New risks related to production contracts include the risk of contractors requiring upgrades 
to buildings and other irrfrastructure that are unexpected to the farmer, and furthermore the 
uncertainty about prolongation of a contract (Boehlje and Lins, 1998; Harwood et al., 1999). 
In relation to marketing contracts, farmers may not be able to fulfil the quality or quantity 
requirements of a contract. Poor weather for example can lead to low yields, and producers 
who contracted a large proportion of their crop need to buy 'replacement' crop at an uncertain 
cash price to meet the terms of delivery on their forward contract (Quiggin and Anderson, 
1979). 
If the costs related to such new risk are larger than the benefits of using the strategy, 
sharing the risk becomes inefficient. 
2.4 What are the benefits of sharing risks? 
2.4.1 For the farmer 
In general, it is assumed that farmers are risk averse, i.e. they are willing to pay a premium to 
reduce exposure to risk. If farmers can trade away part of the risks on their farm at an 
acceptable cost4, the utility of the farmer will increase (Arrow, 1996; Harrington and Niehaus, 
1999). 
Which risks are shared by the farmer? 
Although sharing risks can increase a farmer's utility, (s)he is not likely to share all risks. It is 
(largely) up to each individual farmer to decide which risks—and which part of them—to 
4 The expected value of a risk-sharing contract is in principle negative due to such aspects as transaction costs. 
For an individual, the expected value can only be positive in case of asymmetric information (section 2.3.3). 
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share. Factors that may influence this decision include a farmer's degree of risk aversion, the 
costs involved in risk sharing, the relative size of a risk, the correlation of the risk with other 
risks, other sources of indemnity, a farmer's perception of the nature of risk, and a farmer's 
income and wealth (Barry et al., 1995; Hardaker et al., 1997; Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
Also important for the farmer's decision about which risks to share and which to bear is 
that this decision is part of the overall risk management problem facing of the farmer of 
selecting a risk-efficient portfolio of on-farm and off-farm risky instruments. Thus, for 
example, a decision about whether to insure against a particular risk, and if so to what extent, 
cannot properly be made without reference to other risky choices. 
The above statements imply that there are no universal rules about which risks to share and 
which not. Only in a few cases is it not completely up to the farmer what risks are managed 
and by what type of strategies. For example, lenders may require that farmers use one or more 
risk management strategies, such as crop insurance and forward contracting, when a loan is 
contracted (Harwood et al., 1999). 
2.4.2 For society 
There are also a number of potential advantages of sharing risks from the point of view of a 
society as a whole. 
1. If two individuals freely enter a contract, then both of them must be better off (i.e. there 
must be an increase in utility for both). The sum of many such contracts makes society 
better off (unless other individuals are injured in some way) (Arrow, 1992). 
2. The possibility of sharing risk permits individuals to engage in risky activities which they 
would not otherwise undertake. That way, the expected return to society is increased over 
what would prevail if individual agents were constrained to accept only those risks they 
could afford to bear themselves (Arrow, 1992; Hardaker et al., 1997s; Rejda, 1998). 
3. If farmers can trade away part of their risks, so that they can move closer—not fully 
because there are costs involved—to the point of expected profit maximisation, the result is 
a more socially desirable allocation of resources (Myers, 1988). 
4. If farmers need to put less effort into on-farm methods of avoiding risks, they may well be 
able to use their resources more efficiently, again implying greater overall efficiency in 
resource use (Hardaker et al., 1997; Rejda, 1998). 
5. Trading away risks is likely to result in more stable farmers' incomes. More stable incomes 
are likely to lead to more stable expenditures on farm inputs and family consumption, 
thereby implying more stability for rural businesses with possible flow-on benefits for the 
5 Hardaker et al. (1997) raise the issues mentioned in this section in a different context: a context in which they 
discuss why governments intervene in agriculture. 
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society as a whole, for example via more rural employment. Moreover, it seems likely that 
more stable farm incomes may contribute to viability of rural towns since there appears to 
be a degree of irreversibility in the provision of retail and service activities in such 
communities. A downturn in farm incomes and hence in spending by farm families leads to 
the closure of some local businesses and to the withdrawal of government and 
commercially-provided services, yet these lost facilities are seldom fully replaced when 
farmers' incomes recover later (Hardaker et al., 1997). 
6. More stable rural incomes for farmers (and other rural businesses) mean more reliable 
repayment of loans. That should be reflected in improved access to credit and/or lower 
borrowing costs, implying increased productive investment in the rural sector (Hazell, 
1992; Hardaker etal., 1997). 
7. If farmers are able to trade away (part of) the disastrous risks they face, the resilience (or 
sustainability) of farms increases, which may mean less human, animal and environmental 
distress after the occurrence of disasters such as severe floods or droughts (Anderson and 
Hazell, 1994). This, however, is only true if moral hazard is dealt with properly. 
Otherwise, farmers may, for example, pay less attention to the prevention of disease 
outbreaks, leading to an increase in the number of disasters occurring. Or, farmers may, for 
example, pay less attention to their stock during droughts, leading to more—instead of 
less—animal distress. 
2.5 Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management: empirical results 
To be able to better assess the possible role of risk-sharing tools for farmers in the light of a 
changing risk-environment, insight is needed into the 'current state of affairs'. To this end, a 
survey of attitudes to risk sharing of Dutch livestock farmers was carried out. 
The mail questionnaire survey was carried out in 1997 among 2700 Dutch livestock 
farmers. The survey included questions about the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
farmers, and about their perceptions of the importance of various sources of risk and risk 
management strategies (both on-farm strategies and strategies in which risks are shared with 
others). Perceptions were measured on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (not relevant) to 5 
(very relevant) (see for example Churchill, 1995). 
Results presented here are based on 647 returned questionnaires.6 Of the 647 farms 
included in the analyses, 376 farms (i.e. 58 per cent) were classified as cattle farms (99.4 per 
cent of these farms were dairy farms), 170 farms (i.e. 26 per cent) as pig farms, 20 farms (i.e. 
6 In total, 737 questionnaires were returned, but small farms (< 20 NGE) and farms in which livestock accounted 
for less than one-third of the total NGE were excluded from the analyses. NGE is a Dutch standard of farm size 
(LEI/CBS, 1998). As an indication: 20 NGE equals 14.6 dairy cows, 74 sows, or 438 fattening pigs. 
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3 per cent) as poultry farms, and 81 farms (i.e. 13 per cent) as mixed livestock farms. 
2.5.1 Sources of risk 
In total, 22 different sources of risk were considered. Table 2.1 groups the sources of risk 
according to the classification from Hardaker et al. (1997) discussed in section 2.2. The table 
shows the number of scores given per source of risk, the percentage distribution of 
respondents over the categories 1 to 5, the average scores, and the overall rank. Averages and 
rank are calculated per source of risk as well as per group. The averages per group are 
weighed averages. 
Table 2.1 Sources of risk, number of scores given (n), percentage distribution of respondents over categories (1: 
not relevant, 5: very relevant), average score1 and overall rank. 
n 1 2 3 4 5 Average Overall 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) score rank 
Price risks (4.14) 0) 
Meat price 390 1 3 11 24 61 4.41 1 
Milk price 433 3 2 10 27 58 4.34 3 
Crop price 154 23 20 23 14 20 2.88 18 
Personal risks (3.59) (2) 
Death of farm operator 620 5 4 13 25 53 4.16 4 
Health situation of farm family 629 3 5 23 34 35 3.92 6 
Disability/health of farm operator2 633 6 10 24 30 30 3.70 8 
Family relations (e.g. divorce) 615 13 7 19 5 36 3.65 9 
Division of tasks within farm family 612 23 23 38 12 4 2.52 21 
Institutional risks (3.50) (3) 
Environmental policy 635 2 8 23 35 32 3.85 7 
Animal welfare policy 631 5 12 26 34 23 3.57 10 
Value of production rights 625 11 12 24 30 23 3.44 12/13 
Elimination of government support 630 11 20 9 23 17 3.14 16 
Production risks (3.37) (4) 
Epidemic animal diseases 632 2 3 8 28 59 4.40 2 
Technical results fattening animals 363 3 4 17 31 45 4.12 5 
Consumer preferences3 618 6 12 29 36 17 3.47 11 
Production costs 611 4 16 33 34 13 3.36 14 
Milk yield 423 8 16 34 25 17 3.26 15 
Non-epidemic animal diseases 625 8 20 39 24 9 3.07 17 
Crop yields 165 25 22 21 16 16 2.76 19 
Technology 574 32 27 29 10 2 2.22 22 
Financial risks (3.02) (5) 
Changes in interest rates 629 8 12 8 31 21 3.44 12/13 
Ability to redeem loans 619 28 22 23 16 11 2.60 20 
'The average scores for groups of risks are weighed averages. 
2Including farm workers. 
'Factor analysis carried out by Meuwissen et al. (1999) showed that this source of risk could be assigned to the 
risk factor 'production'. 
Table 2.1 shows that of the five categories of risk distinguished, price risks were perceived as 
the major source of risk, and financial risks as the least important. Considering the 22 sources 
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of risk separately, Table 2.1 shows that, besides meat and milk price, 'epidemic animal 
diseases' and 'death of farm operator' were also perceived as important. In the categories of 
'institutional risks' and 'financial risks' none of the included sources was perceived as really 
important. Note, however, the large dispersion of answers given for some sources such as 
'value of production rights' and 'ability to redeem loans'. 
2.5.2 Risk management strategies 
In the questionnaire survey, 12 risk management strategies were considered. Table 2.2 gives 
an overview of the strategies, grouped into 'strategies in which risks are shared with others' 
and 'on-farm risk management strategies'. Per strategy, the table shows the number of scores 
given, the percentage distribution of answers over the categories 1 to 5, the average score, and 
the overall rank. 
Table 2.2 Risk management strategies, number of scores given (n), the percentage distribution of respondents 
over categories (1: not relevant, 5: very relevant), average score1, and overall rank. 
n 1 
(%) 
2 
(%) 
3 
(%) 
4 
(%) 
5 
(%) 
Average 
score 
Overall 
rank 
Risk-sharing strategies (3.16) 0) 
Buying business insurance 576 2 2 11 31 54 4.34 2 
Buying personal insurance 571 4 4 18 29 45 4.06 3 
Price contracts for farm outputs 457 36 13 17 18 16 2.65 6 
Price contracts for farm inputs 464 37 14 17 19 13 2.58 7 
The use of futures markets 445 69 12 13 4 2 1.58 12 
On-farm strategies (2.47) (2) 
Producing at lowest possible costs 591 0 0 4 23 73 4.66 1 
Applying strict hygienic rules 578 2 4 25 31 37 3.97 4 
Increase solvency ratio 522 10 7 33 27 23 3.44 5 
Spatial diversification 509 49 14 17 12 8 2.16 8 
Off-farm investment 514 44 20 21 10 5 2.14 9 
Enterprise diversification 514 50 16 18 9 7 2.06 10 
Off-farm employment 506 54 16 17 8 5 1.96 11 
'The average scores for groups of risk management strategies are weighed averages. 
Table 2.2 shows that, in general, risk-sharing strategies were perceived as more important risk 
management strategies than on-farm strategies. On a per strategy basis, producing at lowest 
possible costs, and buying business and personal insurance (in this order) were perceived as 
most important. Note that price risks were perceived as the major source of risk on average 
(Table 2.1) but that risk-sharing strategies to deal with price risks were not perceived as 
important (although answers given for price contracts show relatively high variation). The use 
of futures markets was perceived as the least important risk management strategy. 
The answers given for risk-sharing strategies were studied in more detail. Tests for the 
existence of significant differences (P<0.05) were carried out for farmers with different age, 
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7 Distinguished categories: cattle farms, pig farms, poultry farms, and mixed livestock farms. 
8 Distinguished categories: sole proprietorship; partnership between husband and wife; between brother and 
sister; between child(ren) and parents; combination of children, husband/wife, and parents. 
9 Distinguished categories: yes, no, don't know. 
1 0 Farm size was the only metric variable; variables such as number of cows and hectares were all transformed 
into NGEs. By using regression it is assumed that standard parametric procedures are appropriate for 
independent variables that are in the form of Likert-type scales (see also Patrick and Musser, 1997). 
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education, gross farm income, type of farm7, form of ownership8, availability of successor9, 
and farm size. Differences were tested with non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H tests (Conover, 
1980). Linear regression was used only for farm size.10 Significant differences were found for 
farm type and form of ownership. Pair-wise comparison between different farm types and 
forms of ownership were carried out with Mann-Whitney U-tests (Conover, 1980). Since this 
was multiple testing of the data, the significance level was adjusted by using the Bonferroni 
test (Winer et al., 1991), i.e. the significance level was divided by the number of categories 
distinguished, resulting in a significance level of P<0.0125 for farm types and of P<0.01 for 
form of ownership (0.05/4 and 0.05/5 respectively). 
Respondents from poultry farms deemed price contracts for both farm inputs and outputs 
as more important than respondents from all other types of farms. Price contracts for farm 
outputs were also perceived as more important by respondents from pig and mixed farms than 
by those with cattle farms. 
Respondents from farms with sole proprietorship and farms owned by parents and 
child(ren) perceived buying business insurance as less important than those from farms with 
an ownership consisting of some combination of children), husband/wife, and parents. 
With linear regressions it was also tested whether those respondents who perceived a 
particular type of risk as more important also assigned more importance to strategies to 
manage it. Such relationships were tested for the perceptions of price risks and price risk 
management strategies, the perceptions of personal risks and personal insurance, and the 
perceptions of production risks and business insurance (for institutional and financial risks no 
such logical relationships with any of the risk-sharing strategies in the survey exist). For price 
risks, no significant relationships were found (P<0.05). For the personal risks 'death of farm 
operator', 'health situation of farm family', and 'family relations' a direct relationship was 
found with the perceived importance of personal insurance. In relation to production risks and 
business insurance such relationship was found for 'epidemic animal diseases' and 'milk 
yield'. 
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2.6 Conclusions and future outlook 
In a context of the changing risk environment for farmers, the goal of this chapter was to 
review the pros and cons of risk-sharing strategies. It can be concluded, both on theoretical 
and empirical grounds, that risk-sharing strategies provide opportunities for dealing with the 
new (and the old) risks with which agriculture is confronted. From a theoretical perspective, 
risk-sharing tools are in principle advantageous to both individual farmers and society as a 
whole. From an empirical perspective, farmers already perceive risk-sharing strategies 
(especially insurance) as important strategies to manage risks. 
Future outlook 
From this study several issues for further research in the field of risk-sharing strategies 
became apparent. First, from the literature it is clear that such arrangements as production 
contracts are growing increasingly important because they ensure farmers access to capital. 
However, the use of production contracts also involves some risks, such as unexpected 
requirements imposed on contractors. Further research into various forms of external equity 
financing for farmers (without the risk mentioned for production contracts) seems worthwhile, 
especially given the increasing industrialisation of agriculture. 
Second, the empirical results indicate that there are factors (i.e. farm type and form of 
ownership) that influence farmers' perceptions of risk-sharing strategies. Further research on 
such factors would be useful for developers and sellers of risk-sharing strategies in order to 
better tune their products, services and marketing strategies. 
Third, empirical results show that there is a mismatch between farmers' perceptions of 
price risks and the perceived importance of risk management strategies to deal with price 
risks. In particular, futures markets were not perceived to be relevant. Research is needed to 
clarify whether there is a lack of understanding by farmers of currently available strategies 
such as futures trading, or whether current products for risk sharing do not fulfil farmers' 
needs. In the first case there is a need for education. In the second case current products may 
need to be adapted and/or new products developed. Given the indicated importance of 
insurance schemes, insurers may be able to develop and successfully introduce schemes that 
cover price risks. 
Fourth, the high priority assigned to epidemic animal disease risks among the livestock 
farmers in the sample, combined with the direct relationship that was found for the perceived 
importance of this risk and the perceived importance of business insurance, seem to imply a 
need for insurers to develop and promote new products in this area. Both with respect to price 
risks and epidemic disease risks, research is needed to examine issues of asymmetric 
information and the systemic character of these risks. 
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3 RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT; AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DUTCH 
LIVESTOCK FARMERS* 
Abstract 
The risk environment of farmers is changing and new risk management strategies are being 
introduced. In this chapter survey data relating to farmers' perceptions of risk and risk 
management are studied, and it is analysed whether characteristics of a farm and/or farmer 
can be identified that relate to these perceptions. The data originate from a large sample of 
livestock farmers (n=612) in the Netherlands and were gathered by a questionnaire survey. 
Results show that, in general, price and production risks were perceived as important sources 
of risk. Insurance schemes were perceived as relevant strategies to manage risks. More 
detailed analyses of the perceptions show that dairy farmers generally saw price risks as very 
important, while pig and mixed farmers were more likely to rank production risks as very 
important. Insurance were perceived relatively less important by mixed farmers than by other 
farmers. The findings have implications for policymakers, advisers, and developers and 
sellers of (new) risk management strategies. 
3.1 Introduction 
The risk environment of farmers is changing, in part due to increasing market liberalisation 
and industrialisation of agriculture (Boehlje and Lins, 1998). These changes lead to new risks, 
and new risk management instruments are being developed (see for example Blank, 1995; 
Harwood et al., 1996; Goodwin and Ker, 1998; Skees et al., 1998). Beal (1996) stated that it 
is to be expected that risk management strategies adopted by farm managers reflect their 
personal perceptions of risk. 
Although much theoretical research on risk in agriculture and its management has been 
done (see for example Hardaker et al., 1997), useful practical insight for policymakers, 
advisers, and developers and sellers of (new) risk management strategies is generally very 
limited. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to provide empirical insight into 1) farmers' 
perceptions of risk and risk management; and 2) characteristics of a farm and/or farmer that 
relate to these perceptions. Data originate from a large sample of livestock farmers in the 
Netherlands and have been gathered by a questionnaire survey. 
Paper by Meuwissen, M.P.M., Huirne, R.B.M. and Hardaker, J.B., submitted for 
publication to Livestock Production Science. 
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Related research has been carried out in the U.S. (Patrick et al., 1985; Boggess et al., 1985; 
Wilson et al., 1988; Patrick and Musser ,1997). They studied respectively livestock farmers in 
eight U.S. states, livestock farmers in Florida and Alabama, Arizona dairy farmers, and large-
scale U.S. cornbelt farmers. The first two studies found a high perceived importance of risks 
of animal diseases and pests and of personal safety and health risks. The latter two studies 
indicate that risks related to yields and input and output prices were perceived as most 
important. 
Wilson et al. (1988) found high scores for risk management methods relating to 
communication with hired labour, use of consultants, use of management information 
systems, and forward contracting. Results from Patrick and Musser (1997) showed that the 
large-scale U.S. cornbelt farmers saw liability insurance, financial/credit reserves, 
debt/leverage management, and (also) forward contracting as important managerial responses 
to risk. Both studies found low scores for off-farm employment, indicating that this was not 
seen as an important risk management strategy. 
In investigating farm/farmer characteristics that relate to farmers' perceptions of risk and 
risk management, Patrick et al. (1985) noted that the perceptions varied across geographic 
areas and by farm type. Boggess et al. (1985) and Wilson et al. (1988) found that perceptions 
varied so much among individuals that a risk classification based on socioeconomic variables 
was not possible. Wilson et al. (1993) reported that 'results illustrate the highly complex and 
individualistic nature of risk perceptions and the selection of management tools'. Patrick and 
Musser (1997) concluded that, besides geographic location and farm type, institutional 
structures and other factors affecting the operating environment of producers were also likely 
to influence farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management. 
This chapter starts with describing the materials and methods used for this research 
(section 3.2 and 3.3 respectively). In section 3.4 farmers' perceptions of risk and risk 
management are analysed. In section 3.5, relationships with these perceptions are explored. In 
section 3.6 the results are discussed. This section also includes a future outlook in which 
implications of the results for people working in the field of risk and risk management are 
addressed. Section 3.7 contains the conclusions. Results presented throughout the chapter are 
those of analyses in which all farm types have been included. Results of regressions for dairy 
and pig farms separately are presented in the appendix. 
3.2 Materials 
The questionnaire survey consisted of three parts, i.e. questions related to 1) farmers' 
perceptions of risk, 2) farmers' perceptions of various strategies to manage risks, and 3) 
socioeconomic characteristics of the farm and farmer. Most questions were closed questions, 
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mainly in the form of Likert-type scales ranging from 1 to 5 (Schuman and Presser, 1981; 
Churchill, 1995). In total, the questionnaire included 121 variables. 
The questionnaire was sent in October 1997 to 2700 randomly selected livestock producers 
in the Netherlands. These included cattle, pig and poultry farmers (respectively 1200, 1200 
and 300)." Before the questionnaire was mailed to the 2700 farmers, it was extensively 
pretested in three sessions with 10-15 farmers in each session. After each session, the 
questions were improved based on the comments and suggestions of the farmers. 
After screening on completeness, the questionnaires of 737 farmers were available for 
statistical analyses, i.e. the effective response rate was 27.3 per cent. The eventual number of 
questionnaires analysed was 612 because only farms with a minimum of 20 NGE were 
included12, and furthermore only farms in which livestock accounts for at least two thirds of 
the total size of the farm (also measured in NGE). From the livestock farms (classified into 
cattle, pig, poultry, and mixed farms), poultry farms have been left out as well as cattle farms 
other than dairy farms.13 In Table 3.1 the average farm in the analyses is compared with the 
average Dutch farm. 
Table 3.1 Comparison of average farm in survey with average farm in the Netherlands. 
Average farm in survey (n=612) Average farm in the Netherlands' 
Number of dairy cows 58 46 
Kg milk per dairy cow 7692 6626 
Number of sows 231 176 
Number of fattening pigs 574 399 
NGE 109 70 2 
Age of farmer 44 3 46 
1996 gross farm income (US $) 55,0003 51,500" 
Education (low-medium-high) 59/34/7 54/38/8 
Labour units 1.70 1.80 
Solvency (equity-to-asset ratio) 0.483 0.725 
'Source: LEI/CBS (1998). 
2 l f only farms larger than 20 NGE are included, the average size of farms is 94 NGE. 
3Questions were in the form of predetermined classes. Averages represent weighed averages. 
"Weighed average (1996/97) of arable, specialised dairy, and pig and poultry farms. 
'Weighed average (1997) of arable and livestock farms. 
The table shows that the average farm in the analyses is larger than the average Dutch farm, 
but has a lower solvency. Of the 612 farms, 361 farms (i.e. 59 per cent) could be classified as 
' 1 The farmers were selected from the lists of addresses from Interpolis Tilburg (the major agricultural insurance 
company in the Netherlands) and Misset Publishers (who publish the major farmers' magazines). 
1 2 NGE is a Dutch standard of farm size (LEI/CBS, 1998). As an indication: 20 NGE equals 14.6 dairy cows, 74 
sows, or 438 fattening pigs. 
1 3 A farm was classified as e.g. a cattle farm if at least two-thirds of the total NGEs of the farm was attributable 
to that livestock category. For further subclassifications the same proportions were used, i.e. a cattle farm was 
classified as a dairy farm if at least two-thirds of the NGEs for cattle was accounted for by dairy cows. 
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dairy farms, 170 farms (i.e. 28 per cent) as pig farms, and 81 farms (i.e. 13 per cent) as mixed 
livestock farms. The dominant form of ownership was a partnership between husband and 
wife. This form occurred on 39 per cent of the farms. Other frequent forms of ownership were 
sole proprietorship (25 per cent), partnerships between child(ren) and parents (18 per cent), 
and partnerships between child, husband or wife, and parents (11 per cent). Of all 
respondents, 33 per cent indicated that they had a successor, 19 per cent had no successor and 
on 48 per cent of the farms succession was yet uncertain. Some 16 per cent of the respondents 
indicated they had an off-farm job. For partners (husband/wife) the proportion was 24 per 
cent. In both cases, the main reasons given for having the off-farm job were an increase of 
family income and an increase of personal skills. 
3.3 Methods 
To analyse the data on risk and risk management, various methods have been used. Table 3.2 
gives an overview. 
Table 3.2 Methods used to analyse perceptions and relationships of risk and risk management. For the analyses 
of relationships, also the dependent and independent variables included in the regressions. 
Analysis of 
Risk Risk management 
Rel. risk attitude Sources of risk Strategies Open-ended q.' 
Perceptions descriptive an. descriptive an. descriptive an. descriptive an. 
Data reduction aggregation factor analysis factor analysis -
Relationships log. regression m. regression m. regression log. Regression 
Dependent var. binary var. factor scores factor scores binary var. 
Independent var.2: 
a. socioeconomic X X X X 
b. rel. risk attitude n.i. X X X 
c. sources of risk X n.i. X X 
d. strategies X X n.i. X 
'Open-ended questions on which risks were perceived as bearable and for which risks insurance would be 
appreciated. 
^ e variables under a, b, and c and d were represented by the original variables, an aggregated measure, and the 
factor scores respectively, 'n.i.' stands for 'not included'. 
As the table shows, farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management were studied by 
descriptive analyses. Before further analyses were carried out, the number of variables was 
reduced: for relative risk attitude by means of aggregation, for sources of risk and risk 
management strategies by factor analyses (Hair et al., 1995). Then, relationships with the 
perceptions were explored by logistic and multiple regressions (Hair et al., 1995). In the 
regression for relative risk attitude (also indicated in Table 3.2), the dependent variable 
consisted of a binary variable reflecting risk attitude. The independent variables consisted of 
the socioeconomic variables (in their original form), the sources of risk (as factor scores) and 
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the risk management strategies (also as factor scores). For the other regressions, the table can 
be interpreted likewise. 
For the factor analyses it was assumed that standard parametric statistical procedures are 
appropriate for ordinal variables in the form of Likert-type scales (see also Wilson et al., 
1993; Patrick and Musser, 1997). 
In the regression analyses, multicollinearity between the independent variables was not 
found to be a problem (i.e. no variables have been omitted): correlations were low, nonlineair 
principal components analysis (Gifi, 1990) for socioeconomic variables did not show strong 
relationships, and variance inflation factors (Hair et al., 1995) had all values around 1. Also, 
in re-estimating the regression models including only significant variables (P<0.10), signs of 
the variables did not change. The internal validity of the regression models was tested by 
taking subsamples of 60 per cent of the data. 
All analyses were carried out using SPSS for Windows (v 6.1.4). 
3.4 Perceptions of risk and risk management 
3.4.1 Perceptions of relative risk attitude 
To get insight into a farmer's perception of his or her risk attitude, the five statements as 
shown in Table 3.3 were used (the fifth statement resembles statement 4 and was included in a 
different place in the questionnaire as a consistency check). Since all statements measure 
attitude towards risks relative to other farmers the term relative risk attitude is used. Similar 
statements were used by Patrick and Musser (1997). Table 3.3 shows the percentage 
distribution of the respondents' answers in relation to each statement. 
Table 3.3 Indicators to measure relative risk attitude and the percentage distribution of respondents over 
categories (1=1 don't agree, 5=1 agree). 
-
1 
(%) 
2 
(%) 
3 
(%) 
4 
(%) 
5 
(%) 
I am willing to take more risks than my colleagues with respect to 
1. ... production 15 15 47 18 5 
2. ... marketing 20 24 40 13 3 
3. ... financial issues 15 20 35 24 6 
4. ... farming in general 13 16 39 28 4 
5. (I am willing to take more risks than other farmers)1 13 21 40 19 7 
'included in a different place in the questionnaire as a consistency check. 
The table shows that for all statements (except for statement 4) the majority of respondents 
indicated a 1,2 or 3. This implies that most respondents perceive the extent to which they take 
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risks as less or equal than that of their colleagues. The answers on the statements 4 and 5 are 
quite similar, indicating consistency. 
For further analyses (section 3.5), the number of variables was reduced (as indicated in 
Table 3.2) by summing up a respondent's answers on the five statements. It was concluded 
that all statements measured the same underlying construct, i.e. relative risk attitude, for the 
following reasons: significant positive correlations (P<0.01) among the answers given on the 
five statements (correlations ranging from 0.41 to 0.64), high loadings (> 0.74) of the 
statements on a single factor model (with eigenvalue of 3.15), and also a high Cronbach's 
alpha of 0.85 (Peter, 1979; Hair et al., 1995). Based on the summed measure, a median split 
was used to divide the respondents in a more risk-averse and a less risk-averse group (see for 
example Powel-Mantel and Kardes, 1999). 
3.4.2 Perceptions ofsources of risk 
In total 22 sources of risk were considered. Five sources were conditional on farm type and 
tenancy of land. The second and third column of Table 3.4 show the average scores of 
farmers' perceptions of each source of risk, and the standard deviations of the scores 
respectively. 
The table shows that, on average, the highest scores were given to risks related to meat 
price, epidemic animal diseases, and milk price. All these sources of risk had standard 
deviations of less than 1, indicating a high level of consensus among respondents. The high 
score for the occurrence of epidemic animal diseases is probably due to the fact that at the 
time the questionnaire survey was held there was a major epidemic of Classical Swine Fever 
in the Netherlands affecting many farms for several months (the so-called 'context issue'; 
Pious, 1993). Sources of risk that received average scores below 3 (indicating that they were 
generally not perceived as relevant) related to changes in farm capital, ability to redeem loans, 
division of tasks within the farm family, technology, and land rent. 
For the remaining part of the analyses (section 3.5), the number of variables was reduced 
by applying factor analysis (as was already indicated in Table 3.2). This resulted in five 
factors with eigenvalues larger than 1 and a total variance accounted for of 55 per cent (which 
can—in social sciences—be regarded as satisfactory; Hair et al., 1995). The variables that 
were conditional on farm type and tenancy of land were not included in the factor analyses, 
because they have many missing values. They are included in their original form in the 
regressions per farm type (see appendix). Table 3.4 shows the factor loadings (after varimax 
orthogonal rotation; Hair et al., 1995) of the sources of risk on the five factors identified. 
According to the loadings, the factors 1 to 5 can best be described as 'health of the farm 
family', 'financial situation', 'legislation', 'production', and 'change in the farming situation' 
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respectively. Factor 1, health of the farm family, has a relatively high loading of 'epidemic 
animal diseases', which likely reflects the emotional impact of the Classical Swine Fever 
epidemic on the farm families involved in the epidemic. In factor 2, financial situation, risks 
associated with interest rates and loans are accompanied by sources of risks determined by 
government actions (i.e. value of production rights and elimination of government support). 
The high loading of consumer preferences on factor 4, 'production', is likely to reflect 
farmers' concern about changes in consumer preferences and the result they may have on 
production techniques used. Factor 5, change in the farming situation, includes both changes 
in the farm family (as indicated by large loadings of variables related to division of tasks, and 
family relations and health) and changes in the farm (as indicated by the loading for 
technology). 
Table 3.4 Average scores (1 = not relevant, 5 = very relevant), standard deviation, and varimax rotated factor 
loadings for sources of risk. 
Average sd Most important factors' 
Source of risk (n=612) 1 2 3 4 5 
Meat price2 4.41 0.86 — — — — — Epidemic animal diseases 4.41 0.89 0.31 0.07 0.12 0.55 -0.08 
Milk price2 4.36 0.95 — — — — — Death of farm operator 4.15 1.14 0.82 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.09 
Technical results fattening animals2 4.13 0.98 — — — — — Health situation of farm family 3.91 1.03 0.69 0.11 0.17 0.03 0.36 
Environmental policy 3.86 1.03 0.14 0.09 0.78 0.18 -0.02 
Disability/health of farm operator3 3.69 1.15 0.75 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.07 
Family relations (e.g. divorce) 3.64 1.35 0.32 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.75 
Animal welfare policy 3.57 1.12 0.13 0.01 0.75 0.29 0.09 
Consumer preferences 3.47 1.08 -0.03 0.08 0.22 0.43 -0.01 
Value of production rights 3.47 1.25 -0.01 0.44 0.64 -0.02 0.09 
Changes in interest rates 3.44 1.18 0.13 0.80 0.01 0.07 0.04 
Production costs 3.33 1.04 0.10 0.28 0.05 0.61 0.01 
Milk yield2 3.28 1.14 — — — — — Elimination of government support 3.14 1.23 0.18 0.45 031 0.16 -0.02 
Animal diseases (non-epidemic) 3.07 1.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.73 0.10 
Changes in farm capital (land, machinery) 2.64 1.14 0.08 0.57 0.27 0.11 0.13 
Ability to redeem loans 2.60 1.34 0.06 0.67 0.01 0.25 0.17 
Division of tasks within farm family 2.52 1.08 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.83 
Technology 2.24 1.06 -0.19 0.20 0.23 0.42 033 
Land rent4 2.06 1.27 — — — — — Per cent of total variance accounted for — — 12.10 11.95 11.20 10.66 9.26 
'Factors 1 to 5 are health of farm family, financial situation, legislation, production, change in farming situation 
respectively. Loadings of 10.25 are in bold. 
2Sources of risk conditional on farm type. 
'including farm workers. 
"Source of risk conditional on tenancy of land. 
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3.4.3 Perceptions of risk management strategies 
Farmers' perceptions of risk management strategies are summarised in the second and third 
column of Table 3.5. 
The table shows that there was a clear distinction between strategies perceived as very 
relevant and those perceived as not very relevant. Strategies in the first category are producing 
at lowest possible costs and the buying of business and personal insurance (in this order). The 
use of futures and options markets was perceived as the less relevant way to manage risks, 
followed by off-farm employment and (other) strategies of diversification. 
Table 3.5 Average scores (1 = not relevant, 5 = very relevant), standard deviation, and varimax rotated factor 
loadings for risk management strategies. 
Average sd Most important factors1 
Risk management strategy (n=612) 1 2 3 4 
Producing at lowest possible costs 4.67 0.59 0.11 0.40 -0.30 -0.17 
Buying business insurance 4.33 0.89 0.00 0.81 0.03 0.14 
Buying personal insurance 4.06 1.10 -0.05 0.77 -0.02 0.06 
Applying strict hygienic rules 3.96 0.99 0.16 0.48 0.12 -0.42 
Increase solvency ratio 3.45 1.19 0.08 0.36 0.09 0.40 
Price contracts for farm outputs 2.58 1.49 0.86 0.07 0.12 0.04 
Price contracts for farm inputs 2.53 1.44 0.88 0.08 0.02 -0.04 
Spatial diversification 2.17 1.35 0.19 0.00 -0.78 -0.21 
Off-farm investment 2.12 1.22 -0.20 0.03 0.61 0.27 
Enterprise diversification 2.05 1.29 0.21 -0.01 0.68 0.17 
Off-farm employment 1.98 1.24 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.72 
Futures and options market 1.58 0.96 0.53 -0.07 0.05 0.40 
Per cent of total variance accounted for — — 16.56 14.93 13.31 10.12 
'Factors 1 to 4 are reduction of price risk, insurance, diversification, and certain income respectively. Loadings 
of£ 0.25 are in bold. 
As with the sources of risk (and as already indicated in Table 3.2), the number of variables for 
further analyses was reduced by applying factor analysis. This resulted in four factors with 
eigenvalues larger than 1 and a total variance explained of 55 per cent. Again, a varimax 
orthogonal rotation was implemented. Based on the concentration of factor loadings, the four 
factors can be described as 'reduction of price risk', 'insurance', 'diversification', and 'certain 
income' respectively. On the factor 'insurance' (factor 2) high loadings of commercial 
(business and personal) insurance are accompanied by high loadings of 'on-farm insurance': 
producing at lowest possible costs and applying strict hygienic rules. Factor 3, diversification, 
seems to reflect diversification 'away from the current farm business' given the high negative 
loadings of variables related to the current farm business (i.e. producing at lowest possible 
costs and spatial diversification). Factor 4, a certain income, has a high loading of off-farm 
employment. Note that the main reason indicated for off-farm employment was 'increase of 
family income'. Also for this factor, loadings suggest that it refers to a certain income 'from 
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outside the current farm business' given the high negative loading for the on-farm strategy of 
applying hygienic rules. 
3.4.4 Perceptions of bearable risks and risks for which insurance is appreciated 
Farmers can respond to risks by applying strategies as discussed in the previous section. 
However, they can also bear a number of risks themselves. In an open-ended question, 330 
respondents indicated which risks they perceived as bearable. The first risk mentioned was 
taken into account in the analyses. Results show that weather and price risks were regarded as 
bearable risks by respectively 24 and 21 per cent of the respondents. Non-epidemic diseases, 
low technical results of livestock, and low crop yields were considered bearable by 
respectively 12,7 and 7 per cent. 
Respondents could also list risks for which they would like to buy insurance. This question 
was answered by 398 respondents. Again, only the first risk listed was included in the 
analyses. Outcomes show that the risks of epidemic diseases, prices, personal disability, and 
legislation were mentioned by respectively 23,14,10, and 10 per cent of the respondents. 
3.5 Variables that relate to the perceptions of risk and risk management 
Table 3.2 already indicated the methods used (i.e. logistic and multiple regressions) to explore 
the relationships with fanners' perceptions of risk and risk management, as well as the 
dependent and independent variables included in the regression models. Table 3.6 shows the 
results of the regressions carried out. For each independent variable, the table shows the 
partial regression coefficient B and a value to assess significance (t-value and Wald statistic 
for multiple and logistic regression respectively). Variables significant at P<0.05 and P<0.10 
are in bold and italics respectively. The goodness-of-fit of the models is indicated by the 
adjusted R 2 (for multiple regression) and the percentage of observations correctly classified 
relative to the proportional chance (in case of logistic regression). 
With respect to relative risk attitude (second column), the table shows that from the 
socioeconomic variables, gross farm income, solvency, farm size, and a farmer's education 
significantly relate to a farmer's relative risk attitude. All these variables, except for solvency, 
have a direct relationship with risk attitude, i.e. higher values indicate a relatively less risk-
averse attitude. Results also indicate that more risk-averse farmers perceived risks related to 
legislation and changes in the farming situation as more important, as well as the risk 
management strategies of insurance and a certain income. 
In relation to the factors representing the sources of risk, Table 3.6 shows that for the risk 
factor 'family health', none of the independent variables was significant at the P50.05 or 
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P < 0 . 1 0 level. The risk factor 'financial situation' was perceived more important by dairy 
farmers as opposed to pig and mixed farmers (as indicated by the negative signs of the farm 
type dummies 'd-p' and 'd-m'). Inverse relationships were furthermore found for gross farm 
income and solvency, and direct relationships for farm size and the perceived importance of 
insurance. Risks related to 'legislation' and 'production' were perceived relatively less 
important by dairy farmers, and for both types of risks an inverse relationship with gross farm 
income was found. Risks related to changes in the farming situation were perceived more 
important by dairy farmers, by farmers with a relatively low solvency, and by farmers who 
perceived diversification as an important risk management strategy. 
Regression results for the factors reflecting risk management strategies show that 
strategies to reduce price risks were perceived relatively less relevant by dairy farmers (as 
indicated in Table 3.6 by the positive signs for the farm type dummies 'd-p' and 'd-m'). 
Inverse relationships were found for solvency and education. Insurance as a risk management 
strategy was perceived the less relevant by mixed farmers (i.e. the farm type dummies 'd-m' 
and 'm-p' have a negative and positive sign respectively). Also farmers with a form of 
partnership, older farmers, higher educated farmers, and less risk-averse ones did perceive 
insurance as less relevant than their colleagues with opposite characteristics. Significant 
positive relationships with the perceived importance of insurance existed for gross farm 
income and for the perceived importance of legislative and production risks. Managing risks 
by diversification was perceived the most relevant by pig fanners. Other direct relationships 
existed for solvency, farm size, hours off-farm work, and relative risk attitude (less risk-
averse farmers perceived diversification as more relevant than more risk-averse farmers). 
Regressions for the risk management strategy 'a certain income' showed that this strategy was 
perceived very relevant by dairy farmers. Furthermore by farmers with (partners having) off-
farm work, and by farmers who perceived risks related to production and changes in the 
farming situation as important. Inverse relationships existed for the availability of a successor 
and farm size. 
With respect to the open-ended questions (see the last four columns in Table 3.6): weather 
risk was more often perceived as bearable by dairy and mixed farmers, price risks by pig 
farmers. For the extent to which price risks were perceived as bearable, a (logical) inverse 
relationship was found with the perceived importance of strategies to reduce price risks. 
Insurance for epidemic diseases was appreciated most by pig farmers and furthermore by 
farmers who did not perceive diversification as an important risk management strategy. 
Appreciation for an insurance for prices was highest amongst dairy farmers and was 
furthermore positively related to farm size and perceived importance of 'a certain income'. 
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Table 3.6 Results of multivariate regressions for risk and risk management1 
Risk Risk management 
Rel.risk Sources of risk Strategies Open-ended questions4 
Independent attit3 ram. health financ. legist prod. change price risk insurance divers. certain bearable: bearable: ins. appr: ins. appr: 
variables2 reduction income weather price epid dis. price 
a. ferm type5: d-p -0.2 (0.1) -0.2 (-1.2) -0.4 (-2.6) 0.7 (4.1) 0.5 (3.4) -0.2 (-1.3) 03(1.0) 0.0 (0.1) OS (32) -0.7 (-43) -3.8 (10.5) 2.8 (13.6) IS (SA) -1.7(3.9) 
a. farm type: d-m -0.2 (0.2) -0.2 (-1.1) -0.1 (-0.7) 0.8 (4.2) 0.4 (2.4) -0.4 (-23) OS (2.9) -0.3 (-1.7) -0.0 (-03) -0.3 (-1.9) -0.5 (0.5) 2.4 (9.6) 0.5 (0.5) -1.8(3.5) 
a. farm type: m-p' 0.1 (0.0) -0.0 (-0.0) -0.3 (-1.5) -0.1 (-0.4) 0.1 (0.6) 0.2(1.0) -0.4 (-1.9) 0.3(1.6) 0.6 (2.9) -0.4 (-1.9) -33 (IS) 0.4 (0.4) 1.0(2.5) 0.1 (0.0) 
a. ownership7 -0.3 (0.6) 02 (1.4) 0.1 (1.0) 0.1 (0.5) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.2(1.0) 03 (2.1) -0.1 (-0.9) -0.1 (-0.9) 0.0 (0.2) IS (6.9) -0.3 (0.3) 03 (0.1) -1.1 (4.7) 
a. successor 03 (0.2) 0.0(0.1) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.2 (1.2) 03(1.6) 0.3(1.5) -0.0 (-02) -0.0 (-03) -0.1 (-03) -0.3 (-1.7) -03(0.1) 1.1 (1.5) -1.2 (5.1) 0.8 (0.9) 
a. gr. farm income 0.5 (5.7) -0.0 (-0.6) -0.2 (-33) -0.2 (-23) -0.2 (-2.4) 0.1 (1.1) 0.0 (0.2) 02 (2.0) -0.0 (-0.5) 0.1 (0.9) 0.3 (1.0) 0.4(1.0) 03 (0.5) 0.1 (0.0) 
a. solvency -0.4(6.7) -0.0 (-0.1) -03 (-5.5) 0.1 (1.9) 0.0 (0.7) -0.1 (-2.7) -03(-33) -0.1 (-0.9) 0.1 (2,7) 0.0 (0.2) -0.3(1.2) 03(1.1) -0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 
a. size 0.0 (4.7) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (1.4) -0.0 (-0.4) -0.0 (-02) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (1.5) -0.1 (-2.9) -0.0(0.0) -0.0 (0.9) -0.0 (0.3) 0.1 (7.1) 
a. age 03 (1.0) 0.1 (1.4) -0.0 (-0.5) 0.0 (0.3) 0.1 (23) -0.0 (-0.1) -0.0 (-1.2) -0.1 (-1.5) -0.1 (-1.3) -0.1 (-13) 0.2 (0.4) -0.2 (0.7) -0.4 (1.9) 0.1 (0.2) 
a. education 0.6 (4.1) -0.1 (-0.7) -0.0 (-0.3) 0.1 (0.9) 0.4 (3.7) 0.0 (0.2) -0.2 (-2.0) -0.2 (-1.2) 0.1 (0.5) 03(1.5) 0.1 (0.0) -1.0 (3.2) -0.6(1.6) -0.4 (0.5) 
a. hrs. off-f.work -0.0 (0.9) -0.0 (-1.5) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0(1.2) -0.0 (-1.5) -0.0 (-0.8) 0.0(1.3) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0(1.6) 0.1 (2.7) 0.0 (0.4) 0.1 (5.7) -0.0(0.2) -0.0 (0.2) 
b. rel. risk attitude5 n.i. 0.1 (0.6) 0.1 (0.4) -0.2 (-1.2) 0.0 (0.1) -0.2 (-1.8) 0.1 (0.4) -03 (-2.4) 0.4 (3.1) -0.2 (-1.3) 0.7 (2.2) 0.6 (1.0) 0.2 (0.2) -0.9 (2.6) 
c. family health 0.1 (0.4) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.1 (-1.6) 0.0 (0.6) -0.1 (-1.7) 0.0 (0.6) -0.1 (0.11) 0.4 (2.1) 0.1 (0.1) 03(1.0) 
c. financial 0.1 (0.2) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1 (1.0) 0.1 (1.6) 0.1 (0.9) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.8) 0.1 (0.1) 03 (0.6) 
c. legislation -0.2(1.5) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1(1.1) 02 (2.7) 0.1 (1.9) 0.0 (0.2) -0.1 (0.2) -0.4(2.0) 0.0 (0.0) 03 (0.9) 
c. production 0.0 (0.0) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.0 (-0.3) 03 (3.4) •0.0 (-0.1) 0.1 (1.8) -0.3 (1.0) 0.5 (3.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.7) 
c. change -0.3 (2.3) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1 (1.4) -0.1 (-1.0) 03 (2.8) 0.1 (2.0) 03 (0.6) 0.0 (0.0) -03(1.0) -0.1 (0.1) 
d. price risk red. 0.1 (0.3) -0.1 (-1.5) 0.1 (1.1) 0.1 (1.4) -0.0 (-0.4) 0.1 (1.3) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.0 (0.0) -OS (4.1) -0.3 (2.1) 0.1 (0.0) 
d.insurance -0 3 (4.8) 0.0 (0.6) 0.1 (2.0) 0.2 (2.7) 0.2 (3.0) -0.1 (-0.9) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) -0.2 (0.8) 03 (0.8) 
d. diversification 0.5(9.2) -0.1 (-1.5) 0.1(1.1) 0.1 (2.1) -0.0 (-0.4) 0.2 (2.6) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.4(2.3) -0.1 (0.0) -0.5(4.1) 0.0 (0.0) 
d. certain income -0.2 (1.9) 0.1 (0.9) -0.0 (-0.1) -0.0 (-02) 0.1 (1.7) 0.1 (1.9) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -OA(6S) 0.4(1.9) 0.0 (0.0) 0.7 (63) 
df 230 233 233 233 233 233 232 232 232 232 146 146 172 172 
0.04 0.24 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.17 
% corr.: pr. chance 75:52 80:64 80:67 81 :65 86:76 
"For each independent variable the table shows the partial regression coefficient B and a value to assess significance (t-value and Wald statistic for multiple and logistic 
regression respectively). The goodness-of-fit of the regression models is indicated by the adjusted R2 (for multiple regression) and the percentage of observations correctly 
classified relative to the proportional chance (in case of logistic regression). Variables and models significant at PS0.05 and PS0.10 are in bold and italics respectively. 
2'a' refers to socioeconomic variables, 'b' to relative risk attitude, 'c' to sources of risk, and'd' to risk management strategies, 'n.i.' stands for 'not included'. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating a more risk averse attitude and 1 a less risk averse attitude. 
"Measured as dummy variables with 0 indicating that the risk was not mentioned as 'bearable' or 'insurance appreciated for', and 1 that the risk was mentioned in that way. 
'Measured by two dummy variables 'd-p' and 'd-m' with 0 indicating dairy (d) farms, and I pig (p) and mixed (m) farms respectively. 
6This row compares mixed (m) and pig (p) farms. In the dummy variable 'm-p' mixed farms are indicated by a 0, pig farms by a 1. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating no partnership and 1 indicating a form of partnership. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating that there is no successor available and 1 indicating that there is a successor available or that this is yet unknown. 
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3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Perceptions of risk and risk management 
In interpreting the perceptions of risk and risk management attention was focused on the 
average scores of all farmers included in the analyses. However, there was considerable 
variation in the answers given, as indicated by the standard deviations in the tables 3.4 and 
3.5. Standard deviations were highest for price contracts for farm inputs and outputs (see 
Table 3.5). Compared to previous studies (which also used Likert-type scales ranging from 1 
to 5; Boggess et al., 1985; Patrick et al., 1985), however, standard deviations in the current 
research are relatively low, indicating either larger consensus among Dutch livestock farmers 
or that the farmers in the survey were a fairly homogeneous group. Other aspects of previous 
studies (such as the risks and risk management strategies that were perceived as most 
important) are difficult to compare with the current study because of the different 
questionnaires used and the different farming and risk environments. 
3.6.2 Variables that relate to the perceptions of risk and risk management 
A number of regression analyses were carried out to explore relationships between farmers' 
perceptions of risk and their risk management strategies. All models had a low goodness-of-fit 
(see last two rows of Table 3.6)—even given some upward bias from estimating and testing 
the models on the same data. The low goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that farmers' 
perceptions are very personal (i.e. varying from farmer to farmer) and/or that important 
variables explaining farmers' perceptions were not included in the questionnaire. The last 
alternative is not very likely, given the large number of topics covered in the questionnaire. 
The first alternative, i.e. the farmer-specificity of perceptions, is in line with other studies 
(Boggess et al., 1985; Wilson et al., 1988; Wilson et al., 1993). 
3.6.3 Future outlook 
Although the results indicate farmer-specificity of perceptions, useful insights for advisers, 
policymakers, and developers and sellers of (new) risk management strategies appear from the 
research. Tests for internal validity of the models support this. For example, it was found that 
dairy farmers perceive 'a certain income' (referring to strategies of off-farm investment, off-
farm employment, and the use of futures and options markets, see Table 3.5) as an important 
risk management strategy. Advisers may anticipate on this by providing the needed education 
and infrastructure in these fields. 
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The insight that pig farmers perceive diversification (away from the current business) as a 
relevant risk management strategy may help policymakers in combating current 
environmental problems in the pig sector. 
It was shown that farmers perceive the risks they take themselves as less serious than those 
taken by other farmers. This may be relevant for insurers; such perceptions may reduce 
farmers' interest in insurance schemes since farmers may have the feeling that they are paying 
for the risks taken by others. Risk classification and premium differentiation based on 
objective and transparent measures of risk may reduce such problems. 
The insight that there is a direct relationship between the perceived importance of 
insurance and the risk factor 'legislation' (referring to among others elimination of 
government support) may be an incentive for insurers to develop insurance products in the 
areas from which governments are (financially) withdrawing. An insurance for epidemic 
disease risks may be such an example. 
If people working in the field of risk and risk management are going to use similar studies, 
they have to note that results reflect farmers' perceptions of risk management strategies, 
which is not necessarily the same as the extent to which they would actually adopt such 
strategies. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The goal of this study was to obtain empirical insight into farmers' perceptions of risk and 
risk management, and into variables relating to these perceptions. From the questionnaire 
survey these insights were obtained for a large group of farmers. Results presented are those 
of professional livestock farms (since small farms were filtered out), and are hence not 
completely representative for the average Dutch livestock farmer (as indicated in Table 3.1). 
In general, price and production risks were perceived as important sources of risk. 
Insurance (both commercial insurance and 'on-farm' insurance such as producing at lowest 
possible costs and applying strict hygienic rules) was perceived as a relevant strategy to 
manage risks. More detailed analyses of the perceptions show that dairy farmers generally 
saw price risks (and other financial risks) as very important, while pig and mixed farmers 
were more likely to rank production risks as very important. Insurance was perceived 
relatively less important by mixed farmers than by other farmers. Results provide useful 
insights for policymakers, advisers, and developers and sellers of (new) risk management 
strategies. 
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Table I Results of multivariate regressions for risk and risk management for dairy farms.1 
Risk Risk management 
Rel. risk Sources of risk (factors and conditional) Strategies Open-ended questions' i 
Independent attitude3 fam. financ. legist prod. change milk milk land price risk insurance divers. certain bearable: ins. appr: ins. appr 
variables2 health yield price rent red. income weather ep. dis. price 
a. ownership5 0.8 (1.7) 03(1.1) 0.1 (0.4) 03(1.0)-0.1 (-0.3) 03 (1.5) 0.3 (1.2) 0.3 (1.7) -0.3 (-13) 0.1 (0.4) -0.3 (-13) -0.1 (-0.5) 0.1 (0.5) 23 (6.5) 1.0(0.9) -1.0(2.2) 
a. successor6 0.9 (1.6) 0.5 (2.0) 0.1 (0.4) 03 (0.7) 0.3(1.2) 0.5 (2.1) -03 (-0.6) 03 (1.4) 03(0.5) -0.2 (-1.0) 0.1(0.3) -0.1 (-0.5) -0.1 (-0.4) 0.3 (0.1) -2.8(53) 1.1 (0.7) 
a. gr. farm income 0.3 (0.8) -0.0 (-02)-0.2 (-1.8) -0.2 (-1.6) -0.1 (-1.6) 0.1 (1.5) 0.1 (0.7) -0.1 (-1.3)-03 (-2.5) 0.1(1.4) 0.0(0.4) -0.2 (-1.7) 0.2(1.7) 0.7(2.8) -0.2 (0.1) 0.3 (0.6) 
a. solvency -0.2 (1.4 -0.0 (-0.5) -03 (-4.6) 0.1 (0.7) 0.1 (1.4) -0.1 (-2.1) -0.1 (-0.7) -0.0 (-0.8) 0.1 (0.6) -03 (-33) 0.0(0.5) 0.1 (1.8) 0.0(0.6) -0.4 (1.3) 03 (0.4) 0.0 (0.0) 
a. size 0.0 (5.0) -0.0 (-2.0) 0.0 (1.1) 0.0 (0.1) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0(1.2) -0.0 (-0.5) 0.0 (0.2) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.0(1.7) 0.0(1.0) -0.0 (-13) 0.0 (0.0) -0.0(0.7) 0.0 (0.3) 
a. age 0.5 (3.8) 0.1 (1.2)-0.0 (-0.4) 0.1 (0.6) 0.1 (1.0) -0.0 (-0.0) 0.1 (1.6) 0.0 (0.4) -0.0 (-03) -0.1 (-1.1) -03 (-2.1) -0.0 (-0.4) -0.0 (-03) 0.5 (2.2) -1.0(3.0) 03 (0.4) 
a. education 0.3 (0.5) -0.2 (-1.0) 0.1 (0.5) 0.3 (1.9) 03(2.1) -0.2 (-1.6) -0.1 (-0.6) 0.1 (0.7) 0.0(0.2) -0.1 (-0.8) -0.2 (-1.1) 03(23) 0.3 (1.9) -0.5 (0.4) 0.3 (0.1) -0.5 (0.5) 
a. hrs. off-f.work -0.0(1.9) -0.0 (-2S) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.0(1.1) -0.0 (-1.6) -0.0 (-13) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (0.5) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.0(0.9) 0.0(25) 0.0(3.9) -0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) -0.0 (0.5) 
b. rel. risk attitude3 n.i. 02 (1.4) 0.0(0.3) -0.3 (-1.7) -0.1 (-0.5) -OS (-3.5) -0.0 (-03) -0.1 (-0.9) 0.1 (0.4) 03 (1.9) -0.1 (-0.7) 0.4 (2.1) -0.0 (-0.1) 03 (0.1) 1.0 (1.3) -0.5 (0.6) 
c. family health 0.5 (3.5) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.1 (-1.8) 0.0(0.4) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.0 (03) -0.4(1.1) -0.1 (0.0) 0.3 (0.6) 
c. financial 0.0 (0.0) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.1 (-0.8) 0.1(1.5) 0.1 (1.1) 0.0(0.1) -0.1 (0.0) 03 (0.4) 0.2 (0.2) 
c. legislation -0.5 (3.6) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.0(0.3) 0.1(1.6) 0.0 (0.5) -0.1 (-1.1) -0.1 (0.1) -0.3 (0.6) 03 (0.7) 
c. production -0.3 (1.2) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1(0.9) 03(2.0) 0.1 (0.6) 0.1 (1.6) -0.6 (2.5) -0.1 (0.0) 03(0.3) 
c. change -1.1 (12.1) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 03 (33) -0.1 (-0.6) 03(2.7) 03(23) 0.4 (0.9) -03(0.2) 0.0(0.0) 
c. milk yield 0.0 (0.0) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1(1.6) 0.0(0.0) 0.0 (03) -0.0 (-0.1) -0.5 (3.1) -0.5 (0.9) 0.2 (0.4) 
c. milk price -0.5 (2.1) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1 (1.0) 0.1 (1.3) -0.0 (-03) 0.1 (0.6) -0.3 (0.4) -0.5 (0.9) 0.4(0.6) 
c. land rent 0.3 (2.0) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 03 (2.7) -0.1 (-1.0) -0.1 (-0.9) 0.0 (0.5) 0.4 (1.9) 0.3 (0.6) -0.3 (1.0) 
d. price risk red. 0.6 (5.2) -0.2 (-1.7) 0.0 (0.2) 0.1 (1.1) 0.0 (0.3) 03 (3.6) 0.2 (1.9) 0.0(0.1) 03 (2.7) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.3 (0.6) -0.3 (0.3) -0.5 (2.0) 
d. insurance -0.1 (0..3) 0.1 (1.0) 0.1 (1.9) 0.1 (1.6) 0.1 (1.8) -0.1 (-1.1) 0.0 (0.5) 0.1 (1.7) 0.0 (0.3) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 03 (0.6) -0.6(2.5) 0.3 (0.9) 
d. diversification 0.6 (4.9) -0.0 (-03) 0.1 (0.9) 0.1 (0.7) 0.0 (0.3) 03 (2.1) 0.0 (0.0) -0.0(-0A) -0.1 (-0.5) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.4(1.1) -23(85) -0.2(0.3) 
d. certain income -0.2 (0.8) 0.1 (1.2) -0.0 (-0.1) -0.1 (-0.9) 0.1 (1.0) 0.0 (0.6) -0.0 (-03) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.4) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -13 (8.1) -0.1 (0.4) 1.0 (73) 
df 125 137 137 137 137 137 144 147 142 127 127 127 127 72 86 86 
0.07 032 0.04 0.02 030 0.01 0.03 0.03 034 0.06 0.08 0.16 
% corr.: pr.chance 81:52 78:56 91 :73 81 :72 
'For each independent variable the table shows the partial regression coefficient B and a value to assess significance (t-value and Wald statistic for multiple and logistic 
regression respectively). The goodness-of-fit of the regression models is indicated by the adjusted R2 (for multiple regression) and the percentage of observations correctly 
classified relative to the proportional chance (in case of logistic regression). Variables and models significant at PS0.05 and PS0.10 are in bold and italics respectively. Due to 
low numbers of observations, no results are included for the open-ended question related to price risk as a bearable risk. 
2'a' refers to socioeconomic variables, 'b' to relative risk attitude, 'c' to sources of risk, and'd' to risk management strategies, 'n.i.' stands for 'not included'. 
3Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating a more risk averse attitude and 1 a less risk averse attitude. 
"Measured as dummy variables with 0 indicating that the risk was not mentioned as 'bearable' or 'insurance appreciated for', and 1 that the risk was mentioned in that way. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating no partnership and 1 indicating a form of partnership. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating that there is no successor available and 1 indicating that there is a successor available or that this is yet unknown. 
Table II Results of multivariate regressions for risk and risk management for pig farms.1 
Risk Risk management 
Sources of risk (factors and conditional) Strategies 
Independent fam. health financ. legist prod. change techn. res. meat price land rent price risk insurance divers certain 
variables2 red. income 
a. ownership3 0.5(1.5) 0.4(1.5) -0.0 (-03) -0.2 (-0.6) 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.4) -0.3 (-1.1) -0.4 (-1.4) 0.8(25) 0.0(0.1) -0.4 (-1.0) -0.4 (-1.6) 
a. successor4 -0.2 (-0.4) -0.2 (-0.6) 0.3(1.2) 0.1 (0.4) -0.0 (-0.1) 0.1 (0.2) -0.3 (-0.9) -0.0 (-0.0) 0.4 (1.3) -0.6 (-1.7) 0.2 (0.5) -0.7 (-23) 
a. gr. farm income 0.2 (0.6) -0.4 (-23) -0.3 (-1.5) -0.1 (-0.5) 0.2 (1.0) 0.0 (0.2) -0.1 (-0.5) -0.3 (-1.4) -0.1 (-0.4) 0.4 (1.8) -0.3 (-1.0) -0.1 (-0.6) 
a. solvency -0.1 (-1.0) -0.2 (-1.9) 03 (3.0) -0.1 (-1.1) -03 (-2.4) -0.2 (-2.4) 0.0(0.1) 03(1.1) -03 (-2.0) -0.3 (-1.7) 03(1.3) -0.0 (-0.3) 
a. size 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0(0.6) -0.0 (-0.6) 0.0(1.7) -0.0 (-1.6) -0.0 (-03) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.4) -0.0 (-2.7) 
a. age 0.1 (0.7) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.6) 03(1.2) 0.1 (0.8) -0.1 (-0.8) -0.1 (-1.0) -0.1 (-0.5) -0.1 (-0.8) -0.2 (-1.1) -0.1 (-0.5) -0.2 (-1.5) 
a. education 0.0 (0.1) -05 (-23) -0.4 (-1.9) 0.8 (33) 0.3(1.1) 0.0 (0.1) 03 (0.8) 0.1 (0.3) -0.1 (-03) 0.1 (0.4) -03 (-0.5) 0.1 (0.5) 
a. hrs. off-f.work 0.0(0.1) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0(1.0) -0.0 (-1.0) 0.0(1.7) -0.0 (-0.1) -0.0 (-1.4) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (0.7) -0.0 (-03) -0.0 (-2.8) 
b. rel. risk attitude' -0.3 (-0.6) 0.4(1.3) 0.3 (1.0) -0.2 (-0.5) -0.3 (-0.7) -0.3 (-1.0) -0.4 (-1.4) 03 (0.5) -0.1 (-03) -0.9 (-25) 1.1 (2.9) -0.8 (-2.7) 
c. family health n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1 (0.4) -0.0 (-0.2) -0.1 (-0.4) 0.0 (0.3) 
c. financial n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.1 (-0.4) 03(1.1) 0.0 (0.0) -0.1 (-03) 
c. legislation n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.3 (1.6) 0.4 (2.6) 0.4(1.9) 03(1.5) 
c. production n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 03 (1.5) 03 (2.1) •0.0 (-03) 03 (1.4) 
c. change n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.2 (-1.1) -03 (-2.0) 0.1 (0.6) 03(2.1) 
c. techn. results n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.3 (-1.6) 03 (0.9) -0.1 (-0.7) -0.1 (-0.8) 
c. meat price n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1 (0.7) -03 (-13) 0.1 (0.3) -03 (-2.4) 
c. land rent n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 0.1 (0.4) -0.1 (-0.7) -0.0 (-0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 
d. price risk red. -0.1 (-0.4) 0.1 (0.4) 02 (1.6) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) -03 (-1.3) 0.0 (0.3) 0.1 (0.6) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 
d. insurance 0.1 (0.5) 0.1 (0.6) 0.2 (1.7) 03 (1.7) -A3 (-2.1) 03 (2.0) 0.0 (0.3) -0.2 (-1.1) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 
d. diversification -0.1 (-0.8) 0.0 (0.3) 03 (2.1) -0.1 (-0.5) 0.1 (1.0) -0.1 (-0.7) 0.1 (0.6) 0.1 (0.5) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 
d. certain income -0.0 (-0.1) 0.0(0.1) 0.2(1.1) 0.0 (0.2) 0.4 (23) -03 (-23) -03 (-23) 0.2 (0.9) n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 
df 45 45 45 45 45 52 49 48 34 34 34 34 
R2«t -0.04 036 038 0.12 0.13 0.07 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.46 
'For each independent variable the table shows the partial regression coefficient B and the t-value. The goodness-of-fit of the regression models is indicated by the adjusted 
R2. Variables and models significant at PS0.05 and P<0.10 are in bold and italics respectively. Due to low numbers of observations, no results are included for relative risk 
attitude and the open-ended questions. 
2 , a' refers to socioeconomic variables, 'b' to relative risk attitude, 'c' to sources of risk, and'd' to risk management strategies, 'n.i.' stands for 'not included'. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating no partnership and 1 indicating a form of partnership. 
4Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating that there is no successor available and 1 indicating that there is a successor available or that this is yet unknown. 
'Measured as a dummy variable with 0 indicating a more risk averse attitude and la less risk averse attitude. 
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4. CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING AN INCOME 
INSURANCE FOR EUROPEAN FARMERS* 
Abstract 
Price and production risks in European agriculture are likely to increase in the future. Present 
agricultural risk markets to deal with price and production risks are limited in scope. In this 
context, this chapter discusses the feasibility of a form of income insurance for crop and 
livestock farmers in Europe which provides more extended protection. Alternative income 
insurance designs and related problems of asymmetric information are discussed. These 
problems lead to the recommendation that there are opportunities for revenue insurance 
schemes for field crops to begin testing income insurance in Europe. In particular area yields 
and observed spot market or futures market prices could be used initially. A Monte-Carlo 
simulation model illustrates the problems with respect to the use of individual farm yield data, 
and the sensitivity of impact and cost of insurance schemes to price and yield variability, 
correlations and insurance design. 
4.1 Introduction 
Income from farming is rather volatile due to stochastic factors that affect production and 
prices. Throughout the years, various risk management tools have been used to reduce, or to 
assist farmers to absorb, some of these risks. Also the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union has taken away some of the risks through a variety of mechanisms that support 
prices of many agricultural products. 
However, price and production risks are likely to increase in the future (Harvey, 1997; 
Boehlje and Lins, 1998). International trade agreements can be expected to lead to price 
liberalisation and to more exposure of European farmers to competitive market forces. 
Furthermore, as trade is expanded, new quality requirements may be defined for farm 
products, such as stricter rules for use of herbicides and medicines. As a result, production 
risk is also likely to increase. These developments may cause the variability in income from 
farming to increase. 
Present agricultural risk markets to deal with price and production risks are limited. For 
example, in most European countries, arable farmers can insure against loss of crop 
production caused by only a few pre-specified named perils. For livestock farms usually no 
Paper by Meuwissen, M.P.M., Hardaker, J.B., Skees, J.R., Black, J.R. and Huirne, R.B.M., 
submitted for publication to Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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low-yield insurance exists, but insurance against stock mortality from specific accidental 
causes is generally available. Price risks can be managed to some extent by forward 
contracting or by hedging on futures markets. The latter option, however, is available for very 
few commodities and can also be subject to considerable basis risk.14 
In this context, this chapter examines the feasibility of a form of income insurance for crop 
and livestock farmers in Europe which provides more extended protection. The chapter begins 
with aspects that determine the attractiveness of income insurance to farmers (section 4.2). 
Section 4.3 does the same from an insurers' point of view. In section 4.4, conceptual ideas are 
illustrated by a Monte-Carlo simulation model. Section 4.5 contains the conclusions and 
issues for further research. Throughout the chapter, experiences with crop revenue schemes in 
Canada (Turvey, 1992) and the US (Goodwin and Ker, 1998; Skees et al., 1998) have been 
taken into consideration. 
4.2 Income insurance: attractive to farmers? 
The reason why farmers may be willing to buy some form of income insurance is that they are 
risk averse (Skees and Reed, 1986; Hardaker et aL, 1997; Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
They are therefore willing to pay some premium to avoid losses, especially catastrophic losses 
that threaten the survival of their farm businesses (Goodwin and Smith, 1995). Although it is 
possible to make some theoretical estimates, the willingness of farmers to pay for specific 
forms of income insurance cover can only be established with confidence by pilot testing and 
will furthermore depend on such factors as: 
1. The income measure used. Schemes that cover losses at a higher level of aggregation are 
potentially more attractive to farmers than schemes that insure only separate components 
of the income, because covering higher aggregation levels deals with losses closer to the 
welfare of a farm family. Compare for example whole-farm income insurance versus 
commodity-wise gross revenue insurance (Tweeten et al., 1994). 
2. The level of risk reduction provided by an insurance scheme. The impact of an insurance 
scheme on farmers' risks depends on several factors, such as the level of deductibles 
applied, and the correlation between the measure used for indemmfication and the actual 
value for the farmer. For example, an area-based insurance scheme bases indemnification 
for individual insured farmers on aggregated area yields. If the individual farmers' yields 
are not closely correlated with the area yields (i.e. when there is much basis risk), the 
insurance does not provide much risk protection (Skees et aL, 1997). 
In Europe, futures markets exist for rape seed, potatoes, piglets, fattening pigs and eggs. According to Atkin 
(1989), the importance of futures markets in Europe is reduced due to the existence of the Common Agriculture 
Policy. 
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3. Subsidies provided by the government. If governments subsidise insurance to some extent, 
the likelihood that insurers will set premiums at levels that farmers will find attractive will 
be higher. On the other hand, the availability of other forms of subsidy that give farmers 
higher and more stable incomes reduces the chances that farmers will want to buy 
commercial income insurance (Robison and Barry, 1987). Price support schemes, 
governmental ad hoc provision of disaster assistance, and low interest loans fall into this 
latter category of a disincentive to insure (Glauber and Miranda, 1994). 
4. The availability of other strategies to manage income risk. For example, part-time farming 
is important in the former BRD (West-Germany), Italy and Denmark. In these countries, 
more than half of the income of the average agricultural household comes from non-farm 
sources (Folmer et al., 1995). 
43 Income insurance: farmers' ideal versus feasibility 
Although individual farmers may wish to have insurance schemes that cover actual deviations 
from their expected farm income, possible problems of asymmetric information make such 
schemes problematic. Furthermore, problems of systemic risk may inhibit any development of 
such insurance. 
Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information exists when the would-be insured knows more about the risk being 
insured than does the insurer, which is rather the rule then the exception (Borch, 1990). Such 
asymmetry of information can lead to the dual problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Moral hazard occurs when an individual purchases an insurance policy and as a result of 
having purchased that policy alters his/her behaviour (production or management practices) so as 
to increase the potential magnitude of a loss and/or the probability of a loss. Adverse selection 
occurs when those purchasing insurance face a higher risk than those who do not, so that rates 
developed on aggregate data underestimate the cost of indemnities to the insurer (Harrington and 
Niehaus,1999). 
To minimise the problems arising from asymmetric information, an insurance scheme 
should ideally cover only (Rejda, 1998): 1) accidental and unintentional losses; if losses are 
influenced by the management of the insured, problems of moral hazard are likely to arise, 2) 
measures for which proper risk classification and rate making are possible (which requires the 
availability of sufficient and reliable data), and 3) losses that are determinable and 
measurable: for a proper loss assessment, the amount of loss and the extent to which the loss 
was caused by an insured event need to be unambiguous. 
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In practice, all these conditions may not be fully satisfied, yet it may still be possible to 
develop a feasible income insurance scheme by using tools such as deductibles and co-
payments. For income insurance, the severity of problems of asymmetric information depends 
in large degree on the income measure insured. The pros and cons of different measures are 
reviewed below: 
1. Whole-farm income insurance. Insuring whole-farm income as such is not possible because 
it includes aspects such as farm operating costs and inventories, which are strongly 
influenced and easily manipulated by the management of the insured. Furthermore, in 
calculating premium rates, sufficient data on whole-farm incomes calculated in an 
acceptable and consistent way may not be available. Programs such as the Canadian NISA 
do work on a whole-farm basis but are not strictly forms of insurance (Skees, 1999a). 
2. Whole-farm gross revenue insurance. Insurance for the gross revenue earned from a 
combination of several commodities on a farm is only feasible if there is insight into the 
correlations between commodities and if the revenues from each of the commodities 
substantially fulfil the requirements listed below for commodity gross revenue insurance. If 
there are only a few commodities for which these conditions are met, whole-farm gross 
revenue insurance is not possible, although gross revenue insurance for specific 
commodities may be feasible. 
3. Commodity gross revenue insurance. Insuring the gross revenue earned from the 
production of a given commodity implies insuring the product of the price and yield of that 
commodity- For insurers to set adequate premiums, they need information on the joint 
distribution of prices and yields. Since prices and yields may not be stochastically 
independent, the information needs to derive the full joint distribution are considerable. An 
extra difficulty arises if the joint distribution changes over time, for example as a result of 
market liberalisation. In addition to issues of jointness and non-stationarity, problems of 
asymmetric information arise in relation to the marginal distributions of the price and yield 
components, as discussed below. 
Yield 
This passage first focuses on yields from field crops. Yields calculated on an area basis (rather 
than individual farm or field yields) cannot be influenced much by the individual farmer and 
could therefore be a good basis for insurance (Miranda, 1991; Wang et al., 1998). However, 
the latter is only true if the area yields can be measured reliably. Furthermore, for reasons of 
basis risk for farmers contemplating buying insurance, area-yield data can only be used in 
insurance contracts in areas where yields are highly correlated across farms (Skees et al., 
1997). If individual farm yields are to be used, instruments such as deductibles, no-claim 
bonuses, monitoring the behaviour of individual insureds (to be sure that good agricultural 
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practices are followed), monitoring commodities just before or at harvest time, and the use of 
a farmer's historical moving average to establish the insured level of yields are necessary to 
reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection problems inherent to the use of farm-level data 
(Nelson and Loehman, 1987; Chambers, 1989; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993). Also 
the weather and soil conditions at the time of planting should be monitored. If farmers plant 
their crops later than normal and/or under less than optimal conditions, the insured level of 
gross revenue should be adjusted downwards. In this way, the required ratio between 
premiums collected and expected indemnity payments can be maintained. If such adjustments 
are not made, the sales closing dates must be enough in advance that farmers have no 
information to determine probable planting dates. 
In covering the yield of livestock commodities and horticultural crops in glasshouses, 
moral hazard problems are to be expected. These commodities do not have a clear 
'harvesting' time, as with most field crops, but are produced 'continuously'. This may allow 
insured farmers to manipulate the timing of sales in order to make an unjustified claim on the 
insurer. Furthermore, for livestock and crops in glasshouses yield fluctuations are usually not 
large (see for example Rasmussen, 1997). The fluctuations that do occur are much more 
sensitive to management than for field crops (for which weather related events usually cause 
most of the fluctuation), implying extra difficulties of moral hazard. Using the concept of 
area-based schemes would not be an option, because yields of livestock and crops in 
glasshouses are not likely to be highly correlated across farms, as can be the case for crops in 
the field. 
Price 
To account for price effects in an insurance scheme, reliable measures are needed of the 
actual price for all relevant grades of each insured commodity at harvest or sale time. Prices 
realised by individual farmers can be problematical since they may be too strongly influenced 
by the management of the insured. Observed spot market prices can be useful for well-
functioning markets with good reporting systems. Well-functioning markets are those with 
high transparency indicated by a high degree of market integration, meaning that prices for 
the same commodity in different places are closely similar (see for example Faminow and 
Benson, 1990)15. If relevant futures markets exist, prices derived from such markets can also 
be used. As Heifher (1996) notes, such prices are "easily observed, unambiguous, and not 
subject to manipulation". 
With respect to the prices at harvest or sale time, two additional issues need to be 
considered. First, price declines can hardly be linked to specific events. This implies that the 
insured event is 'low prices', which reinforces the need of using a reliable measure for price. 
1 5 Ongoing vertical integration (Barry et al., 1992) will affect such transparency of price information. 
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Second, at harvest or sale time, the quality of any commodity can be less than the quality 
agreed upon in the insurance contract. This loss of quality can be due to seasonal effects, but 
also due to 'bad management'. If loss of quality is excluded from coverage, the insurance 
scheme provides less protection for the farmer. On the other hand, including loss of quality 
can clearly involve significant moral hazard problems. This implies that covering the price 
risks of commodities from which the price is largely determined by quality issues, such as 
with apples, is likely to be problematical. 
Besides measures of the actual price at harvest or sale time, insurers need to make forecasts 
of that price in order to properly rate the insurance. These forecasts should be based on price 
movements within the season: serious problems can arise if long run averages of prices are 
used (Skees, 1999a). In insuring price movements within the season, insurers will have to 
account for the existence of price cycles and trends. This will force them to use as much 
actual market information as possible and to reset the prices on which the insured level of 
gross revenue is based each year. Futures markets may be helpful instruments, since futures 
prices may be presumed to reflect all market information available (Purcell, 1991). 
In conclusion, due to problems of asymmetric information, the most aggregated form of 
income insurance that is likely to be feasible to begin pilot tests with is revenue insurance for 
field crops16, in particular if based on area yields and observed spot market or futures market 
prices. Such insurance may cover multiple perils (with 'low prices' being one of the insured 
perils) or 'all risks' (with certain rninimum requirements for good agricultural practices). 
Problems with respect to the use of individual farm yields are illustrated in section 4.4 by a 
Monte-Carlo simulation model. 
Systemic risk 
Both components of revenue, i.e. price and yield, are systemic, meaning that multiple insureds 
can suffer losses at the same time (Skees et al., 1997). Insurance companies have problems 
pooling such risks themselves and adequate reinsurance capacity is not usually available when 
the scale of the systemic risk is large (Jaffee and Russell, 1997; Miranda and Glauber, 1997). 
For these reasons, some form of public-private partnership may well be necessary for insurers 
to enter this revenue insurance market. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into details 
of such partnership. Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997) and Barnett (1999) discuss the advantages 
of having governments financially involved through such partnership. Possible problems and 
pitfalls are discussed by Skees (1999b). Lewis and Murdock (1996) and Skees and Barnett 
(1999) discuss market-based alternatives for public-private partnerships. 
1 6 Less aggregated forms of 'income' insurance are yield insurance for quality goods (for example apples) and, 
possibly, price insurance for livestock and for horticultural commodities in glasshouses. 
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4.4 Monte-Carlo simulation 
A Monte-Carlo simulation model (Hammersley and Handscomb, 1965) is developed to 
illustrate conceptual differences between the (more aggregated) gross revenue insurance on 
the one hand, and separate yield and price insurance schemes on the other. All insurance 
schemes use farm-level yield data, because area data were not available. The model runs on a 
commodity basis and is developed in @Risk, an 'add-in' in Excel (Palisade, 1995). 
4.4.1 Description of the model 
Differences between gross revenue insurance and separate yield and price insurance are 
illustrated by the cost of the insurance schemes, and the impact of the schemes on a farmer's 
income risk. 
The cost of insurance schemes is represented by the expected claim cost (Harrington and 
Niehaus, 1999). Vox yield insurance, the expected claim cost is calculated from a distribution 
reflecting the within-farm yield variability of a homogeneous group of farmers (in the current 
study all farmers in a region). In this way, the expected claim cost reflects variation in 
production from the region rather than from one farmer. Using the vvithin-farm yield 
variability of a group of farmers implies that data are relative (and the expected claim cost a 
percentage), because each yield observation for each farm in each year first needs to be 
expressed as a percentage of the average yield of that farm before it is included in the 
distribution. For price insurance, the expected claim cost is derived from observed (i.e. non-
farm) price data. For similarity reasons with the expected claim cost of yield insurance, price 
data were also expressed in a relative way (i.e. as a percentage of the average price). To 
calculate the expected claim cost for revenue insurance, yield and price distributions are 
multiplied given a certain price/yield correlation. The formula for the expected claim cost 
ECC%fc,t of revenue insurance for farmer ƒ commodity c, and year t is as follows (see 
Appendix for formulas on price and yield insurance): 
The expected claim cost (equation la) equals the integral from 0 to R%insfXi, of the 
probability density function of revenue data r%CJ. R%insfx,t (equation lb) is the percentage 
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revenue insured by farmer f, measured as 1 minus the deductible d%ftC,t. r%c,t (equation lc) 
reflects the joint distribution of yields and prices. 
The impact of the insurance schemes on a farmer's income risk is measured by the 
variability of a farmer's income and the chance of a 'bad outcome' (here interpreted as the 
chance of an income lower than 25 per cent of the average income). A farmer's income is 
reflected by his/her net return to management and labour NRf,c/. 
NR = 7 *ƒ> - r *VCr (2) 
where YftC¡t represents the actual yield of farmer ƒ of commodity c, Pf,c,t the actual price of that 
commodity for farmer f, and FC/C)< the variable costs. In the simulations, the variable costs 
were set to zero. If a farmer buys insurance, the net return to labour and management is 
diminished by a premium PR/,c,t and increased by an indemnity (if triggered) IftCtt. The 
premium PRj,c,t for revenue insurance for commodity c 1 7 is calculated by multiplying the 
expected claim cost by the average revenue: 
PR, = ECC%t *RC (3a) 
f,cj f,cj f,cj 
s.t. R = 7 *P (3b) 
The average revenue of a farmer (equation 3b) is calculated by multiplying his/her average 
yield by an average observed price. An indemnity IfCJ (equation 4a) is triggered if the actual 
farmer's revenue RftCyt falls below the insured revenue Rinsf,c,t. The payment equals the 
difference between both values: 
/, = Rins, — R, R, <Rim, (4a) 
S.t. Rim =R%im *R/,» (4b) 
and R =Y *P (4c) 
The insured revenue (equation 4b) is the percentage revenue insured R%insfCtt times the 
average revenue. The farmer's actual revenue (equation 4c) equals the actual yield Y/At times 
an actual observed price PClt. 
7 No further specifications have been made according to grades of a commodity. 
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4.4.2 Yield and price data used in the model 
For yields, a large panel data set containing individual farm-yield data from the period 1989-
1995 (FADN Information European Commission) has been analysed. The data set includes 
annual data from six EU countries (Denmark, France, Germany (only the former BRD), 
Greece, Italy and the Netherlands) and four agricultural commodities (wheat, potatoes, sugar 
beet, and milk). The total data set covers 49 regions and about 13,000 farms. Insight into farm 
yield variability is obtained by calculating the coefficient of variation (CV) for each of the 
farms. For a number of regions, Table 4.1 shows the average CV, the CV of farm yields at the 
0.10 and 0.90 fractile for the sample, and the number of farms in the data set. 
Table 4.1 Yield variability (average values and fractile values for sample of n farms) and price variability (at the 
country level) in European agriculture. 
Yields' Prices2 
CV(%)3 n~ CV(%) 
Average 0.10 0.90 
Potatoes 
The Netherlands 12.2 7.1 17.6 43 41.6 
Ipiros-Peloponissos-Nissi Ioniou (Greece) 15.6 5.9 26.1 65 22.4 
Niedersachsen (Gennany) 18.4 9.8 28.5 84 26.9 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (France) 21.8 10.9 32.5 48 38.1 
Baden-Wurtemberg (Germany) 29.3 15.6 42.3 44 26.9 
Sugar beet 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) 9.1 4.6 14.0 65 5.6 
Niedersachsen (Germany) 11.0 6.6 16.1 108 5.6 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (France) 11.3 5.8 17.1 101 7.1 
Picardie (France) 12.4 6.2 18.4 112 7.1 
Denmark 12.7 8.3 18.2 77 7.3 
Marche (Italy) 21.1 8.4 32.6 255 2.8 
Wheat 
Pays de la Loire (France) 17.8 9.7 26.5 104 10.5 
Umbria (Italy) 13.6 6.5 24.6 175 9.8 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) 13.7 7.0 21.4 137 11.8 
Denmark 13.9 7.3 21.7 233 9.7 
Makedonia-Thraki (Greece) 25.6 11.4 43.2 284 6.5 
Milk 
The Netherlands 4.9 2.9 6.7 62 3.6 
Denmark 6.2 3.3 9.7 190 4.9 
Niedersachsen (Germany) 8.2 4.2 12.9 278 3.9 
Makedonia-Thraki (Greece) 16.6 6.6 30.2 101 9.6 
Valle d'Aoste (Italy) 16.7 10.0 24.6 122 6.9 
'Panel data for specific regions (FADN Information European Commission) from the period 1989-1995. 
2Prices at the country level (Eurostat, 1997) from the period 1986-1995. 
'Coefficient of variation (CV): (sd/mean)*100%. 
Table 4.1 shows that the average fluctuation of yields at farm level, as measured by the 
corresponding CVs, differs considerably among regions. Yield fluctuations are especially low 
for milk in the Netherlands and Denmark (see also Rasmussen, 1997). 
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For prices, Eurostat data at the country level from the period 1986-1995 have been 
analysed (Eurostat, 1997). Calculated CVs are included in the last column of Table 4.1. The 
table shows that large differences exist between commodities that are under EU price support 
and those that are not: the CVs of prices for potatoes (no price support) vary between 22.4 and 
41.6 per cent, whereas the CVs for milk prices (with price support) are below 10 per cent in 
all countries analysed. 
4.4.3 Results 
Results are presented for potatoes in the region of Baden-Wurtemberg (Germany) as an 
example. To illustrate the impact of the various insurance schemes on a farmer's income risk, 
three farms from the 44 farms in the available data set were chosen: one with a yield 
variability at the average level (CV«30 per cent, see Table 4.1), one with a low yield 
variability (at the 0.10 fractile; CV«16 per cent), and one with a high yield variability (at the 
0.90 fractile; CV»42 per cent). The following assumptions have been made: 1) the analysed 
country prices are used as the observed measures of price (CV«27 per cent), 2) farmers' 
prices have a variability that is 30 per cent higher, 3) the correlation between observed and 
farmers' prices is +0.5, 4) the correlation between yields and prices is 0, and 5) deductibles 
for all insurance schemes and all farmers are set to 20 per cent. 
Table 4.2 first shows results based on the empirical data and the above assumptions. 
Results are then shown for increased price and yield variability: the CV of observed prices is 
increased to 42 per cent (CV of potato prices in the Netherlands), and the CV of the yield 
distributions for the three farms is increased to 40, 29, and 53 per cent respectively.18 This 
'increased yield and price variability situation' is used to carry out three what-if scenarios: 
one with higher deductibles (50 per cent instead of 20 per cent), one with no basis risk for 
price (i.e. the correlation between observed and farmers' prices becomes +1), and one with a 
natural hedge effect (i.e. the correlation between yields and prices becomes - l 1 9 ) . 
From the first part of Table 4.2 (empirical data), it can be seen that a gross revenue 
insurance costs more than separate yield and price insurance (compare expected claim cost of 
6.5 and 5.5 per cent respectively), but also has a larger impact on the variability of income 
(the CV of the income of the farmer with the average yield variability becomes 37.4 per cent 
with the separate schemes, while 35.8 per cent with gross revenue insurance). 
This was done by introducing a catastrophic event (by a Poisson distribution) with a frequency of on average 
once per four year and a variation per year of 0 to 3. If the catastrophic event occurs 1, 2, or 3 times within one 
year, yields decrease by 50,75, and 100 per cent respectively. 
1 9 Due to interaction with the correlation between farmers' and observed prices of +0.5, the eventual correlation 
between yields and prices is about -0.5. 
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Table 4.2 Expected claim cost, and simulation results (income variability and chance of bad outcome) of 1000 
©Risk-iterations for three farms (potato farms in Baden-Wurtemberg, Germany) that differ in their variability of 
farm yields. 
Average yield var. Low yield variability High yield variability 
Exp.cl. CVNR NR< Exp.cl. CVNR NR< Exp.cl. CVNR NR< 
cost 25% cost 25% cost 25% 
(%) (%)' (%)2 (%) (%)' (%)2 (%) (%)' (%)
2 
Empirical data3 
No insurance 0 40.7 0 0 30.1 0 0 51.8 0 
Gross revenue insurance4 6.5 35.8 0 6.5 30.0 0 6.5 41.0 0 
Yield and price insurance5 5.5 37.4 0 5.5 31.8 0 5.5 41.4 0 
Increased yield and price variability6 
No insurance 0 72.6 13.1 0 64.5 12 0 80.2 13.6 
Gross revenue insurance 10.6 64.3 8.3 10.6 58.2 8.5 10.6 67.5 5.5 
Yield and price insurance 13.9 65.0 8.1 13.9 58.7 8.4 13.9 67.1 5.9 
Higher deductibles 
No insurance 0 70.7 14.4 0 64.7 11.9 0 83.5 13.8 
Gross revenue insurance 2.4 68.3 11.9 2.4 63.4 10.1 2.4 79.2 9.6 
Yield and price insurance 1.2 69.2 13.2 1.2 64.3 12.3 1.2 80.8 11.6 
No basis risk for price 
No insurance 0 70.7 13.5 0 63.8 12.7 0 80.3 13.3 
Gross revenue insurance 10.6 58.5 3.8 10.6 53.9 2.3 10.6 65.3 2.8 
Yield and price insurance 13.9 58.5 0 13.9 53.0 0 13.9 63.9 0 
Natural hedge between yields and prices 
No insurance 0 62.6 10.1 0 57.0 11.0 0 67.7 8.6 
Gross revenue insurance 5.5 55.5 8.3 5.5 52.4 7.9 5.5 56.1 4.8 
Yield and price insurance 13.9 61.2 10.2 13.9 56.8 9.3 13.9 61.3 7.6 
'Coefficient of variation (CV) = (sd/mean)* 100%. NR = net return to management and labour, 
frequency of NR being less than 25% of the average NR. 
3CVs of yields of average, low, and high-variability farm: 30%, 16%, and 42% respectively; CV of observed 
price: 27%. 
Loss ratio for average, low, and high-variability farm: 1.0,0.3, and 1.8 respectively. 
'Loss ratio for average, low, and high-variability farm: 1.0,0.1, and 1.9 respectively. 
6CVs of yields of average, low, and high-variability farm: 40%, 29%, and 53% respectively; CV of observed 
price: 42%. 
The table also illustrates that the schemes provide more risk protection to the farmer with the 
high yield variability than to the farmer with the lower yield variability. The footnotes 4 and 5 
under the table furthermore show that for both insurance situations, the loss ratio (indemnities 
received divided by premiums paid) is smaller than 1 for the 'low-variability' farmer and 
larger than 1 for the 'high-variability' farmer, indicating that the farmer with the low yield 
variability pays more in premiums than (s)he receives in indemnities, while for the farmer 
with the high yield variability it is just the other way around. Such differences would in 
practice lead to problems of adverse selection (Skees and Reed, 1986; U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1993; Wang et aL, 1998). 
With increased yield and price variability (second part of the table), gross revenue 
insurance costs less than separate yield and price insurance (compare expected claim cost of 
10.6 and 13.9 per cent respectively) and has still more effect on the farmer's income risk than 
the separate schemes. However, with higher deductibles (third part of table), gross revenue 
insurance becomes again more expensive. In the situation of no basis risk for price, the 
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separate price and yield schemes become more effective. The last part of the table (natural 
hedge between yields and prices) illustrates that in case of a natural hedge the need for an 
insurance decreases (as indicated by the reduced variability of farmers' incomes). However, 
revenue insurance accounts for such natural hedge, which results in lower expected claim cost 
(5.5 per cent). The costs of separate yield and price insurance stay the same (13.9 per cent). 
The 'increased yield and price variability situation' together with the what-if scenarios 
illustrate that a more aggregated insurance (i.e. the revenue insurance) can be more effective 
and even less expensive in a number of situations. Results, however, show that outcomes are 
very sensitive to price and yield variability, price and yield correlation, and insurance design 
(for example with respect to deductibles and basis risk). 
4.5 Conclusions and further research 
European farmers' price and yield risks are likely to increase in the future. Given that present 
agricultural risk markets to deal with yield and price risks are limited, this study focused on 
the feasibility of a form of income insurance as a new risk management tool for farmers. 
From a farmers' point of view, income insurance schemes that cover losses at a higher level 
of aggregation, i.e. closer to the welfare of a farm family, are more attractive than schemes 
that cover only separate components of farm income (for example yield). However, from an 
insurers' point of view, the more aggregated measures of income (for example whole-farm 
income) are not insurable for reasons of asymmetric information. 
The most aggregated form of income insurance that is likely to be feasible to begin pilot 
tests in Europe with is revenue insurance for field crops, in particular if based on area yields 
and observed spot market or futures market prices. In pilot tests the appeal to farmers, the 
profitability to insurers, and the role of governments can be clarified. If there are several 
commodities for which revenue insurance appears to be feasible, insurance of the aggregated 
gross revenue from these commodities can be considered. 
Results of the Monte-Carlo simulation model illustrated the problems of using individual 
farm data: although premium rates were based on farm data of a relatively homogeneous area, 
levels of the loss ratio show that there would still be problems of adverse selection. With area-
based schemes, adverse selection problems can be significantly reduced and data 
requirements are in principle less extensive. Research should clarify whether homogeneous 
areas for field crops exist within European agriculture (and, if so, whether data can be 
collected in a reliable way). 
The model has also illustrated the sensitivity of impact and cost of insurance schemes to 
price and yield variability and correlation, and basis risk. This reinforces the value of accurate 
data and of simulation models with which what-if scenarios can be carried out. Further 
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research is recommended on a number of 'data issues'. For yields, data need to become 
available from a longer time period: seven-year data are too short to analyse trends and to 
develop premium rates. For price, analyses should be carried out to the within-year price 
variability. With respect to price/yield correlations, insight is needed into such levels per 
commodity, as well as between commodities and over time (intertemporal correlation). In 
relation to basis risk, more insight is needed into the correlation between 'observed levels of 
price' and actual farmers' prices. Research should also consider the opportunities of using 
Chicago Board of Trade futures and commodity prices or Rotterdam harbour prices as 
measures of insurable price for European agriculture. 
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Appendix Formulas for price insurance and yield insurance 
Price insurance 
The expected claim cost ECC%fXi, for price insurance is calculated from the probability distribution (PDF) of 
observed (here: country-level) prices (that are expressed relatively). For a specific fanner, the expected claim 
cost depends on the level of the price insured P%insf_CI: 
The premium PRfa, is calculated by multiplying the expected claim cost by the average observed price and the 
average farmer's yield: 
PRff)= ECC%f^PCJ*YUl <*0 
An indemnity IfiCJ is triggered if the actual observed price falls below the insured price. The payment equals the 
difference between both prices times the fanner's average yield: 
= (Pins^-PC,)*YUJ | P„ <P*.M (7a) 
S.t. Pirn, =P%im, *Pc (7b) U) f.» K ' 
Yield insurance 
The expected claim cost ECC%fA, is calculated from the PDF of farm yields (expressed relatively in order to 
include the within-farm yield variability of all farms in the region). For a specific farmer, the expected claim cost 
depends on the level of farm yields insured Y%insfC,;. 
The premium PRffCi, is calculated by multiplying the expected claim cost by the average farm's yield and the 
average observed price: 
ECC%^*YUJ*PCJ (9a) 
An indemnity IfA, is triggered if the actual farmer's yield falls below the insured yield. The payment equals the 
difference between both levels times the average observed price: 
J.CJ 
s.t. 
(Ytm, -Y, )*P 
K ft) J,C)' CJ 
Y <Yim, 
ft) S.CJ 
Yim =Y%lns *Y, 
(10a) 
(10b) 
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5. A MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSICAL 
SWINE FEVER EPIDEMICS: PRINCIPLES AND OUTCOMES* 
Abstract 
A model is presented aimed at a financial analysis of a Classical Swine Fever epidemic. 
Financial consequences are calculated for affected parties, including governments (EU and 
national), farms, and related industries in the production chain. The model can be used to 
calculate the losses from a real epidemic as well as of a simulated one. In this chapter, the 
model is applied to the 1997/98 epidemic of Classical Swine Fever in the Netherlands. 
Results show that total financial consequences of the epidemic are US $2.3 billion. 
Consequential losses for farmers and related industries are US $423 million and US $596 
million respectively. Budgetary consequences for governments include less than 50 per cent 
of the total losses calculated by the model. The model can easily be adapted to suit other 
diseases and countries. 
5.1 Introduction 
Epidemics in livestock generally involve many farms at the same time. In Germany in 1994, 
for example, 117 farms were infected with Classical Swine Fever (CSF). In Belgium in the 
same year, on 48 farms Classical Swine Fever was diagnosed. In the Netherlands in 1997/98, 
429 farms were infected with CSF and more than 60 per cent (i.e. 13,000) of the total number 
of pig farms in the Netherlands were confronted with one or more control measure (Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries, 1998). 
Countries of the European Union (EU) are obliged to apply the control measures as laid 
down in EU directives if an epidemic occurs. For CSF, these measures include stamping-out 
of infected herds and the establishment of a movement standstill in an area around infected 
herds (Council Directive 80/217/EEC). Pre-emptive slaughter is applied to herds that may 
have become infected as a result of their location and direct or indirect contact with the 
infected herd. Countries may—after EU approval—take additional control measures, such as 
the pre-emptive slaughter of all pig herds within a certain radius of an infected herd 
(Vanthemsche, 1995). A measure that is often applied for reasons of animal welfare in areas 
with a movement standstill is the so-called welfare slaughter of pigs that are ready to be 
Paper by Meuwissen, M.P.M., Horst, H.S., Huirne, R.B.M. and Dijkhuizen, A.A., 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, in press. 
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delivered (Pluimers et al., 1999). With welfare slaughter, as with pre-emptive slaughter and 
stamping-out, pigs are destroyed and do not enter the food chain. 
Because of the large number of farms involved, especially in densely populated livestock 
areas, financial consequences of epidemics can be extensive. These consequences range from 
compensations paid by governments for destroyed animals to the losses for farmers whose pig 
buildings are (partly) empty due to, for example, welfare slaughter. Also other participants in 
the livestock production chain, such as slaughterhouses, animal traders and feed suppliers, can 
suffer significant losses, mostly from a decline in turnover. 
In general, financial consequences of epidemic livestock diseases are presented in terms of 
budgetary consequences for governments (see for example Marangon, 1995; Vanthemsche, 
1995; iVIinistry of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries, 1998). Budgetary 
consequences for governments mainly include compensations paid for destroyed animals and 
costs of organisation. These consequences, however, are only part of the total financial losses. 
Calculations carried out by Berentsen et al. (1992) include losses for participants in the 
livestock production chain. They express these losses in terms of a fixed amount of money per 
average removed pig. Saatkamp et al. (1997) go one step further and make a distinction 
between sows, pigs and piglets and distinguish a separate amount of losses for the feed 
industry. 
This chapter presents a computer model, entitled EpiLoss (EpiáevÁc Losses), that 
calculates in the first place losses for farms subdivided into various cost components and on 
an individual farm basis, i.e. according to the type of farm and the number of animals on the 
farm. For other participants in the livestock production chain, losses are calculated as well, 
allocated to different participants and cost components. The participants of the production 
chain distinguished are slaughterhouses, animal traders and transporters, breeding 
organisations and feed suppliers. The financial consequences generally captured under the 
budgetary consequences for governments are calculated by the model as well. The model is a 
project appraisal type of model (Little and Mirrlees, 1974) meaning that the model takes into 
account the losses incurred by parties involved in a project. In this chapter, the 'project' refers 
to the control measures applied during an epidemic. 
The chapter begins with explaining the financial model (structure, input, calculation 
principles). In section 5.3, the model is applied to the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the 
Netherlands. The sections 5.4 and 5.5 contain the discussion and conclusions respectively. 
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5.2 The financial model 
5.2.1 General description of the model 
Control measures applied are central to calculations with EpiLoss. Related to the measures 
applied, losses for farms and related industries are calculated. The start and the end of control 
measures are reflected by so-called events. Table 5.1 shows the control measures included in 
the model, together with their related events and the implications each event has. The control 
measures considered are stamping-out of infected herds, establishment of areas with a 
movement standstill, pre-emptive slaughter, welfare slaughter, breeding prohibition and 
establishment of 'restricted areas'. 
Welfare slaughter can be applied to pigs that are ready to be delivered, weaned piglets, and 
3-17 day old piglets. The pigs in the 'ready to be delivered category' depend on the type of 
farm; on a farrowing farm, these are piglets with a liveweight of 25 kg, on a finishing or a 
farrow-to-fmishing farm, these are the pigs with a liveweight of 110 kg. On a breeding farm, 
the pigs that are ready to be delivered include both breeding pigs and pigs not suited for 
breeding that are delivered to finishing farms and slaughterhouses. A breeding prohibition is 
aimed at preventing welfare problems (and costs of welfare slaughter) in the longer term, as 
the gestation period lasts almost 4 months. In a restricted area, pig movements are (again) 
allowed, but they are restricted and under severe control. 
Table 5.1 Control measures, related events in EpiLoss, and implications of the events. 
Related events Implications 
Compulsory measures 
Stamping-out Depopulation Herd is destroyed, buildings empty till repopulation 
Repopulation Restarting the farm 
Movement standstill Start movement standstill No supply and delivery of animals allowed 
End movement standstill Supply and delivery of animals allowed 
Pre-emptive slaughter Depopulation Herd is destroyed, buildings empty till repopulation 
Repopulation Restarting the farm 
Additional measures 
Welfare slaughter' Start welfare slaughter Animals for which measure applies are destroyed 
End welfare slaughter End of destruction of animals under consideration 
Breeding prohibition Start breeding prohibition Prohibition of insemination of sows 
End breeding prohibition Insemination of sows allowed 
Restricted activity area Start restricted area Pig movements restricted, repopulation allowed 
End restricted activity area All pig movements allowed 
'in EpiLoss, three different forms of welfare slaughter are distinguished: welfare slaughter of pigs that are ready 
to be delivered, welfare slaughter of weaned piglets, and welfare slaughter of 3-17 day old piglets. 
Figure 5.1 presents the flow diagram of EpiLoss. The model (programmed in Borland Pascal 
7.0) is based on two embedded loops. The outer one screens farms, while the inner calculates 
losses day by day. 
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Start 
First ferm 
Stop 
Figure 5.1 Flow diagram of EpiLoss. 
The input file with outbreak data provides the model with information on the farms involved. 
The data can originate from a real epidemic or from simulation and can refer to current 
epidemics and to epidemics that have finished. Each row of the file contains a day number, 
the unique identification (ID) of the farm involved, and the event the farm is confronted with 
on the specified day. If a farm is confronted with several events on one day, these are 
represented in multiple rows. 
EpiLoss starts with the first farm in the outbreak data file. Since the file is in chronological 
order, this is a farm that is confronted with measures on the first day of notification of the 
epidemic. All the events for this particular farm are collected from the data. Then, the 
sequence of events is checked for validity. For example, a farm cannot be repopulated if the 
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herd has not been destroyed previously. If the sequence of events is not valid, the data must 
be corrected before calculations can start (which is in Figure 5.1 indicated by 'stop, check 
outbreak data'). If the sequence is valid, calculations start. 
Losses are calculated on a day-by-day basis and saved accordingly, i.e. per day and per 
type of loss. For farms, losses are calculated per individual farm, given the type and size of 
the farm, and the type of events the farm is confronted with. Based on this information, losses 
for the other participants in the livestock production chain as well as for the governments are 
calculated. For each day there are checks on whether events which previously occurred 
influence the losses on that day. For example, losses caused by welfare slaughter of weaned 
piglets are affected if a breeding prohibition was in force about 140 days previously (140 days 
is the approximate time between insemination and the weaning of piglets). In total, the model 
considers 23 different types of losses. The inner loop ends if the last day the farm is involved 
in control measures is reached. In principle, this is the day at which the movement standstill is 
lifted (the restricted area can still be in force). For depopulated farms it can be at a later point 
in time since these farms are not always allowed to immediately repopulate. 
Once the inner loop has ended, the outer loop screens a new farm and the process starts 
again. A farm that encounters control measures after the loop for this farm was ended, i.e. 
after the movement standstill had been lifted or repopulation was allowed, is regarded as a 
new case/farm. 
5.2.2 Input 
The most important input file is the file that provides the model with information on the 
epidemic, as discussed in the previous section. Other input files used by the model contain 
farm data, price data and loss parameters (see also Figure 5.1). The file with farm data 
contains per farm-ID the type of the farm and the number of animals. In principle, these are 
real farm data, but, in case of simulation hypothetical farms can be put in. The following 
types of farms are distinguished 1) farrowing farm, 2) finishing farm, 3) farm with sows and 
fattening pigs, 4) breeding farm, and 5) artificial imemination (Aí) station. 
The file with price data provides information on the prices paid for pigs under welfare 
slaughter on a daily basis. These prices can refer to assumed average prices or to actual prices 
applied during a real epidemic. 
The file with loss parameters includes economic parameters such as the losses for 
depopulated farms per place and per day that buildings are empty. The major principles 
behind the loss parameters are explained in the next section. 
59 
Chapter 5 
5.2.3 Calculation of financial consequences 
Losses calculated by EpiLoss can be subdivided into direct costs and consequential losses. 
For both types of losses, Table 5.2 shows the underlying events and—per party involved—the 
various cost components. 
Table 5.2 Losses calculated by EpiLoss, the underlying events, and per party involved the different cost 
components. 
Governments 
Farms 
Slaughterhouses 
Animal traders 
and transporters 
Feed suppliers 
Breeding org.3 
Direct costs 
Depopulation 
Welfare si. 
Breeding proh. 
Compensation1 
+ organisation 
Part of costs 
under governm.2 
Movement 
standstill 
Organisation 
Part of costs 
under govemm. 
Consequential losses 
Depopulation 
Welfare si. 
Breeding proh. 
Business 
interruption 
Decline in # of 
pigs slaughtered 
Decline in # of 
pigs traded 
Decline in kg 
feed sold 
Decline in genetic 
progress" + decline 
in Al sales b 
Movement 
standstill 
Change in kg 
feed sold 
Extra hygienic 
measures 
forAI"4* 
Repopulation 
Supply and Repopulation 
delivery problems 
'Compensations paid for pigs (and feed) destroyed and sows under breeding prohibition, 
agreements on the distribution of direct costs are illustrated in section 5.3.4 for the Dutch 1997/98 case. 
3Only a few situations are mentioned here. An 'a' refers to a situation in which own farms of the breeding 
organisation are involved; a 'b' to a situation in which clients are involved. 
In the following subsections, Table 5.2 is used as a framework to discuss the losses 
calculated. 
The basic technique used for calculating losses is partial budgeting. Partial budgeting is 
used to estimate the change that will occur in a company's profit or loss from some change in 
the company's plan by considering only those items of income and expense that change 
(Boehlje and Eidman, 1984; Dijkhuizen and Morris, 1997). The general format for a partial 
budget is made up of four categories: additional returns, reduced costs, returns forgone, and 
extra costs. In these categories, an alternative situation (here: livestock epidemic) is compared 
with a basic situation (no epidemic). In this chapter, all categories are cash-flow-based 
(Brealey and Myers, 1996). Illustrative examples of partial budgets are given throughout the 
sections. The partial budgets are based on average prices, feed costs etcetera and are derived 
from the Agricultural Information and Knowledge Centre and the Research Station for 
Animal Husbandry (1997). 
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5.2.3.1 Direct costs 
Direct costs are reflected by the partial budget category of extra costs. The cash flows that 
reflect these costs refer to the compensations paid for pigs and feed destroyed, the 
compensations paid for sows under a breeding prohibition, and the costs made for 
organisational aspects. 
Under depopulation, the compensation for pigs is based on estimates of the average value 
of the pigs. These average values are determined by calculating the average amount of capital 
invested in a pig. For a fattening pig, for example, this is a very straightforward calculation: 
the price for which the piglet is purchased plus half of the costs of feed and other countable 
costs made during the fattening period of the pig, such as health costs. 
Under welfare slaughter, the compensation per animal destroyed can be calculated as 
described for pigs under depopulation, but can also be linked to real prices paid (which in 
EpiLoss are included in the file with price data, see Figure 5.1). Compensations paid for sows 
under a breeding prohibition are—in case of a real epidemic—determined by the government. 
The extra costs for 'organisation' refer to costs of hiring equipment to destroy animals and 
the costs of luring personnel to either carry out the 'normal' tasks of the personnel of, for 
example, the National Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat, or to carry out 'field tasks', 
such as serological controls. Parameters are based on estimates of the National Inspection 
Service for Livestock and Meat. Estimates include the organisational costs of depopulation 
(costs of diagnosis, valuation, killing, and costs of cleaning and disinfecting the pig 
buildings), welfare slaughter (costs of lethal injections and electrocution equipment), the costs 
of controlling a movement standstill, and the costs of clinical and serological controls. 
5.2.3.2 Consequential losses for farmers 
Business interruption 
Losses from business interruption occur on farms where buildings are empty. Depopulation 
leads to farms being completely empty for a certain period. Also welfare slaughter can—in 
case of fmshing farms—after some time lead to completely empty buildings. Farms can also 
be partly empty, for example in case of a farrowing farm being confronted with a breeding 
prohibition and a farrow-to-finishing farm faced with welfare slaughter of the 25 kg piglets. 
Table 5.3 shows for two possible situations (depopulation and breeding prohibition) the 
four categories of a partial budget, together with an example for a sow on a farrowing farm. 
Table 5.3 shows that, in case of depopulation, the additional returns are zero, all variable 
costs are saved, all sales are forgone, and there are no extra costs. Losses are US $430 per 
sow per year if buildings are completely empty during an entire year. For use in EpiLoss, i.e. 
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to be able to calculate losses from completely empty buildings on a daily basis, the US $430 
is converted to a value per day (US $430/365). 
Table 5.3 Partial budget to determine losses from business intemiption in case of depopulation and breeding 
prohibition (basic situation = no epidemic). Examples for a farrowing farm.1 (Amount in US $). 
Type of farm Farrowing farm Farrowing farm 
Situation on farm Depopulation (completely empty) Breeding prohibition (partly empty) 
Time period 1 year 1 year 
Number in example 1 sow 1 sow 
1. Additional returns 0 Compensation paid by the 
government (US $35 per month) 420 
2. Reduced costs All variable costs: Part of the variable costs: 
purchase of breeding sows 129 feed for sows 71 
feed for sows 229 feed for piglets 187 
feed for piglets 187 AI 25 
boar 6 health 15 
AI 25 heating + water 13 
health care 40 total 311 
heating + water 57 
total 673 
3. Returns forgone All sales: Part of the sales: 
piglets 1032 piglets 1032 
culled sows 71 
total 1103 
4. Extra costs 0 0 
Compared to basic situation ( l + 2 ) - ( 3 + 4 ) : -430 (1 + 2 ) - ( 3 + 4 ) : -301 
'Based on Agricultural Information and Knowledge Centre and Research Station for Animal Husbandry (1997). 
In the case of a breeding prohibition there are additional returns from government 
compensation, but, on the other hand, only part of the variable costs can be saved. The returns 
forgone refer to the piglets not produced. Extra costs are assumed to be zero. Given a 
compensation from the government of US $420 per year, losses from business interruption 
caused by a breeding prohibition are less than those caused by depopulation. 
Supply and delivery problems 
Supply and delivery problems occur on farms that are confronted with a movement standstill. 
They face losses because no pigs can be transported to the farm and pigs that are ready to be 
delivered to a finishing farm or slaughterhouse cannot be transported. Losses are different for 
farms with sows (i.e. farrowing, breeding, and farrow-to-finisrring farms) and farms with 
fattening pigs only (finishing farms). Table 5.4 shows the partial budgets that are used to 
calculate the losses from supply and delivery problems. Examples are given for a farrow-to-
finishing farm and a finishing farm. 
On the farrow-to-fmishing farm, the production of piglets continues and losses are 
reflected by the extra costs from feed for maintenance of the animals that are ready to be 
delivered, which are 110 kg pigs. It is assumed that the feed for maintenance is 50 per cent of 
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the normal ration. The returns forgone are zero because the replacement of sows at a less than 
optimal moment is not taken into account, and because it is assumed that welfare slaughter is 
considered for the animals that are ready to be delivered. Under welfare slaughter, no discount 
applies for a less than optimal quality of the pigs. 
Table 5.4 Partial budget to determine losses from supply and delivery problems (basic situation = no epidemic). 
Examples for a farrow-to-finishing farm and a finishing farm.1 (Amount in US $). 
Type of farm Farrow-to-finishing farm Finishing farm 
Situation on farm Supply and delivery problems Supply and delivery problems 
Time period 1 month 1 month 
Number in example 200 sows + 1200 fattening pigs 1200 fattening pigs 
1. Additional returns 0 0 
2. Reduced costs 0 0 
3. Returns forgone 0 Turnover 890 
4. Extra costs Feed for maintenance 983 Feed for maintenance 983 
Compared to basic situation (1+2)-(3+4): -983 (1+2)-(3+4): -1873 
•Based on Agricultural Information and Knowledge Centre and Research Station for Animal Husbandry (1997). 
On the finishing farm, the supply of 25 kg piglets to the farm is interrupted. For each place on 
the farm to which a new piglet should have been supplied, the farmer suffers a decline in 
turnover, which equals the cost of the place being empty. Furthermore, for each fattening pig 
that is ready to be delivered but that is still on the farm, farmers face extra costs of feed for 
maintenance. In Table 5.4, the extra costs of feed for maintenance are equal in both examples, 
because both farms have 1200 finishing places. The fact that a finishing farm faces losses due 
to a decline in turnover and due to extra costs from feed for maintenance implies that, if the 
supply and delivery problems last longer than a whole fattening period, losses for the farmer 
are higher in the case of supply and delivery problems than with completely empty buildings. 
Repopulation 
Farms whose herd has been destroyed or whose buildings have become empty, partly or 
completely, due to measures of welfare slaughter and breeding prohibition face losses from 
repopulation. In the partial budget, these losses are reflected by extra costs inherent to storting 
with a completely new herd, i.e. extra costs of health problems and losses from business 
interruption caused by the fact that the new population gradually has to fit into a farmer's 
mode of operation. The extra costs thus do not refer to the costs of buying back a new herd; it 
is assumed that the compensation received is sufficient to buy a herd of equal quality. 
For a farm with fattening pigs repopulation losses are assumed to be reflected by the losses 
from business interruption from completely empty buildings during half a fattening period 
(122 days); for a farm with sows this is assumed to be a whole production cycle (160 days). If 
a farm is located in a restricted area at the moment of repopulation, losses from repopulation 
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are assumed to be 1.5 times higher, because in such an area there is less supply of pigs and it 
is difficult to get permission to transport pigs to a farm. 
5.2.3.3 Consequential losses for other participants in the livestock production chain 
To derive losses for the other participants in the livestock production chain from the events on 
individual farms first the number of pigs that cause losses need to be calculated, then the 
amount of loss per pig. In this section the background of the losses per pig is explained and 
the number of pigs that cause losses is illustrated by examples. 
Slaughterhouses 
Slaughterhouses suffer losses for each pig that cannot be slaughtered in the usual way. In the 
partial budget this leads to reduced costs and to returns forgone. Because no information is 
available on the size of these cash flows, losses are approached by determining the costs that 
remain when a pig is not slaughtered, i.e. the fixed costs. Taking into account that costs from, 
for example, housing and wages of regular staff remain for 100 per cent, but that cleaning 
costs decline and inspection costs reduce to zero, experts from various slaughterhouses 
estimated that on average 75 per cent of the slaughter costs should be considered as fixed 
costs. 
With regard to the number of pigs that cannot be slaughtered in the usual way, i.e. to 
calculate the number of pigs with which 75 per cent of the slaughter costs per pig need to be 
multiplied, Table 5.5 gives examples. Examples refer to three types of farms in different 
situations. The starting point is the average number of animals delivered to a slaughterhouse 
in a situation without an epidemic. 
Table 5.5 Illustration of the number of pigs that cause losses for slaughterhouses and animal traders and 
transporters.1 
Type of farm Farrowing farm Finishing farm Breeding farm 
Situation on farm Completely empty Completely empty Breeding prohibition 
Time period 3 months 3 months 3 months 
Number in example 200 sows 1200 places 200 sows 
Decline in number of 
pigs to be slaughtered Culled sows 
Fattening pigs2 
20 
1035 
Fattening pigs 0 Fattening pigs3 621 
Decline in number of 
pigs to be traded Breeding sows 22 Fattening pigs 0 25 kg piglets 1060 
Culled sows 20 Fattening pigs 621 
25 kg piglets 1060 Breeding pigs 349 
Fattening pigs 1035 
'Based on Agricultural Information and Knowledge Centre and Research Station for Animal Husbandry (1997). 
Numbers are rounded to whole figures. 
2Taking into account a death rate of 2.4%. 
3The remaining pigs are breeding pigs. 
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Table 5.5 shows that from farrowing farms, the decline in slaughter pigs comes from culled 
sows and fattening pigs not delivered. For breeding farms, these are the pigs not suited for 
breeding. 'Future' fattening pigs are taken into account under farrowing farms instead of 
finishing farms because it is the farrowing farm at which the production of piglets stops when 
buildings are empty. 
Animal traders and transporters 
In the partial budget of animal traders and transporters the category of additional returns is 
assumed to be zero, since for small-scale animal traders and transporters usually few 
alternatives exist for their vehicles. No information is available to determine reduced costs 
(for example fuel saved) or possibly extra costs. Returns forgone are based on the amount of 
money normally charged for transacting the sale or purchase of an animal. 
The number of transactions forgone is not in a one-to-one relation to the number of pigs 
destroyed and not produced, because 1) not all pigs would have been traded by animal traders 
and transporters, and 2) some pigs are traded more than once and others less than once, 
depending on the type of farm and pig. The number of transactions for a culled sow, for 
example, is usually higher than for breeding pigs. For this reason, losses for animal traders 
and transporters are calculated on the average number of transactions per animal. This implies 
that losses need to be calculated for all pigs destroyed and not produced, also for piglets on 
closed fartow-to-finishing farms and breeding farms that are in practice not traded, for 
example because they are kept for breeding purposes. The average number of trade 
transactions for, for example, a piglet is calculated by dividing the total number of trade 
transactions with piglets per year (13.41 million; Agricultural Economic Institute and Bureau 
for Statistics, 1991) by the total number of piglets produced per year (25 million; Agricultural 
Economic Institute and Bureau for Statistics, 1997). 
Table 5.5 gives some examples of the number of pigs that cause losses for the animal 
traders and transporters. Notice that the number of 25 kg piglets is the same for the farrowing 
and the breeding farm. The eventual losses for animal traders and transporters are calculated 
by multiplying numbers as shown in Table 5.5 by the average trade transactions per type of 
pig and the amount of money normally charged for the transaction of such a pig. 
Feed suppliers 
Feed suppliers suffer losses from a reduction in the quantity of feed fed in kilograms, for 
example due to depopulation. For feed suppliers this leads to returns forgone at the one hand 
and reduced costs at the other. Since no information is available for these factors separately, 
losses are estimated by multiplying the kilograms of feed fed less by the gross value added 
per kilogram. The gross value added per kilogram refers to the value of goods and services 
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sold minus the value of goods and services bought. Losses for feed suppliers are corrected for 
the kilograms of feed that are fed extra, for example in the case of delivery problems on 
farrow4o-fimshing farms. 
Taking the farrowing farm from Table 5.5 as an example, the kilograms of feed sales 
forgone would be based on the feed for 200 sows (including piglets) for three months and the 
feed of 1035 fattening pigs. 
Breeding organisations 
Breeding organisations suffer losses if a breeding farm or artificial msemination (Aí) station 
is depopulated, and furthermore if clients from the organisation are affected by control 
measures, for example a breeding prohibition. For both cases, i.e. when own farmers are 
involved and when clients are involved, partial budgets are composed. Losses calculated for 
breeding organisations do not refer to farm-level losses from, for example, empty buildings 
on a breeding farm itself, because these losses have already been accounted for in the 
consequential losses for farms. Parameter values for breeding farms reflect a farm 
composition of 5 per cent Great Grand Parent (GGP) animals and 95 per cent Grand Parent 
(GP) animals. This is done because the input file with farm data does not distinguish between 
GGP and GP farms. The percentages are based on the composition of breeding populations. 
Related to depopulated breeding farms, the partial budget for the breeding organisation 
includes extra costs and returns forgone. The extra costs refer to a temporary decline in 
genetic progress and to costs related to bringing in other Al-stations for delivery of semen. 
The losses from a decline in genetic progress depend on the extent to which genetic materials 
of the breeding organisation are geographically spread, i.e. the extent to which farms and AI-
stations of the organisation are involved in the epidemic. Returns forgone include losses from 
clients seeking other breeding organisations for delivery of breeding pigs (this cost is also 
incurred if breeding farms are in a movement standstill). Another cause of returns forgone 
occurs if rearing pigs destroyed under welfare slaughter are compensated as if they were 
fattening pigs, while, in practice, their value is on average three times higher than that of 
fattening pigs. 
Related to clients of breeding organisations that are involved in an epidemic, the partial 
budget depends on the specific situation on the farm (for example depopulated or in a 
movement standstill). The category of extra costs can include extra costs for Aí on farms in a 
movement standstill, for example from extra hygienic measures, the use of disposable 
materials and less efficient routes. Returns forgone can include losses from a decline in Aí 
sales in case of breeding prohibition and depopulation. 
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5.2.3.4 Loss compensating effects for individual farms and companies 
During an epidemic, a number of fortuitous circumstances can lead to some net loss reduction 
for individual farms and participants in the livestock production chain. Examples include 
slaughterhouses that are chosen to kill pigs for welfare slaughter at moments rendering 
capacity is insufficient, and animal traders and transporters who can transport pigs from 
welfare slaughter to locations with electrocution equipment. For such companies the 
additional returns category of the partial budget becomes positive. Also farmers can reduce 
their net losses from, for example, empty buildings after depopulation. Examples of loss 
reduction include off-farm work and the renovation of buildings for which personnel 
otherwise would have been hired. 
5.3 Application to the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, in 1996, approximately 14 million pigs were kept on 21,245 farms 
(Agricultural Economic Institute and Bureau for Statistics, 1997). The average herd size was 
680 pigs per farm, which is the largest average in Europe. Pig populations are especially 
dense in the southern part of the country. The number of pigs per hectare in this part is the 
highest in Europe, i.e. 19.9 (Nagel, 1995). 
In 1997 CSF was diagnosed in this densely populated pig area of the Netherlands. The 
epidemic lasted for 15 months (February 1997 until May 1998). In this period, a total of 429 
farms were infected and detected, more than 13,000 farms were involved in one or more 
control measures, and more than 11 million pigs were destroyed. Figure 5.2 gives the number 
of farms infected per day. 
12 ; 
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tart of epidemic 
Figure 5.2 Number of infected farms per day during 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands 
(Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries, 1998). 
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The control measures applied during the epidemic included the minimum EU-measures of 
stamping-out of infected herds, a movement standstill in areas around infected herds, and pre-
emptive slaughter of contact herds. An additional measure taken during the course of the 
epidemic was the pre-emptive slaughter of pig herds wimin a radius of 0.5 km to (later) 1 km 
of infected herds. Other additional measures taken during the epidemic were mainly aimed at 
reducing welfare problems on farms that were confronted with a movement standstill. These 
measures included welfare slaughter (of pigs ready to be delivered, weaned piglets and 3 to 17 
day old piglets) and a breeding prohibition. A last additional measure taken in the Dutch CSF-
epidemic referred to the establishment of a so-called restricted area at the time the epidemic 
was coming to an end, i.e. when the movement standstill in a number of areas had already 
been lifted. Related to compensating effects for individual participants in the production 
chain, a number of animal traders and transporters were chosen to transport pigs under 
welfare slaughter to electrocution equipment, and a number of slaughterhouses could 
slaughter pigs for welfare reasons at times of insufficient rendering capacity. 
5.3.2 Application of the computer model 
The epidemic described in the previous section resulted in a customised input file 'outbreak 
data' (see Figure 5.1) of 142,000 lines of data including in total 13,000 farms and 16 different 
events. These are the events presented in Table 5.1. The input file with farm data includes 
data on farm type and number of animals for all farms with pigs in the Netherlands. The file 
with price data contains, for the period of the epidemic, daily information on the prices paid 
for pigs under welfare slaughter. Table 5.6 gives an overview of the major parameters 
included in the file with the loss parameters. 
5.3.3 Extent of losses 
Because EpiLoss calculates and saves losses on a daily basis, output can be generated on a 
very detailed level. Figure 5.3 presents the cumulative development of losses from the start of 
the epidemic until the end. Losses are grouped into seven categories, of which the first five 
refer to direct costs and the last two to consequential losses. 
Figure 5.3 shows that costs of stamping-out and pre-emptive slaughter increased mainly in 
the period between 50 and 250 days from the start of the epidemic. As was shown in Figure 
5.2, this is the period with the highest numbers of infected farms per day. Also the costs of 
welfare slaughter increased most between 50 and 250 days from the start of the epidemic. 
Related to these developments in the field of welfare slaughter, losses for related industries 
increased rapidly as well. From Figure 5.3 it can also be seen that the breeding prohibition 
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was only enforced at a later stage of the epidemic; costs began at around 150 days. It can be 
seen in the right-hand side of the figure, i.e. in the last months of the epidemic, that losses, 
especially for farmers, were still increasing (due to costs of repopulation). Total losses can be 
read from the figure when all losses at the last day of the epidemic are accumulated: about US 
$2.3 billion. 
Table 5.6 Major input parameters for the calculation of losses from the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the 
Netherlands (amount in US $). 
Farms' Farrowing farm Farrow-to-
finishing farm 
Finishing farm Breeding farm 
Production 
Value destroyed pigs 
Value destroyed feed 
Business interruption6 
21.5 piglets 
/sow/year 
517/sow3 
8.10/sow 
1.18/sow/day 
18 fattening pigs 
/sow/year 
976/sow4 
25/sow 
2.42/sow/day 
2.99 fattening pigs 
/place/year 
77 
2.82 /place 
0.20/place/day 
7.1 breeding pigs 
/sow/year2 
1525/sow5 
25/sow 
2.72/sow/day 
Related industries7 
Slaughterhouses 
Animal traders and 
Per pig 14 
transporters 
Feed suppliers 
Breeding organisations 
Per piglet (1.70 per transaction; 0.54 transactions) 0.92 
Per fattening pig (4.05 per transaction; 0.84 transactions) 3.40 
Per breeding pig (16.25 per transaction; 0.15 transactions) 2.44 
Per culled sow (11.50 per transaction; 1.40 transactions) 16.10 
Per kilogram feed8 0.03 
Own farms involved9 
Genetic material (per breeding sow destroyed) 26 
Genetic material (per AI-boar destroyed) 500 
Sales of breeding pigs (per breeding sow destroyed or in movement 650 
standstill) 
Reorganising AI (per AI-boar destroyed and per day) 44 
Clients involved 
Extra costs for AI (costs/week/breeding farm) 100 
- Extra costs for AI (costs/week/farrowing and fartow-to-finishing farm) 50 
- Loss of AI due to breeding prohibition and depopulation 0.12 
(losses/sow/day) 
Miscellaneous 
Depopulation on farm with sows (costs per sow) 
Depopulation on farm with fattening pigs (costs per place) 
Welfare slaughter per piglet of 3-17 days 
Welfare slaughter per weaned piglet (4.30 for destruction; 1.25 for transport) 
Welfare slaughter per 25 kg piglet (6.45 for destruction; 2.25 for transport) 
Welfare slaughter per fattening pig (15 for destruction"; 4.00 for transport) 
Clinical control (costs per farm) 
Serological control (costs per farm) 
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7 
2 
5.55 
8.70 
19 
115 
450 
'Based on Agricultural Information and Knowledge Centre and Research Station for Animal Husbandry (1997). 
2The remaining pigs are either delivered to finishing farms or slaughterhouses. 
'including the value of piglets. 
4Including the value of piglets and fattening pigs. 
'including the value of piglets, fattening pigs and breeding pigs. 
6With completely empty buildings and an average price per piglet of US $48 and per kg meat of US $1.50. 
'Parameters are derived from literature and experts; principles are explained in section 5.2.3.3. 
8Komen and Peerlings (1998). 
'Parameters per sow reflect values of 5% GGP and 95% GP. 
'"Mainly estimated by National Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat (see section 5.2.3.1). 
"Costs reflect the compensation paid to slaughterhouses for slaughtering the pigs (shortage of rendering 
capacity); pigs were rendered at a later point in time. 
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II Depopulation - stamping-out 
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• Breeding prohibition 
B Organisational costs 
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Figure 5.3 Cumulative development of losses during 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands 
(amount in billion US $). 
Table 5.7 gives a more detailed insight into the calculated total losses from the epidemic. In 
the table, the 23 loss categories calculated by the model are grouped into 17 categories. 
Table 5.7 shows that the major part of the total losses consists of compensations paid for 
pigs under welfare slaughter. Total direct costs are 56 per cent of the total losses. From the 
consequential losses, 42 per cent is suffered on farms, 58 per cent in industries related to 
farms. 
5.3.4 Distribution of losses among governments and participants of the livestock production 
chain 
To calculate the distribution of the losses among national government, European Union and 
participants in the livestock production chain, the following rules have been applied (Council 
Directive 90/424/EEC; Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries, 1998): 
the veterinary budget of the European Union refunds 50 per cent of the costs of compulsory 
and pre-emptive slaughter, 70 per cent of the costs of welfare slaughter, and 50 per cent of the 
costs of organisation. The remaining part of these costs is divided on a fifty-fifty basis 
between national government and the primary sector. The consequential losses are completely 
borne by the participants in the livestock production chain. Figure 5.4 shows the results of 
applying these rules to the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands. 
As Figure 5.4 shows, the budgetary consequences for the Dutch government and the 
European Union include 47 per cent of the total financial consequences of the epidemic. 
Farmers bear in total 28 per cent (which equals US $664 million) and related industries 25 per 
cent (which percentage had already been shown in Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7 Losses calculated by EpiLoss for the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands (amount in million 
US $). 
Losses In% 
of total 
Direct costs Depopulation - stamping-out infected herds 104 4 
Depopulation - pre-emptive slaughter 184 8 
Welfare slaughter - pigs ready to be delivered 605 26 
Welfare slaughter - weaned piglets 114 5 
Welfare slaughter - piglets 3-17 days 133 6 
Breeding prohibition 42 2 
Costs of organisation 138 6 
Subtotal 1321 56 
Consequential losses farms Business interruption - depopulated farms 110 5 
Business interruption - other farms 137 6 
Supply and delivery problems 19 1 
Losses from repopulation - depopulated farms 109 4 
Losses from repopulation - other farms 48 2 
Subtotal 423 18 
Consequential losses related industries Slaughterhouses' 228 10 
Animal traders and transporters2 56 2 
Feed suppliers 102 4 
Breeding organisations - own farms involved 194 8 
Breeding organisations - clients involved 17 1 
Subtotal 596 25 
TOTAL 2340 100 
'Losses are corrected for extra profit from slaughter activities as a result of a shortage of rendering capacity. 
2Losses are corrected for extra returns from transporting pigs under welfare slaughter. 
Related 
industries 
government 
10% 
Figure 5.4 Distribution of financial losses from 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands. 
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5.3.5 Sensitivity analyses 
To illustrate the impact of major assumptions in the model, sensitivity analyses were carried 
out and summarised in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 Results of sensitivity analyses. 
Change in Change in 
total losses consequential losses 
(in %) For (in %) 
Depopulation: losses from business interruption - 50% -2.4 Farmers -13.0 
Depopulation: compensation destroyed animals 25% too low 0 Farmers + 17.0 
Repopulation: period with extra losses - 50% -3.3 Farmers -18.1 
Repopulation: no extra losses from restricted area -2.1 Farmers - 11.4 
Slaughterhouses: remaining costs of 40% -4.8 Slaughterhouses -49.8 
With regard to the effects of depopulation on losses from business interruption, discussed in 
section 5.2.3.2, it was assumed that additional returns are zero (see also Table 5.3 for the 
example on the farrowing farm). However, as mentioned in the subsection on 'loss 
compensating effects for individual farms and companies' (section 5.2.3.4), farmers may be 
able to create additional returns. Table 5.8 shows the effect of a 50 per cent decrease in losses 
from business interruption after depopulation: a 2.4 per cent decrease in total losses and a 
13.0 per cent decrease in consequential losses for farmers (i.e. a decrease from US $423 
million—see Table 5.7--to US $368 million). 
In the subsection on costs of repopulation (subsection of 5.2.3.2), it was originally assumed 
that the compensation paid for animals destroyed under depopulation is always sufficient to 
buy back a herd of equal quality. Table 5.8 shows the results if the compensations paid by the 
government cover only 75 per cent of the value of animals and the rest need to be borne by 
farmers involved. The effect on farmers' losses would be an increase in consequential losses 
of 17.0 per cent (i.e. from US $423 million to US $495 million). It can be argued that part of 
these losses on farms of breeding organisations would have to be taken by the breeding 
organisation. Total losses stay the same. 
With regard to the repopulation of farms, it was also assumed that losses are reflected by 
losses from business interruption during half a fattening period (in the case of finishing farms) 
and a whole production cycle (in the case of farms with sows). Table 5.8 shows the results if 
farms that are repopulating face fewer problems and the period with losses decreases to a 
quarter of a fattening period and half a production cycle respectively. Table 5.8 also shows 
the results if location in a restricted area does not lead to higher repopulation losses. For both 
situations the decrease in losses has a large effect on farmers' total consequential losses. 
In relation to losses for slaughterhouses, experts estimated that 75 per cent of the fixed 
costs remain when no pigs are slaughtered (see section 5.2.3.3). However, if all personnel 
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(also the regular staff) can be put to work somewhere else, remaining costs are only 40 per 
cent. Table 5.8 shows that the effect of such cost reduction lowers the consequential losses of 
slaughterhouses by 50 per cent (i.e. from US $228 million to US $115 million). 
5.4 Discussion 
The model 
EpiLoss calculates losses based on 1) control measures applied (for example welfare slaughter 
on a specific farm leads to x losses on that farm and y losses for the other participants in the 
livestock production chain), and 2) the duration of these measures (i.e. calculations are carried 
out until control measures are lifted). 
Losses calculated are overestimated if, in practice, there is no such strong one-to-one 
relation between measures applied on a farm and losses for related industries. This could be 
the case if slaughterhouses are able to fill their slaughter capacity with slaughter animals from 
other areas in the country or even from abroad (though some extra costs for transport and 
higher pig prices can be involved then). However, if one slaughterhouse fills its capacity with 
animals meant for another slaughterhouse, the throughput in the latter will decrease and total 
losses stay the same. Furthermore, with further chain integration, opportunities of switching 
between clients will decrease. The same arguments can be made for animal traders and 
transporters. There is also a reason to argue that losses calculated are underestimated. This is 
true if slaughterhouses and feed suppliers face significant costs from extra hygienic measures. 
Such costs have only been included for breeding organisations concerning AI. 
In practice, after an epidemic has ended and control measures are lifted, some cost factors 
will be recovered, others will further increase. Such effects are not included in EpiLoss. An 
example of loss 'recovering' occurs in the case of breeding organisations because they are 
likely to face a temporary increase in sales after the end of an epidemic. Examples of losses 
that will further increase are losses for slaughterhouses and feed suppliers because, after the 
epidemic, production levels will not fully recover immediately. Animal traders' losses can be 
recovered on the one hand for the same reasons as mentioned for breeding organisations and 
can further increase on the other hand for the same reasons as for slaughterhouses and feed 
suppliers. Losses for animal traders and transporters can also increase after an epidemic has 
ended if they face the permanent loss of certain export markets. 
EpiLoss calculates direct financial consequences of control measures. Price effects 
(indirect consequences) are included through the input file with prices paid for pigs under 
welfare slaughter (these prices usually reflect market prices to prevent farmers from selling 
their pigs illegally). If financial consequences are to be evaluated at a national level, price 
effects should be considered in a broader perspective. The size of price effects depends on, 
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among others, the existence of export bans and the herd density in the area with the epidemic. 
During an epidemic price effects can have a compensating effect at national level if farmers 
outside affected areas face higher prices due to the epidemic. After the end of an epidemic 
price effects can also increase total losses at national level if prices are very low due to 
oversupply of the market. Evaluating financial consequences of epidemics at the national 
level also gives the opportunity to include effects such as the complete restructuring of the pig 
sector in the Netherlands after the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF. 
Data 
For calculations with EpiLoss, two types of data play an important role. In the first place, 
there are data that provide the model with information on the epidemic, i.e. which farms are 
involved with what control measures and for how long (the 'day, ID, event' information). In 
case of real epidemics, such data become more and more available due to developments in the 
use of computerised data bases. However, it is extremely important not to blindly use the data 
from such data bases. An illustrative example relates to the situation in which, for a specific 
farm on a certain day, the movement standstill is lifted while, on the same day, a new 
movement standstill is enforced. If such information would have been used in the model 
straightaway, costs related to the end of a movement standstill would have been calculated 
(i.e. costs of repopulation) while, in practice, the situation on the farm did not change. 
EpiLoss checks for such situations. Related to outbreak data in case of simulation, it is a 
matter of tuning the output of a simulation model to produce the input required by EpiLoss. 
With respect to industries that are related to farms, no detailed outbreak information is 
required, because losses for these industries are derived from the events on farms. However, if 
detailed information were available, for example with respect to the occupation rate of 
production capacity, losses for related industries could be calculated directly. 
The second important type of data concern economic data for the calculation of loss 
parameters. Experience from this research is that these data are more readily available for 
farms than for the related industries. Sensitivity analyses are used to get insight into the 
impact of assumptions made. 
5.5 Conclusions 
With EpiLoss it is possible to extend the financial analyses of Classical Swine Fever 
epidemics beyond the (usually presented) costs from a government's budget point of view to 
the consequential losses suffered by the various participants in the livestock production chain. 
EpiLoss enables the evaluation of financial consequences of the epidemic and the control 
measures applied. 
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The computer model EpiLoss is suited for the calculation of losses from real epidemics, as 
is shown in this chapter for the 1997/98 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands. Results show 
that budgetary consequences for governments include less than half of the total losses. 
EpiLoss can also be linked to simulation models that simulate epidemics and the effect of 
various control strategies. By linking such simulation models to EpiLoss, (epidemiological) 
simulation results can be translated into economic data. This makes the model a useful tool 
for governments in deciding which control measures to take. The model can furthermore be 
useful for insurance companies because, if there are any funds to be raised or insurance 
policies to be developed, the kind of financial consequences calculated by EpiLoss are the 
type of losses that will be considered for indemnity payments. However, if related industries 
are to be included in such schemes, more specific information about these industries, both on 
event and economic data, would need to be incorporated into the model. 
EpiLoss is a flexible computer model in the sense that it can be used to evaluate other 
epidemic livestock diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). This is because other 
types of animals can be easily included and not all events described in this chapter need to be 
applied for a certain disease to run the model. Furthermore, with some adaptation of the loss 
parameters to country-specific values, the model is also applicable to other countries. 
Currently, the model is being linked to an FMD simulation model in New Zealand (Sanson et 
al., 1994) and to a model developed in the Netherlands that simulates the spread of CSF 
(Jalvingh et al., 1999; Nielen et al., 1999). For the linkage with the FMD model, cattle farms 
are also incorporated in EpiLoss. 
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6. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSING FARM BUSINESS 
INTERRUPTION INSURANCE FOR CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER* 
Abstract 
In this chapter the feasibility of a farm business interruption insurance for Classical Swine 
Fever is discussed. Insight into the size of risk, under various scenarios, is obtained by a 
detailed Monte-Carlo simulation model. As an illustrative example, the model is applied to 
the southern part of the Netherlands, a very densely populated swine area. Simulation results 
for the most likely scenario show expected annual total losses from Classical Swine Fever of 
US $246 million, with a range from zero to US $4.5 billion. The expected annual losses from 
business interruption total US $18 million, with a range from zero to US $396 million. Given 
the availability of such quantitative insights and carefully considering aspects such as the 
systemic character of the risk, and farmers' and governments' influence on the size of risk, it 
is concluded that a farm business interruption insurance is in principle feasible. The feasibility 
of insurance would be improved through spreading the risk among larger groups of farmers, 
through some financial involvement of the government, and by the provision of the insurance 
through 'mutual companies'. 
6.1 Introduction 
Epidemics of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) can have very large, devastating financial 
consequences. Recent CSF-epidemics in Europe include epidemics in Belgium (1990 and 
1993/94), Germany (1993/94), Spain and the Netherlands (1997/98), and (again) Germany 
(1999) (Office International des Epizooties, 1998; OIE-internet site, 1999). The financial 
consequences of the CSF-epidemic in the Netherlands were the highest so far totalling US 
$2.3 billion (Meuwissen et aí., 1999a). Part of these losses were borne by governments. 
However, business interruption losses (US $247 million) had to be completely borne by 
farmers. As a result, many affected farms were close to bankruptcy. Some farmers would even 
have gone bankrupt if banks and other financiers had not been willing to work with them. 
In this chapter the feasibility of business interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever 
is studied, because such insurance may protect farmers against such financial disasters in the 
future. Meuwissen et al. (1999b) found that farmers perceive the risk of epidemics as a very 
important source of risk and that farmers are interested in buying insurance protection against 
Paper by Meuwissen, M.P.M., Skees, J.R., Black, J.R., Huirne, R.B.M. and Dijkhuizen, 
A. A., submitted for publication to American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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losses caused by epidemics. 
In discussing insurance for Classical Swine Fever, an important issue is the little 
information available about the size of risk. This study provides such insight by a detailed 
Monte-Carlo simulation model. The model is partly based on insights provided by existing 
(epidemiological and financial) models (Horst et al., 1999a; Jalvingh et al., 1999; Meuwissen 
et al., 1999a; Nielen et al., 1999). 
Published literature on insuring losses from livestock epidemics is scarce. Available work 
by Davies (1996) and Howe and Whittaker (1997) is only qualitative and refers to direct costs 
instead of business interruption losses. 
This chapter begins with a short background on livestock epidemics (control measures, 
loss factors, compensation by government). In section 6.3 the structure and results of the 
Monte-Carlo simulation model are described. Section 6.4 deals with a range of issues that 
need to be considered when introducing a business interruption insurance for epidemics. 
Section 6.5 contains the discussion and conclusions. 
6.2 Background 
Livestock epidemics in the European Union of so-called 'List-A diseases' (Office 
International des Epizooties, 1998), such as Classical Swine Fever, are controlled by 
stamping-out infected herds, pre-emptive slaughter of contact herds, and by immediately 
estabUshing surveillance zones around such herds. In these zones, animal movements are 
restricted and to a large extent prohibited. Depending on the severity of the epidemic, national 
governments can take additional control measures, such as the pre-emptive slaughter of all 
herds within a certain radius (for example 1 km) of infected herds. If the established 
surveillance zones lead to severe animal welfare problems on the farms that are located in 
these zones, so-called welfare slaughter is generally applied to reduce such problems 
(Vanthemsche, 1995; Pluimers et al., 1999). 
Losses related to the control measures can be divided into direct costs and consequential 
losses (Meuwissen et al., 1999a). Direct costs refer to the value of destroyed animals (all 
animals in stamping-out, pre-emptive slaughter, and welfare slaughter programs are destroyed 
and rendered), and the costs of organisational aspects such as the monitoring of farms in 
surveillance zones. 
For farmers, consequential losses include, among others, losses from business interruption, 
and, after a time, costs of repopulating the farm. Business interruption occurs because farm 
buildings become empty due to stamping-out, pre-emptive slaughter, or welfare slaughter, and 
stay empty until surveillance zones are lifted. With stamping-out and pre-emptive slaughter, 
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buildings are completely emptied (i.e. depopulated). With welfare slaughter, buildings may 
only become partly empty (depending on the type (age/weight) of pigs slaughtered and on the 
type of farm). Losses related to repopulating the farm include losses due to extra weeks with 
empty buildings (for example because new sows are not readily available) and extra costs of 
animal health problems.20 
The other source of consequential losses for farmers includes losses related to established 
surveillance zones: farms in surveillance zones face (long) periods in which pigs (such as 
fattening pigs and culled sows) and manure can not be transported from the farm. These 
periods are characterised by animal welfare problems, extra feeding costs, and emergency 
measures for housing of pigs and storage of manure. 
For related industries, consequential losses originate from such aspects as a decline in the 
number of animals slaughtered, the number of trade transactions, and quantity of feed sold. 
Direct costs are largely borne by governments (national and EU). Consequential losses 
need to be borne by farmers and related industries (Horst et al., 1999b). For business 
interruption on farms, losses include US $1.18 per day for a farrowing sow and US $0.20 per 
day for a IMsIring place. For a typical one-person Dutch farm this is about US $300 per day 
or 0.3 per cent of a farmer's typical annual income (Meuwissen et al., 1999a). 
6.3 The size of risk 
Ideally, insight into the size of risk is obtained from historical information. For epidemics, 
however, historical data, if at all available, has limited value due to a low frequency of 
epidemics, continuously changing legislation with respect to prevention and control strategies 
applied, and a large variability in possible outcomes. Monte-Carlo simulation is an 
appropriate alternative for obtaining insight into losses, and what-if analyses can be used to 
study the impact of changes in the input parameters (Law and Kelton, 1991). 
6.3.1 Monte-Carlo simulation of Classical Swine Fever 
A Monte-Carlo simulation model is developed (in @Risk; Palisade, 1995) that gives insight 
into expected losses from CSF-epidemics. To demonstrate the features of the model, it is 
applied to the southern part of the Netherlands, which is an area of very dense swine 
population (Nagel, 1995) and the centre of the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic. The area contains 
more than 75 per cent of the total number of pigs (i.e. 14 million) in the Netherlands. Figure 
6.1 shows the structure of the simulation model. 
2 0 Repopulation losses thus do not refer to the costs of buying a new herd; government compensation for the 
slaughtered herd is generally sufficient to buy back a herd of equal quality. 
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Figure 6.1 Flow diagram of Monte-Carlo simulation model for Classical Swine Fever 
The model consists of three major parts (so-called 'sub-models'). The first part provides the 
simulation model with information on the number of CSF-epidemics per year. The second and 
third part simulate the epidemiological and financial extent of each of these epidemics. Then, 
losses from year t are summed and multiple iterations provide insight into the distribution of 
annual losses (Law and Kelton, 1991).21 The three sub-models are explained below. 
Frequency of epidemics 
Since the Netherlands are in principle free of CSF, the occurrence of an epidemic is caused by 
the introduction of CSF-virus from other countries. Parameters in the sub-model that 
determine the number of CSF-epidemics in the Netherlands refer to the frequency of CSF-
epidemics in other European countries, the duration of so-called 'high risk periods'22, and the 
risks related to the import and export of livestock, and the import of animal products. For a 
more detailed description of this sub-model, reference is made to Horst et al. (1999a). 
2 1 The number of iterations carried out is at least 500, or until the percentage change of the mean and standard 
deviation of the losses is 1.5 per cent or lower. 
2 2 The 'high risk period' is the period in which virus is already present in a country but not yet detected or under 
control (Horst et al., 1999a). 
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Epidemiological extent of epidemics 
The sub-model on the epidemiological extent of epidemics refers to a very detailed, spatial, 
dynamic and stochastic simulation model. Given the occurrence of a CSF-epidemic, the 
model simulates the spread of CSF-virus between farms through local spread and contacts 
(from transport, animals, and persons), and given a specific control strategy. Parameters in the 
model are, among others, based on the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic in the Netherlands. Output 
from this sub-model is very extensive and includes among others the number of farms 
infected and the number of farms under surveillance for each day of an epidemic. Details of 
the model are provided by Jalvingh et al. (1999) and Nielen et al. (1999). 
Financial impact of epidemics 
Epidemiological information is translated into financial data by the third sub-model. This 
financial model calculates—also on a very detailed level—direct costs and consequential 
losses for all participants of the livestock production chain. Details of this sub-model are 
explained by Meuwissen et al. (1999a). 
6.3.2 Results of Monte-Carlo simulation 
6.3.2.1 Results of sub-models 
Most likely scenarios 
In relation to the frequency of CSF-epidemics in the southern part of the Netherlands (first 
sub-model), the most likely scenario concerns a frequency of on average 1 epidemic per 5 
years (Horst et al., 1999a). Figure 6.2 shows the probability density function of the number of 
epidemics per year for this scenario. 
As Figure 6.2 illustrates, the probability of zero epidemics per year is highest, i.e. 0.82. 
The probability of 1, or more than 1, epidemic per year is 0.17 and 0.01 respectively. The 
mean number of epidemics per year resulting from this distribution is 0.20 with a standard 
deviation of 0.44. 
With regard to the epidemiological extent of epidemics, the most likely scenario concerns a 
scenario in which epidemics are controlled by the minimum EU control strategy (as described 
in section 6.2). Given this strategy (and combining output from the sub-models on the 
epidemiological and financial extent of epidemics), Figure 6.3 shows the expected total losses 
(million US $) from a CSF-epidemic in the southern part of the Netherlands (the left-hand 
part of the figure subdivides expected total losses into different categories, the right-hand part 
subdivides expected consequential losses for fanners into different causes of loss). 
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Figure 6.2 Probability density function (PDF) of the number of CSF-epidemics in the 
southern part of the Netherlands per year in most likely scenario 
As Figure 6.3 shows, expected total losses mainly consist of direct costs; these include US 
$872 million. The expected values of the consequential losses of related industries and 
farmers are US $268 million and US $170 million respectively. Of the consequential losses 
for farmers, US $76 million is due to repopulation and surveillance zones, and US $51 million 
and US $43 million due to business interruption (from depopulation and welfare slaughter 
respectively). Figure 6.4 shows the range around the expected values for both types of 
business interruption losses. 
Figure 6.3 Expected total losses from a CSF-epidemic in the southern part of the Netherlands in 
most likely scenario (million US $) 
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Figure 6.4 Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of business interruption losses (from depopulation and 
welfare slaughter) from a CSF-epidemic in the southern part of the Netherlands in most likely scenario 
(million US $) 
As Figure 6.4 illustrates, the range of business interruption losses from depopulation is wider 
than that of business interruption losses from welfare slaughter, i.e. for depopulation, losses 
range from US $17 million to US $158 million, while these numbers are US $28 million and 
US $115 million respectively for welfare slaughter. 
Alternative scenarios 
In relation to the frequency of epidemics, two alternative scenarios were defined, i.e. one with 
an increase in the number of epidemics (to on average 2 per 5 years) and one with a decrease 
in the number of epidemics (to on average 1 per 10 years). In the pessimistic scenario of on 
average 2 epidemics per 5 years, the mean number of epidemics per year is 0.40, with a 
spread from 0 to 4. In the optimistic scenario of 1 epidemic per 10 years, these numbers are 
0.10,0, and 2 respectively. 
With regard to the epidemiological extent of epidemics, also two alternative strategies 
were defined (Nielen et al., 1999): one in which the minimum EU control strategy is extended 
with a pre-emptive slaughter program of all herds within a 2-km radius of infected herds, and 
one in which surveillance zones have a radius of 20 km instead of 10 km. With the more 
severe pre-emptive slaughter program (and focusing on business interruption losses), losses 
decrease significantly, i.e. expected business interruption losses decrease from $51 million for 
depopulation and US $43 million for welfare slaughter (see Figure 6.3) to US $28 million and 
US $10 million respectively. In the scenario with larger surveillance zones, expected business 
interruption losses from depopulation decrease, i.e. to US $47 million, but those of welfare 
slaughter increase (to US $77 million). 
Depopulation 
Welfare slaughter 
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6.3.2.2 Results of the overall simulation model 
Most likely scenario 
The first part of Table 6.1 shows the results of the overall model for the most likely scenario 
of on average 1 epidemic per 5 years and with the minimum EU control strategy. 
Table 6.1 Annual losses from CSF in the southern part of the Netherlands (expected values and tractile values) 
for three scenarios (million US $). 
Expected 
value 
Min 0.50 0.95 Max 
Most likely scenario (i - 3100)' 
Total losses 246 0 0 1404 4462 
Consequential losses farmers 
Business interruption from depopulation 10 0 0 61 181 
Business interruption from welfare slaughter 8 0 0 47 215 
Repopulation and surveillance zones 14 0 0 89 292 
Pessimistic scenario (i = 1800) 
Total losses 761 0 0 3336 8572 
Consequential losses farmers 
Business interruption from depopulation 18 0 0 77 199 
Business interruption from welfare slaughter 30 0 0 130 283 
Repopulation and surveillance zones 38 0 0 168 434 
Optimistic scenario (i- 3800) 
Total losses 75 0 0 641 2653 
Consequential losses farmers 
Business interruption from depopulation 3 0 0 25 118 
Business interruption from welfare slaughter 1 0 0 8 61 
Repopulation and surveillance zones 6 0 0 49 159 
'Number of @-Risk iterations carried out 
Table 6.1 shows that in the most likely scenario, expected annual total losses from CSF in the 
southern part of the Netherlands are US $246 million, with a range from zero to US $4.5 
billion. The expected annual losses from business interruption total US $18 million, with a 
range from zero to US $396 million (US $181 million + US $215 million). 
Alternative scenarios 
In the pessimistic scenario (with on average 2 epidemics per 5 years and the control strategy 
with larger surveillance zones), expected annual total losses are three times higher than in the 
most likely scenario, i.e. US $761 million (Table 6.1). Expected annual losses from business 
interruption are US $48 million (US $18 million + US $30 million), with a 0.95 fractile of US 
$207 million and a maximum of US $482 million. 
In the optimistic scenario (with on average 1 epidemic per 10 years and the more severe 
pre-emptive slaughter program), expected annual total losses are US $75 million. Expected 
annual business interruption losses are now US $3 million and US $1 million for depopulation 
and welfare slaughter respectively. 
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6.4 Careful considerations when introducing a farm business interruption insurance for 
livestock epidemics 
Premium rates 
For the three scenarios presented in Table 6.1, premium rates for farm business interruption 
insurance (covering business interruption from depopulation as well as from welfare 
slaughter) have been calculated. Rates are based on expected claim cost (with zero deductible) 
for two situations, i.e. a situation in which expected losses are based on the whole loss 
distribution (as shown in Table 6.1), and a situation that considers the same loss distribution 
but without the catastrophic part of it, which is defined as the 'last 5 per cent' (or, the upper 
tail) of the loss distribution. Table 6.2 shows the expected premium rates for both situations. 
Table 6.2 Expected premium rates (in US $ per year) for farm business interruption insurance with and without 
catastrophic part of loss distribution.1 
With catastrophic risk Without catastrophic risk 
Most likely scenario 
Premium per sow 8.44 5.23 
Premium per finishing place 1.77 1.09 
Pessimistic scenario 
Premium per sow 23.11 11.41 
Premium per finishing place 4.84 2.39 
Optimistic scenario 
Premium per sow 1.91 0.71 
Premium per finishing place 0.40 0.15 
•Catastrophic part of the distribution is defined as the upper tail (last 5 per cent). 
In the most likely scenario and taking into account the whole loss distribution, premium rates 
per sow and per finishing place are US $8.44 and US $1.77 per year respectively. If farmers' 
premiums do not need to cover the catastrophic part of the distribution, rates reduce 
significantly: to US $5.23 and US $1.09 respectively. Premium rates in the pessimistic and 
optimistic scenarios are significantly higher and lower respectively compared to these 
numbers. 
The rates in the most likely scenario (and including the catastrophic part of the loss 
distribution), are about 2 per cent of the mean gross margin of sows and fattening pigs 
(Agricultural Information and Knowledge Centre and Research Station for Animal 
Husbandry, 1997), and would be about 8 per cent of the mean insured value. If premiums in 
this same scenario were to be based on the data without the catastrophic part, these numbers 
are about 1 and 5 per cent respectively. Compared to other insurance schemes, such rates are 
relatively high. 
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The systemic character of the risk 
Since epidemics generally involve many farms at the same time, losses can be catastrophic (as 
indicated by the maximum losses in Table 6.1). However, whether the maximum loss in the 
pessimistic scenario (US $199 million + US $283 million = US $482 million; Table 6.1) is 
'catastrophic' for an individual insurer, depends on several factors, such as the number and 
geographic spread of insured farmers, the extent to which the insurer's portfolio is diversified, 
and the way reinsurance is arranged (Vaughan and Vaughan, 1996; Miranda and Glauber, 
1997). Considering the extent to which insurers already can deal with other systemic risks, 
such as hurricanes and earthquakes (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999), the systemic nature of 
the CSF-risk seems to be manageable for most insurers. 
Influence offarmers on the size of risk 
A farmer can influence the expected probability of his/her herd becoming infected. Factors 
that influence this probability include the sanitary barriers and hygiene on the farm, number 
of animal contacts, and the place stock is purchased (from sources with known health status 
versus markets and dealers premises) (Davies, 1996). Such influence of farmers on the size of 
risk is likely to cause problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Rejda, 1998). 
Adverse selection is to be minimised by differentiating premiums according to 
(measurable) risk factors. Measuring the risk of farms is facilitated through evolving systems 
in the field of 'animal safety indices' (Bokma-Bakker and Vesseur, 1999) and national 
identification and recording systems (Saatkamp et al., 1995). 
Moral hazard is to be rrnmrnised by contract specifications on 'due diligence' (again 
requiring measurable aspects of farming practices), and by the use of deductibles (for example 
by not covering the first week with business interruption). In relation to infected herds, the 
number of animals already dead at the time of stamping-out may be used as an (additional) 
measurable aspect of farming practices; many dead animals may indicate little alertness of the 
farmer. 
Influence of governments on the size of risk 
Governments decide on (and are held responsible for) the control measures taken during an 
epidemic. In this way, they largely influence the size of losses (of which they cover the direct 
costs themselves). In case of business interruption insurance, agreements between 
governments and insurers about the control strategies to be applied under various 
circumstances are necessary in order to prevent debates on this issue during an epidemic. For 
example, some measures may seem very expensive at the time they are taken but they may 
lead to significant lower eventual losses. 
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Hazard-prone areas 
In some areas the expected frequency of epidemics is higher than in other areas (Horst et al., 
1999a). Stated factors determining this risk include the animal and herd densities, the 
incidence of wildlife that may be carriers, and the proximity of airports and seaports as source 
of infection. Also, the expected size of epidemics varies across areas, (also) largely depending 
on animal and herd densities. Differentiation of premiums according to the location of a farm 
is likely to increase the interest of farmers from outside hazard-prone areas in the insurance 
(giving the insurer potential for risk spreading). 
Solidarity instead of liability 
The fact that, after the notification of an outbreak, governments decide on such measures as 
surveillance zones and pre-emptive slaughter makes it unreasonable to hold the farmer with 
the outbreak liable for the losses suffered by other farmers as a consequence of the measures 
taken. This is especially true since it is generally not possible to prove that the outbreak is due 
to the farmer's (or for example a trader's, or veterinarian's) negligence (Howe and Whittaker, 
1997). In these circumstances there is a need for some degree of solidarity among farmers. 
Solidarity is stimulated through setting minimum standards for 'good agricultural practice' at 
the national level; such standards give each farmer incentives to reduce the risk—also those 
farmers who choose not to insure, for example because they can bear business interruption 
losses themselves, or, because they are 'free riders' (Stevens, 1993; Howe and Whittaker, 
1997). 
Defining "business interruption " 
The business interruption insurance in this chapter covers business interruption losses from 
(partly) empty buildings. The losses related to repopulating the farm at the end of the period 
with business interruption (see section 6.2) are not considered insurable for reasons of moral 
hazard (although some fixed mdemnity might be included in a business interruption insurance 
to cover such losses). Also for reasons of moral hazard, losses caused by surveillance zones 
are not considered insurable. 
In relation to business interruption losses from empty buildings, the issue whether farm 
buildings are empty can be determined objectively, leaving few opportunities for fraud. This 
is especially true in case of depopulation; in case of buildings emptied from welfare slaughter, 
information from official sources about the exact moment of welfare slaughter and the 
number of animals actually slaughtered is likely to be necessary to exclude fraud. 
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6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
There are several arguments in favour of increasing the feasibility of a farm business 
interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever. First, the insurance may reduce the size of 
the risk through such aspects as premium differentiation and clauses of 'due diligence' (see 
also Kunreuther, 1996). Second, more generally, insurance schemes have potential benefits 
for the society as a whole (see for example Arrow, 1992). 
A possible way to increase the feasibility of business interruption insurance is to (further) 
reduce the size of risk (so that premium rates can become lower). Giving farmers incentives 
for preventing losses (and minimising the extent of losses during an epidemic) is crucial in 
this respect. Mutual insurance companies have more opportunities to give such higher 
incentives to farmers than insurance companies organised otherwise (Vaughan and Vaughan, 
1996). Mutuals are owned by the insured farmers. There is therefore likely to be broader 
support for premium differentiation since colleague farmers—instead of anonymous 
insurance companies—impose these measures. Mutuals also make proper loss assessment 
easier (which reduces problems of moral hazard and fraud) because of social control, and 
familiarity of colleague farmers with production circumstances. Mutuals are furthermore 
allowed to charge insureds relatively low advance premiums but additionally assess them 
'surcharges' (generally to some limit) once losses become larger than the advance premiums 
paid. Such surcharges are a direct incentive for loss prevention. 
Another possible way to increase the feasibility of the insurance is to decrease farmers' 
premium rates by spreading the risks more broadly. In the current case this would, for 
example, imply that rates for farmers in the northern part of the Netherlands would not be 
completely differentiated according to the lower levels of risk in this part of the country. Such 
solidarity would be justified if farmers in less hazard-prone areas face increased profits from 
the occurrence of epidemics (as was the case during the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic in the 
Netherlands). 
Some financial involvement of governments could also increase the feasibility of business 
interruption insurance. Governments could, for example, provide some starting buffer for 
insurers (to handle the risk of major epidemics occurring after the start of the insurance), or 
they could subsidise farmers' premiums to some extent. If governments subsidise the 
catastrophic part of the risk (i.e. the upper tail of the loss distribution), premiums would 
reduce significantly (as shown in Table 6.2). Note that the premiums in Table 6.2 were based 
on expected claim costs alone. Had other costs such as reserve loads been included, the 
relative decrease in premiums would be even larger since insurers generally include large 
reserve and catastrophe loads for the catastrophic part of risks (Hogarth and Kunreuther, 
1989; Doherty, 1997). 
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Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to study the feasibility of a farm business interruption insurance 
for Classical Swine Fever. Given that quantitative insight into the size of risk can be obtained 
from such detailed simulation model as described in this chapter, and carefully considering 
issues such as the systemic character of the risk, farmers' and governments' influence on the 
size of risk, and the importance of some degree of solidarity among farmers, it is concluded 
that a business interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever is in principle feasible. 
The feasibility of the insurance would be improved through spreading the risk among 
larger groups of farmers, through some financial involvement of the government, and by the 
provision of the insurance through 'mutual companies'. 
Considering similar analytical frameworks as presented in this chapter, it is argued that 
business interruption insurance is in principle also feasible for other livestock epidemics, such 
as Foot and Mouth Disease and Swine Vesicular Disease. 
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7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to study the appropriateness of insurance as a risk 
management tool for farmers to deal with 'new' risks emerging in agriculture (Chapter 1). 
This objective was subdivided into four parts, around which the thesis was organised: insight 
into principles, opportunities, and problems of risk-sharing strategies in general (Chapter 2); 
farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management (Chapter 3); the feasibility of an income 
insurance (Chapter 4); and losses from livestock epidemics, and the feasibility of business 
interruption insurance for livestock epidemics (Chapters 5 and 6). 
In each of the chapters, underlying objectives, methods, results, opportunities, limitations, 
and issues for further research have been discussed. In this general discussion three overall 
issues found to be crucial when discussing insurance concepts for 'new' risks are addressed, 
i.e. the availability of data for developing insurance schemes (section 7.2), problems of 
asymmetric information (section 7.3), and the systemic character of 'new' risks together with 
the role of the government (section 7.4). In section 7.5 there is some further discussion of the 
applicability of the insurance principles of income insurance and business interruption 
insurance in crop and livestock farming. 
7.2 Data availability 
In considering the design of new insurance products for 'new' risks, insurers first need to 
have data on farmers' perceptions of these risks—if farmers do not regard the risks as 
relevant, they will not be interested in buying insurance (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
They also need information on the size of the risks, in order to set adequate premiums (Rejda, 
1998). 
7.2.1 Farmers'perceptions of risk 
Literature on farmers' perceptions of risk is scarce. To get insight into these perceptions, 
exploratory research can be carried out (Churchill, 1995). In this thesis, results of a mail 
survey on farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management among a large sample of 
livestock farmers in the Netherlands were described. Results show, for instance, that 25 per 
cent of the respondents indicated a preference for some insurance protection to cover losses 
from livestock epidemics. 
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In interpreting the survey results it has to be borne in mind that individuals typically have 
problems in assessing the probability of, or the potential magnitude of, catastrophic loss 
events (Kunreuther, 1976). Furthermore, results are potentially influenced by the context in 
which the survey was carried out (Pious, 1993)—as was likely the case in this survey because 
of the major epidemic of Classical Swine Fever. However, as demonstrated, questionnaire 
surveys can be a useful first step in exploring farmers' perceptions of risks and risk 
management: results reflect 'the state of affairs' of farmers' perceptions and they can very 
well be used as the starting point for improved communication among all the parties 
concerned about risk. Communication about risk (Fischhoff, 1998) between farmers, advisers, 
governments, and insurers increases people's awareness and understanding of risks. For 
farmers, this would make the decision to buy insurance for specific risks more objective, and, 
once the insurance has been bought, the (differentiated) levels of premium more clear. 
In discussing whether the indicated interest in insurance coverage is sufficient for an 
insurer to successfully introduce the insurance, several aspects play a role (i.e. not only the 
likely number of insureds), such as the degree of stochastic independence of the insured risks, 
the geographic spread of insured farmers, the extent to which the insurer's portfolio is 
diversified, and the way reinsurance is arranged (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
7.2.2 Size of risk 
For 'new' risks, typically there are not many relevant historical data. For example, for the risk 
of livestock epidemics detailed historical data are very scarce and, mrthermore, the few 
available data have limited value due to the low frequency of epidemics, large variability in 
possible outcomes, and changing legislation with respect to prevention and control policies 
applied. The same applies for floods, because of changed riskiness due to such things as 
changing mitigation policies and effects of El Nino. For prices, increasing market 
liberalisation reduces the relevance of historical price data. Following Law and Kelton (1991), 
Monte-Carlo simulation models were used to synthesis the missing frequencies and to provide 
insights into situations about which there is little empirical information. Outcomes of the 
models indicate the possible variation of losses, and what-if analyses can be used to study the 
impact of changes in the starting parameters. As a consequence of technical developments, 
there are opportunities for simulation models to become more and more sophisticated and 
powerful, for example by linking them to large data bases. 
For the output of simulation models to be used with reasonable confidence, it is important 
to use reliable input data (especially since external validation of the models is difficult given 
the constantly changing risk environment). Experience in this study showed the importance of 
checking data outliers (found useful in relation to the panel data on farm yields) and logic (the 
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sequence of events in the file with information on the control measures applied on farms 
involved in the 1997/98 Classical Swine Fever epidemic in the Netherlands was found not to 
be wholly logical). 
Simulation models are not only useful for providing the necessary data for calculating 
premiums; they are also very useful in the field of risk communication (previous section). For 
example, with respect to epidemics, simulation results show the existence of hazard-prone 
areas, but also illustrate that other areas do not have zero risk (Horst et al., 1999). Also, 
simulation results illustrate that some control measures that may seem very expensive at first 
sight can lead to lower eventual losses (Nielen et al., 1999). Such insights support decision-
making both in planning for and during actual epidemics. 
The simulation models in this thesis (i.e. the Monte-Carlo simulation models of income 
insurance and of the size of epidemic disease risks) were used to analyse the size of risks at a 
partial level (respectively a commodity-by-commodity analysis and an analysis for affected 
parties). Such analyses are of direct relevance for insurers, i.e. they refer to the risks covered 
under the considered insurance schemes. However, simulation analyses at a more aggregated 
level, such as a whole-farm or a social cost-benefit analysis, would be useful from a broader 
risk and risk management perspective. A whole-farm analysis may, for example, illustrate that 
the total level of risk on a farm may not decrease much from buying insurance for a specific 
commodity (for example because farmers take on more and different risks; Skees, 1999). A 
social cost-benefit analysis at the national level for livestock epidemics could indicate 
whether losses of affected farmers are outweighed by gains of non-affected farmers, perhaps 
supporting the inclusion of farmers from less hazard-prone areas in an insurance. 
7.3 Problems of asymmetric information 
Asymmetry of information can lead to the dual problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. If these problems are not properly addressed, they may make a risk uninsurable 
(Rejda, 1998). The term 'properly' refers to whether the problems can be dealt with at 
acceptable costs and in a sufficiently successful way. For instance, basing indemnity 
payments on some objective and transparent index (for example a rainfall index) eliminates 
informational asymmetry and has low transaction costs, but leaves farmers exposed to what 
may be a substantial basis risk (Skees et al., 1997). 
Opportunities for dealing with moral hazard and adverse selection are increasing. For 
example, insurers may link their underwriting criteria to objective criteria established for 
other risk management tools such as HACCP (hazard analysis and critical control points), 
GAP (good agricultural practice), and so-called 'animal safety indices' (Bokma-Bakker and 
Vesseur, 1999). Monitoring may be facilitated by developments of systems such as global 
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positioning systems and integrated remote sensing. In this way, transparency is greatly 
improved, thus reducing the asymmetric information problems significantly. Also, research in 
the field of 'objective and transparent indices' as a basis for insurance is increasing; Turvey 
(1999) describes trends in weather derivatives based on measures of, among others, 
cumulative degree days, cumulative rainfall, specific temperatures, and specific precipitation 
(rainfall, snowfall). A further development in reducing the asymmetric information problem is 
the increased attention being given to mutual insurance companies. Mutuals (for example for 
livestock epidemics) are owned by the insured farmers (Vaughan and Vaughan, 1996). There 
is therefore likely to be broader support for differentiation of premiums (and indemnities) 
since colleague farmers—instead of anonymous insurance companies—impose these 
measures. Mutuals also make proper loss assessment easier because of social control and 
familiarity of colleague farmers with production circumstances. 
7.4 Systemic risk and the role of governments 
Many of the 'new' risks are partly systemic (such as floods, heavy rainfall, droughts, and 
epidemics) or even completely systemic (such as prices). Reinsurance capacity for such risks 
is not yet widely available and some form of public-private partnership for reinsurance may 
be necessary for such risks to become insurable. 
Based on experience in the US, the starting point for public-private partnerships should be 
a minimisation of moral hazard and rent seeking opportunities for insurance companies 
(Barnett, 1999). This can be achieved through arrangements whereby governments reinsure 
only part of the risks underwritten by the insurers (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992), 
and by ensuring that governments have access to the same information as the companies 
about insured risks and losses (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997). This is facilitated 
through using transparent loss indices as bases for reinsurance agreements (Skees and Barnett, 
1999)—as mentioned in the previous section to reduce asymmetric information problems in 
primary insurance contracts. 
There are two main ways in which governments might become involved in a public-private 
partnership: they could agree to provide some reinsurance coverage to insurance companies at 
zero costs, or they could provide reinsurance at fully commercial rates. There are several 
arguments in favour of governments providing reinsurance at zero costs: 
- Governments already provide disaster relief (for example in case of floods). Providing 
assistance through reinsurance seems more efficient, because disaster relief is very ad hoc 
and often involves problems of 'who receives the money'. There are also considerable 
administrative costs incurred to set up special agencies to organise and provide the disaster 
relief. By providing reinsurance, governments can use the experience and capacity of 
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insurance companies in dealing with moral hazard and adverse selection problems and in 
handling large numbers of claims (Hazell, 1992; Barnett, 1999). 
- Governments already provide continuous payments to farmers (for example through price 
support). Providing assistance through reinsurance seems more efficient, because 
governments provide assistance when and only when farmers' incomes are low and 
marginal utility is high (Henessey et al., 1997). 
- Insurance schemes, like other risk-sharing devices, have potential advantages for society as 
a whole (Arrow, 1992). Therefore, a case can be made that some modest subsidy, 
embodied in reinsurance, may be socially beneficial. 
- Individuals typically have problems in assessing the probability of, or the potential 
magnitude of, catastrophic loss events (Kunreuther, 1976). Because of such cognitive 
failure, the willingness to pay of individuals for insurance that covers such catastrophic 
events is less than the actual premium required for such insurance (Skees and Barnett, 
1999). A modest subsidy for reinsurance might close this gap. 
- Having the government financially involved may address a moral hazard problem in 
government behaviour: many catastrophes (for example losses from floods) can be either 
prevented or magnified by government policies (or lack thereof). Having governments 
financially responsible for some losses might be an incentive for them to put into place 
appropriate hazard management measures (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997). 
- Having the government financially involved may reduce political pressure to provide ad 
hoc disaster relief. 
There are also some arguments in favour of governments providing reinsurance at fully 
commercial rates. 
- Governments can potentially provide reinsurance more economically than can private 
market reinsurers (assuming the private sector could provide the needed capacity). 
Governments have substantial advantages because of their deep credit capacity and their 
unique position as the largest social entity in a country. These advantages enable them to 
diversify claims intertemporally and to spread risks broadly (Lewis and Murdock, 1996; 
Priest, 1996; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997). 
- If governments charge for providing reinsurance at rates that will cover costs, some of 
these functions will be taken over by the private sector as capital and commodity markets 
deepen (Lewis and Murdock, 1996; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997). The development of 
capital and commodity markets is facilitated if governments participate in the market as a 
'market party'—not as an institution that provides price support and free disaster relief to 
farmers (Barnett, 1999; Skees and Barnett, 1999). 
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- If farmers have to pay for their risk protection, the insurance scheme is really a risk 
management tool—not some form of income enhancement by the government (Skees, 
1999). 
For the reasons listed above, it is recommended that—if governments become involved in 
providing (some) reinsurance capacity to the private sector—they should charge for the 
provided capacity to a certain extent. Further research should clarify the precise extent to 
which governments should charge the private sector for specific risks. Besides arguments 
already listed, a further issue that may play a role in determining this extent is that of income 
inequity in agriculture (or, stated differently, the extent to which some government subsidies 
for farmers—and not for other small firms—would be fair). 
Another issue for further research is the extent to which governments can promote the 
development of insurance instruments for serious farming risks in other ways, for example 
through elimmating certain taxes on insurance contracts. 
7.5 Further applicability of income insurance and business interruption insurance 
Two types of insurance were considered in the thesis: income insurance and business 
interruption insurance. This section discusses the applicability of both of these forms of 
insurance in relation to 'new' risks in crop and livestock farming. 
Income insurance 
Although in theory income insurance seemed a promising idea by means of which losses 
might be covered at a high level of aggregation, in practice, problems of asymmetric 
information mean that only revenue insurance is considered feasible. Furthermore, (again for 
reasons of asymmetric information) revenue insurance is only considered applicable to field 
crops; for livestock commodities and horticultural commodities in glasshouses yield 
fluctuations are small and largely influenced by management. Revenue insurance would cover 
low revenues (price times yield) at harvest time. Insured perils can range from low prices to 
floods, hail, heavy rainfall, and droughts. 
Business interruption insurance 
Business interruption insurance is also a form of income insurance, i.e. a form that covers low 
margins (price times yield minus variable costs). However, business interruption insurance 
only covers low margins that are caused by periods of business interruption from specific 
events (low margins themselves are not considered insurable). For livestock, insured events 
can include the occurrence of epidemics, such as Classical Swine Fever and Foot and Mouth 
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Disease, or food safety problems (for example related to dioxin in animal feed). For 
commodities in glasshouses, such an event can be the occurrence of floods. For field crops, 
the trigger might be epidemics which result in changes in the crop rotation plan (Bruinrof). 
Business interruption insurance generally compensates the farm business facing an insured 
interruption at an average margin for each day of business interruption. As with establishing 
premiums and indemnities for revenue insurance, however, in business interruption insurance 
the price part of the insurance could be established yearly, depending on such factors as price 
cycles and trends. 
Possible advantages of using actual spot market prices to base indemnities on may be that 
indemnities are perceived as fairer by insured farmers and that moral hazard is reduced in 
those situations in which the average price would be higher than the actual price. However, 
catastrophic events such as floods and epidemics generally do not occur very frequent 
(implying that the costs of re-estimating price levels each year may not be worth it) and the 
events themselves will heavily influence spot market prices (which complicates the estimation 
of premium levels). 
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SUMMARY AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The risk environment of farmers is constantly changing, in part due to a changing role of the 
government—less intervention on the one hand, more regulation on the other—and an 
increasing industrialisation of agriculture. Examples of the changed environment include 
increased price risks, at least for European farmers currently producing under the price 
support programs of the Common Agricultural Policy, and increased production risks due to 
more regulated use of medicines and vaccines, such as restrictions on the use of antibiotics 
and vaccines for epidemic diseases respectively. Changes are also occurring in relation to 
risks of catastrophic events such as floods. In the past, farmers have often been compensated 
for such losses by governments but now there is increasing pressure to find private market 
solutions. As a result of the increasing industrialisation of agriculture, required levels of 
investment increase and farmers become more and more dependent on changing market 
circumstances. 
Taking more risks can increase a farmer's expected profit. However, farmers (like most 
people) are generally risk averse. They therefore adopt a range of strategies to manage the 
risks they face. These strategies include on-farm measures such as diversification or selecting 
less risky production methods, as well as strategies for sharing risk with others. A well-known 
risk management strategy whereby farmers can share risks with others is to buy insurance for 
particular types of risk. The current study was directed towards insurance to see whether this 
risk management tool is suited to deal with the 'new' risks with which agriculture is 
confronted. More specifically, the objectives of this study were to provide insight into: 
1. Principles, opportunities, and problems of risk-sharing strategies in general; 
2. Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management; 
3. The feasibility of farm income insurance; and 
4. Losses from livestock epidemics, and the feasibility of farm business interruption 
insurance. 
Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management (objective 2) were analysed for livestock 
farmers in the Netherlands. Income insurance (objective 3) and livestock epidemics (objective 
4) were studied in a European context. Of the various livestock epidemics that exist Classical 
Swine Fever (CSF) was chosen for study. For each of the objectives, scope and definition, 
materials and methods used, and results found are summarised below. 
99 
Risk-sharing strategies in general 
Risk sharing is based on the concept of pooling. The principle of pooling is that by combining 
independent losses in a pool, the expected amount of losses stays the same, but variance 
decreases. In addition, if the pool consists of large numbers of independent risks, relative 
variation of actual loss from average loss further decreases (law of large numbers) and the 
party that pools the risk is able to more accurately predict average losses (and hence also the 
amount of money needed for dealing with these losses, such as an insurance premium). 
Major opportunities of risk-sharing strategies include the fact that they are in principle 
advantageous for both the individual farmer and society as a whole. Major challenges refer to 
problems of asymmetric information and systemic risks. However, opportunities for dealing 
with these aspects are currently increasing. For instance, the use of objective and transparent 
indices (such as rainfall indices) to base insurance on reduces problems of asymmetric 
information, and market-based public-private partnerships for reinsurance reduce problems of 
insufficient reinsurance capacity for systemic risks. 
Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management 
To get empirical insight into farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management, and into 
characteristics of a farm and/or farmer that relate to these perceptions, survey data were 
analysed. The data originate from a large sample of livestock farmers (n=612) in the 
Netherlands and were gathered by a questionnaire survey. The questions related to 1) farmers' 
perceptions of risk, 2) farmers' perceptions of various strategies to manage risks, and 3) 
socioeconomic characteristics of the farm and farmer. 
Results show that, in general, price and production risks were perceived as important 
sources of risk. Insurance schemes (both commercial insurance and 'on-farm' insurance such 
as producing at lowest possible costs and applying strict hygienic rules) were perceived as 
relevant strategies to manage risks. More detailed analyses of the perceptions show that dairy 
farmers generally saw price risks as very important, while pig and mixed farmers were more 
likely to rank production risks as very important. Insurance was perceived as relatively less 
important by mixed farmers than by other farmers. The study provides useful insights for 
policymakers, advisers, and developers and sellers of (new) risk management strategies. For 
example, the insight that pig farmers perceive diversification (away from the current business) 
as a relevant risk management strategy may help policymakers in combating current 
environmental problems in the pig sector. 
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Farm income insurance 
The concept of income insurance was studied because such a concept may encompass 
coverage of various ('new') risks under one overall form of insurance at a high level of 
aggregation. 
The extent to which income insurance schemes will be attractive to farmers depends on 
several factors, among others the income measure used. Schemes that cover losses at a higher 
level of aggregation are potentially more attractive to farmers than schemes that insure only 
separate components of the income, because covering higher aggregation levels deals with 
losses closer to the welfare of a farm family (compare for example whole-farm income 
insurance versus commodity-wise gross revenue insurance). Another important factor is the 
level of subsidies provided by the government. If governments subsidise insurance to some 
extent, the likelihood that insurers will set premiums at levels that farmers will find attractive 
will be higher. On the other hand, the availability of other forms of subsidy that give farmers 
higher and more stable incomes (such as price support schemes and governmental ad hoc 
provision of disaster assistance) reduces the chances that farmers will want to buy commercial 
income insurance. 
From an insurers' point of view, the attractiveness of income insurance schemes depends 
on the extent to which problems of asymmetric information and the systemic character of 
'new' risks can be dealt with. Because of aspects of asymmetric information, only revenue 
insurance (price times yield) is considered possible. Furthermore, (again because of 
asymmetric information) revenue insurance is only considered applicable to field crops; for 
livestock commodities and horticultural commodities in glasshouses yield fluctuations are 
small and largely influenced by management. Both components of revenue, i.e. price and 
yield, are systemic, meaning that multiple insureds can suffer losses at the same time. 
Insurance companies have problems pooling such risks themselves and adequate reinsurance 
capacity is not usually available when the scale of the systemic risk is large. For these 
reasons, some form of public-private partnership may well be necessary for insurers to enter 
this revenue insurance market. 
In pilot tests the appeal to farmers, the profitability to insurers, and the role of governments 
can be clarified. A pilot test of revenue insurance could be based initially on area yields and 
observed spot market or futures market prices. A Monte-Carlo simulation model illustrated 
the problems with the use of individual farm yield data. The model furthermore illustrated the 
sensitivity of the effectiveness and cost of insurance schemes to price and yield variability, 
correlations and insurance design. 
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Losses from Classical Swine Fever and the feasibility of farm business interruption 
insurance 
In the European Union, livestock epidemics of so-called 'List-A diseases', such as Classical 
Swine Fever (CSF), do not occur frequently, but if they occur, losses can be very large. A 
model was developed to allow a financial analysis of a CSF-epidemic. The model, entitled 
EpiLoss. (Epidemic Losses), considers financial consequences for all affected parties, 
including governments (EU and national), farms, and related industries in the production 
chain. The results of applying the model to the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic in the Netherlands 
show that total financial consequences of the epidemic were US $2.3 billion. Consequential 
losses for farmers and related industries were US $423 million and US $596 million 
respectively. Budgetary consequences for governments included less than 50 per cent of the 
total losses calculated by the model. 
Since governments only compensate direct costs (such as the value of destroyed herds) and 
not consequential losses, such as the business interruption losses encountered by farmers, the 
feasibility of a farm business interruption insurance for CSF-epidemics was analysed. Insight 
into the size of risk, under various scenarios, was obtained by a detailed Monte-Carlo 
simulation model. This model consists of three sub-models. Besides EpiLoss, these are 
models of the frequency and extent of epidemics. As an illustrative example, the model was 
applied to the southern part of the Netherlands, a very densely populated swine area and the 
centre of the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic. Simulation results for the most likely scenario show 
expected annual total losses from CSF of US $246 million, with a range from zero to US $4.5 
billion. The expected annual losses from farm business interruption total US $18 million, with 
a range from zero to US $396 million. 
Given the availability of such quantitative insights and considering aspects such as the 
systemic character of the risk and farmers' and governments' influence on the size of risk, it 
is concluded that a farm business interruption insurance is in principle feasible. The feasibility 
of insurance would be improved through spreading the risk among larger groups of farmers, 
through some financial involvement of the government, and by the provision of the insurance 
through 'mutual companies'. 
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Main conclusions 
Based on the results of this research, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
- Insurance schemes can provide opportunities for farmers to deal with 'new' risks in 
agriculture. 
- Risk-sharing strategies are in principle beneficial to farmers and society as a whole. 
Conditions include that problems of asymmetric information and the systemic character of 
risks can be dealt with efficiently, and that the costs of new risks introduced by the risk-
sharing strategies are not larger than the benefits of using the risk-sharing strategy. 
- In general, price and production risks are perceived as important sources of risk. Dairy 
farmers generally see price risks (and other financial risks) as very important, while pig 
and mixed farmers are more likely to see production risks as very important. 
- In general, farmers perceive insurance (both commercial insurance and 'on-farm' 
insurance such as producing at lowest possible costs and applying strict hygienic rules) as 
the most important strategy to manage risks. Mixed farmers were found to perceive 
insurance as relatively less important than pig and dairy farmers. 
- Opportunities exist to begin testing farm income insurance in Europe via a pilot scheme of 
revenue insurance for field crops. The insurance would cover low revenues (price times 
yield) at harvest time. Insured perils can range from low prices to floods, hail, heavy 
rainfall and droughts. 
- The total financial consequences calculated for the 1997/98 epidemic of Classical Swine 
Fever in the southern part of the Netherlands are US $2.3 billion. Of these losses, US $247 
million was due to business interruption for farmers. Simulation results for the most likely 
scenario show expected annual total losses from Swine Fever of US $246 million, with a 
range from zero to US $4.5 billion. The expected annual losses from business interruption 
total US $18 million, with a range from zero to US $396 million. 
- Opportunities exist for a business interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever. More 
generally, a business interruption insurance (which is also a form of income insurance) can 
be used for multiple risks that lead to periods of business interruption. For livestock, this 
can be the occurrence of epidemics, such as Classical Swine Fever and Foot and Mouth 
Disease, or food safety problems (for example related to BSE or dioxin in animal feed). 
For commodities in glasshouses, interruption may be due to floods. For field crops, the 
cause can be epidemics which result in changes in the crop rotation plan (Bruinrot). 
- The changing risk environment for farmers is partly attributable to a changing role of 
government (less intervention, more regulation). Because of the systemic character of the 
'new' risks, the role of governments is likely to change further and may be extended to 
include that of reinsurer in public-private partnerships. 
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Based on this research the following conclusions regarding to the methods used can be drawn: 
- A consistent use of partial budgeting as a means of calculating the financial consequences 
of an epidemic enables a structured discussion on the losses incurred, both for farms and 
related industries in the production chain. 
- Monte-Carlo simulation models enlarge the insight into the size of risk and the variables 
that are important in determining it. 
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Inleiding 
Risico's in de landbouw veranderen voortdurend. Overheidsbeleid (minder interventie, meer 
regelgeving) en toenemende industrialisatie van de landbouw spelen hierin een belangrijke 
rol. Voorbeelden van veranderende risico's zijn een toename van prijsrisico's (met name voor 
produkten die nu nog onder het EU-prijsbeleid vallen) en een toename van produktierisico's. 
Produktierisico's nemen onder andere toe als gevolg van restricties op het gebruik van 
medicijnen (zoals antibiotica in veevoer) en vaccins (de EU voert een zogenaamd non-
vaccinatiebeleid voor zeer besmettelijke dierziekten als mond- en klauwzeer). Ook risico's 
rond calamiteiten zoals overstromingen en overvloedige regenval veranderen doordat 
overheden zich terugtrekken uit de schadevergoeding en de private sector zelf voor 
oplossingen moet zorgen. De toenemende industrialisatie van de landbouw heeft tot gevolg 
dat investeringen steeds omvangrijker worden en agrarische ondernemers daardoor steeds 
afhankelijker van ontwikkelingen in de markt. 
Het nemen van risico's kan leiden tot een hogere winstverwachting. Agrarische 
ondernemers zijn over het algemeen echter risico-avers (zoals de meeste mensen) en 
gebruiken allerlei risicomanagementstrategieën om met hun risico's om te gaan. Deze 
strategieën zijn in te delen in strategieën binnen het bedrijf (bijvoorbeeld diversificatie) en 
strategieën waarin het risico gedeeld wordt met anderen (zogenaamde 'risk-sharing 
strategies'), zoals het afsluiten van een verzekering. 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op het risicomanagementinstrument 'verzekeringen'. De 
doelstelling van het proefschrift is het analyseren van de geschiktheid van dit instrument voor 
het afdekken van de 'nieuwe' risico's in de landbouw. Subdoelstellingen zijn het verkrijgen 
van inzicht in: 
1. De principes, mogelijkheden en problemen van 'risk-sharing strategies' in het algemeen; 
2. De perceptie van agrarische ondernemers ten aanzien van risico's en risicomanagement; 
3. De haalbaarheid van een inkomensverzekering; en 
4. Schade als gevolg van besmettelijke dierziekten en de haalbaarheid van een bedrijfs-
onderbrekingsverzekering. 
De perceptie van agrarische ondernemers (subdoelstelling 2) is geanalyseerd voor 
Nederlandse veehouders. De inkomensverzekering en besmettelijke dierziekten (sub-
doelstellingen 3 en 4) zijn bestudeerd in een Europese context. De studie rond besmettelijke 
dierziekten is toegespitst op klassieke varkenspest. Voor elk van de subdoelstellingen zijn de 
belangrijkste resultaten en conclusies hieronder samengevat. 
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'Risk-sharing strategies' 
Het principe van 'risk-sharing strategies' is dat van het 'poolen' van risico's. Bij het 'poolen' 
van onafhankelijke risico's blijft het te verwachten risico gelijk, maar neemt de variantie af. 
Hoe groter het aantal onafhankelijke risico's dat 'gepooled' wordt, hoe verder de relatieve 
variantie afneemt en des te nauwkeuriger de partij die het risico 'pooled' de gemiddelde 
schade (en bijvoorbeeld de benodigde verzekeringspremie) kan voorspellen. 
Het gebruik van 'risk-sharing strategies' is in principe gunstig voor zowel de individuele 
ondernemer als de gehele samenleving. Problemen kunnen zich echter voordoen in geval van 
asymmetrische informatie tussen de partijen die een risico 'poolen', en als risico's catastrofaal 
van aard zijn. 
De mogelijke manieren om met problemen rond asymmetrische informatie en catastrofale 
risico's om te gaan nemen toe. Door een verzekering bijvoorbeeld te baseren op een 
objectieve en transparante index (bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de hoeveelheid neerslag in 
een bepaald gebied) in plaats van bedrijfsspecifïeke data, kunnen problemen rond 
asymmetrische informatie verminderd worden. Verder kunnen zogenaamde 'public-private 
partnerships' de problemen rond het catastrofale karakter van risico's—en de daarmee 
samenhangende beperkte herverzekeringscapaciteit—voor een belangrijk deel wegnemen. 
Perceptie van veehouders ten aanzien van risico's en risicomanagement 
Om empirisch inzicht te krijgen in de perceptie van veehouders ten aanzien van risico's en 
risicomanagementstrategieën, en in de ondernemers- en bedrijfskenmerken die met deze 
percepties samenhangen, is een schriftelijke enquête uitgevoerd onder een grote groep 
veehouders in Nederland. Enquête-vragen hadden betrekking op 1) de perceptie van 
veehouders ten aanzien van risico's, 2) de perceptie van veehouders ten aanzien van risico-
managementstrategieën, en 3) de'sociaal-economische karakteristieken van de veehouder en 
zijn/haar bedrijf. 
Uit de resultaten (gebaseerd op 612 geretourneerde enquêtes) komt naar voren dat prijs- en 
produktierisico's als belangrijke bronnen van risico worden beschouwd. Verzekeringen 
(zowel commerciële verzekeringen als 'eigen verzekeringen' met betrekking tot onder andere 
het produceren tegen zo laag mogelijke kosten en het toepassen van strikte 
hygiënemaatregelen) worden beschouwd als een belangrijke manier om met risico's om te 
gaan. Voor melkveehouders zijn prijsrisico's belangrijker dan voor varkenshouders en 
veehouders met gemengde bedrijven. Voor produktierisico's geldt precies het omgekeerde. 
Voor wat betreft het belang van verzekeringen als risicomanagementinstrument blijkt dat de 
veehouders met gemengde bedrijven deze 'tooi' minder belangrijk vinden dan de melkvee- en 
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varkenshouders. Uit de enquête komen zeer bruikbare resultaten voor beleidsmakers, 
adviseurs en mensen werkzaam op het terrein van risicomanagement naar voren. 
Bijvoorbeeld, het resultaat dat varkenshouders diversificatie naar andere bedrijfstakken toe 
zeer relevant vinden, kan beleidsmakers ondersteunen in hun (flankerend) beleid rond de 
huidige milieuproblematiek. 
Een inkomensverzekering 
Het concept 'inkomensverzekering' is bestudeerd vanuit het idee dat met een dergelijk 
'overall' concept mogelijk meerdere 'nieuwe' risico's binnen één verzekering kunnen worden 
afgedekt. 
De belangstelling van agrarische ondernemers voor een inkomensverzekering hangt af van 
een aantal zaken, onder meer van de gebruikte inkomensmaatstaf. De meer geaggregeerde 
maatstaven zoals bedrijfsinkomen of bruto bedrijfsopbrengsten zijn aantrekkelijker dan 
maatstaven die afzonderlijke componenten van het inkomen afdekken (zoals prijs of kg-
opbrengst per hectare). De reden hiervoor is dat de meer geaggregeerde maatstaven risico's 
afdekken op een niveau dat dichter bij het welzijn van het gezin ligt. Een ander belangrijk 
aspect dat de belangstelling van agrarische ondernemers voor een inkomensverzekering 
beïnvloedt is subsidiëring door de overheid. Een subsidie van de overheid zal naar alle 
waarschijnlijkheid leiden tot lagere premies en dus tot een grotere interesse van agrarische 
ondernemers in de verzekering. Echter, andere overheidssubsidies (die ook leiden tot een 
hoger en/of meer stabiel inkomen, zoals prijsondersteuning en schadevergoeding bij 
calamiteiten) zullen de interesse in een commerciële inkomensverzekering doen afnemen. 
De belangstelling van verzekeringsmaatschappijen voor een inkomensverzekering hangt 
met name af van de mate waarin oplossingen kunnen worden gevonden voor problemen rond 
asymmetrische informatie en het catastrofale karakter van de 'nieuwe' risico's. Vanwege het 
gevaar van asymmetrische informatie wordt alleen een inkomensverzekering in de vorm van 
een opbrengstverzekering (prijs maal hoeveelheid) haalbaar geacht. Bovendien wordt een 
dergelijke verzekering (ook vanwege problemen rond asymmetrische informatie) alleen 
haalbaar geacht voor gewassen in het veld; in de veehouderij en glastuinbouw zijn 
volumefluctuaties gering en—meer dan bij gewassen in het vetó—te beïnvloeden door het 
management van de ondernemer. 
Prijs- en hoeveelheidsrisico's zijn beide catastrofaal van aard, oftewel: meerdere 
verzekerden kunnen tegelijkertijd schade lopen. Omdat het 'poolen' van catastrofale risico's 
lastig is—en adequate herverzekeringscapaciteit nauwelijks beschikbaar—is een 'public-
private partnership' voor wat betreft de herverzekeringscapaciteit mogelijk noodzakelijk om 
verzekeraars werkelijk te interesseren voor opbrengstverzekeringen. 
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Een pilot test kan de belangstelling van betrokken partijen (agrarische ondernemers, 
verzekeraars, overheid) voor een opbrengstverzekering verduidelijken. In een pilot test 
zouden in eerste instantie voor de prijs- en hoeveelheidsgegevens respectievelijk 
waargenomen (termijn)marktprijzen en objectieve regio-data gebruikt kunnen worden. 
Problemen rond het gebruik van individuele bedrijfsgegevens zijn geïllustreerd aan de hand 
van een Monte-Carlo simulatiemodel. Uit de resultaten van het simulatiemodel wordt ook 
duidelijk dat de premies voor, en de impact van, een opbrengstverzekering in grote mate 
beïnvloed worden door (aannames met betrekking tot) prijs- en hoeveelheidsfluctuaties, 
correlaties, en opzet van de verzekering. 
Schade door klassieke varkenspest en de haalbaarheid van een bedrijfsonderbrekings-
verzekering 
In Europa is de frequentie van uitbraken van zogenaamde 'categorie-A dierziekten' zoals 
klassieke varkenspest laag, maar als zich uitbraken voordoen kunnen schades wel zeer groot 
zijn. Om dergelijke schades te kunnen inschatten is een model, getiteld EpiLoss (Epz'demic 
Losses), ontwikkeld. EpiLoss berekent directe schade voor de (Europese en nationale) 
overheden en gevolgschade voor alle schakels in de produktiekolom. Het toegepaste 
berekeningsprincipe is dat van 'partial budgeting'. 
De met behulp van EpiLoss berekende schade van de 1997/98-varkenspestepidemie in 
Nederland bedraagt 4.6 miljard gulden. Hiervan is 846 miljoen gulden gevolgschade voor de 
primaire sector (waarvan 494 miljoen gulden door leegstand). De berekende gevolgschade 
voor de toeleverende- en verwerkende industrie bedraagt ruim 1 miljard gulden. Van de totale 
berekende schade komt minder dan 50 procent voor rekening van de overheid. 
De overheid neemt (een groot deel van) de directe kosten (zoals de waarde van geruimde 
veestapels) voor haar rekening maar geen gevolgschade (die onder andere het gevolg is van 
het leeg staan van stallen). 'Voor het inschatten van de haalbaarheid van een 
bedrijfsonderbrekingsverzekering voor leegstand door varkenspest is een Monte-Carlo 
simulatiemodel ontwikkeld. Dit Monte-Carlo simulatiemodel is opgebouwd uit drie 'sub-
modellen'. Naast EpiLoss zijn dit modellen met betrekking tot de frequentie en de 
epidemiologische omvang van varkenspestuitbraken. Het simulatiemodel is toegepast op het 
zuiden van Nederland, een zeer varkensdicht gebied en tevens de regio waar de 1997/98-
varkenspestepidemie plaatsvond. 
In het meest waarschijnlijke scenario bedraagt de jaarlijks te verwachten totale schade als 
gevolg van varkenspest in het zuiden van Nederland 492 miljoen gulden, variërend van nul tot 
9 miljard gulden. De jaarlijks te verwachten schade door leegstand/bedrijfsonderbreking in de 
primaire sector bedraagt 36 miljoen gulden, variërend van nul tot 792 miljoen gulden. 
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Gegeven dergelijke kwantitatieve inzichten en rekening houdend met het catastrofale 
karakter van het risico en de invloed van agrarische ondernemers en overheden op de omvang 
van het risico, wordt een bedrijfsonderbrekingsverzekering in principe haalbaar geacht. De 
haalbaarheid wordt vergroot als het risico over meer varkenshouders in Nederland gespreid 
wordt, als de overheid een deel van het risico op zich zou nemen, en als de verzekering wordt 
geïntroduceerd via een zogenaamde 'onderlinge'. 
Belangrijkste conclusies 
Met betrekking tot de resultaten van dit onderzoek kunnen de volgende conclusies worden 
getrokken: 
- Verzekeringen kunnen agrarische ondernemers mogelijkheden bieden voor het afdekken 
van 'nieuwe' risico's in de landbouw. 
- Het gebruik van 'risk-sharing strategies' is in principe gunstig voor zowel de individuele 
ondernemer als de gehele samenleving. Voorwaarden betreffen dat er efficiënt wordt 
omgegaan met eventuele problemen rond asymmetrische informatie en het catastrofale 
karakter van de risico's, en dat de kosten van risico's die volgen uit het gebruik van de 
'risk-sharing strategies' niet groter zijn dan de baten. 
- Prijs- en produktierisico's worden als belangrijke bronnen van risico ervaren. 
Produktierisico's met name door varkenshouders en veehouders met gemengde bedrijven. 
Prijs- (en andere financiële) risico's met name door melkveehouders. 
- Verzekeringen (zowel commerciële verzekeringen als 'eigen verzekeringen' met 
betrekking tot onder andere het produceren tegen zo laag mogelijke kosten en het 
toepassen van strikte hygiënemaatregelen) worden ervaren als een belangrijk 
risicomanagementinstrument. Varkens- en melkveehouders vinden verzekeringen wel 
belangrijker dan veehouders met gemengde bedrijven. 
- Een inkomensverzekering voor de Europese landbouw wordt haalbaar geacht in de vorm 
van een opbrengstverzekering voor gewassen te velde. Zo'n opbrengstverzekering dekt 
lage opbrengsten (prijs maal hoeveelheid) bij oogst. Verzekerde gevaren kunnen onder 
meer betrekking hebben op lage prijzen, droogte en overvloedige regenval. 
- De berekende financiële gevolgen van de 1997/98-varkenspestepidemie in Nederland 
bedragen 4.6 miljard gulden. Van deze schade is 494 miljoen gulden toe te schrijven aan 
leegstand in de primaire sector. Monte-Carlo simulatie laat zien dat in het meest 
waarschijnlijke scenario de jaarlijks te verwachten totale schade als gevolg van 
varkenspest in het zuiden van Nederland 492 miljoen gulden bedraagt, variërend van nul 
tot 9 miljard gulden. In dit scenario geldt voor de jaarlijks te verwachten schade door 
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leegstand in de primaire sector een bedrag van 36 miljoen gulden, variërend van nul tot 
792 miljoen gulden. 
- Er bestaan mogelijkheden voor een bedrijfsonderbrekingsverzekering voor varkenspest. In 
meer algemene zin wordt een bedrijfsonderbrekingsverzekering (hetgeen ook een vorm 
van inkomensverzekering is) haalbaar geacht voor risico's die lijden tot een periode van 
bedrijfsonderbreking. Voor veehouders kunnen dergelijke risico's betrekking hebben op 
uitbraken van besmettelijke dierziekten zoals klassieke varkenspest en mond- en 
klauwzeer, en op problemen rond voedselveiligheid (BSE, dioxine). In de glashtinbouw 
kan bedrijfsonderbreking het gevolg zijn van overstromingen. In de akkerbouw kan 
bedrijfsonderbreking optreden door epidemieën (zoals Bruinrot) die leiden tot een 
wijziging in het rotatieschema (teeltplanschade). 
- De 'nieuwe' risico's in de landbouw worden deels veroorzaakt door een veranderende rol 
van de overheid (minder interventie, meer regulering). Door het catastrofale karakter van 
de risico's zal de rol van de overheid naar alle waarschijnlijkheid verder veranderen en ook 
die van herverzekeraar in 'public-private partnerships' gaan inhouden. 
Met betrekking tot de toegepaste methoden kunnen de volgende conclusies worden getrokken: 
- Een consistent gebruik van 'partial budgeting' voor het kwantificeren van de financiële 
gevolgen van een uitbraak van een besmettelijke dierziekte maakt een gestructureerde 
berekening van schades mogelijk, zowel voor de primaire sector als voor toeleverende- en 
verwerkende sectoren. 
- Monte-Carlo simulatiemodellen vergroten het inzicht in de omvang van risico's en in 
variabelen die dit risico bepalen. 
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